

MODERN AGE

A CONSERVATIVE REVIEW

Volume 4

FALL 1960

Number 4



THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

OCT 26 1960

PERIODICAL
READING ROOM

John Chamberlain—
The End of the Old Education

CONSERVATISM AND FREEDOM:

Frank S. Meyer—

Freedom, Tradition, Conservatism

*M. Stanton Evans—*A Conservative Case for Freedom

*George Schwartz—*The Future of Britain

*James Burnham—*The Circular Travels of The Professors

Rudolf Allers—

Some Reflections on the Problem of Universal Style

*Folke Leander—*Irving Babbitt and the Aestheticians

J. V. Langmead Casserley—

Personality in Psychology and Metaphysics

*Eliseo Vivas—*In Defense of Non-Objective Art

William H. Chamberlin—

Human Liberty: Its Nature and Condition

*Melchior Palyi—*The Problem of Union Power

Dean Terrill—

Human Nature and the Human Condition

\$1.25 the copy

\$4.00 the year

MODERN AGE

A Conservative Review



EDITOR:

Eugene Davidson

PUBLISHER AND ASSOCIATE EDITOR:

David S. Collier

ASSOCIATE EDITORS:

Kenneth Colegrove

Eliseo Vivas

Richard M. Weaver

**THE INSTITUTE FOR
PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL STUDIES:**

Directors

David S. Collier

Ellerton A. Lodge

Louis H. T. Dehmlow

Henry Regnery

Paul T. Kessler, Jr.

Dean Terrill

Frank F. Kolbe

EDITORIAL ADVISORS:

Rudolf Allers

Felix Morley

Donald Davidson

Wilhelm Röpke

Ludwig Freund

Harry Rudin

Lynn Harold Hough

Leo R. Ward

James J. Kilpatrick

Frederick Wilhelmsen

William M. McGovern

Francis Graham Wilson

Frank S. Meyer

Published under auspices of the INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL STUDIES, INC.

Volume 4, Number 4, Fall 1960, published quarterly under the auspices of the Institute for Philosophical and Historical Studies, Inc., 64 E. Jackson Blvd., Chicago 4, Ill., U.S.A. Second Class Postage paid at Chicago, Ill. and other mailing offices. Subscriptions: 1 yr.—\$4.00, 2 yrs.—\$7.00, 3 yrs.—\$10.00; add 50 cents per year for Canadian and foreign postage; individual copies—\$1.25. Address all correspondence to the above address. Articles in this periodical do not necessarily represent either the views of the Institute, or of the editors. The editors are responsible for selection and acceptance of articles; responsibility for opinions expressed and accuracy of facts in articles published rest solely with individual authors. The editors are not responsible for unsolicited manuscripts; unaccepted manuscripts will be returned if accompanied by a stamped return envelope. MODERN AGE is indexed by the Public Affairs Information Service. Printed by Wayside Press, Mendota, Ill., U.S.A.

Copyright ©1960 by the Institute for Philosophical and Historical Studies, Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction of less than 200 words may be made without specific permission of the publisher, provided MODERN AGE is duly credited and two copies of the publication in which such material appears are forwarded to MODERN AGE.

C.
al
hi-
nts
ve
the
ex-
not
a
by

Re-
ded
are

CONTENTS

Fall 1960
Volume 4, Number 4

Introducing Eugene Davidson	338	
A Look at East Germany	340	
The End of the Old Education	343	JOHN CHAMBERLAIN
<i>Conservatism and Freedom—</i>		
Freedom, Tradition, Conservatism	355	FRANK S. MEYER
A Conservative Case for Freedom	364	M. STANTON EVANS
The Future of Britain	371	GEORGE SCHWARTZ
The Circular Travels of the Professors	380	JAMES BURNHAM
Some Reflections on the Problem of Universal Style	387	RUDOLF ALLERS
Irving Babbitt and the Aestheticians	395	FOLKE LEANDER
Personality in Psychology and Metaphysics	405	J. V. LANGMEAD CASSERLEY
<i>A Rejoinder—</i>		
In Defense of Non-Objective Art	412	ELISEO VIVAS
<i>Reviews—</i>		
Human Liberty: Its Nature and Condition	416	WILLIAM H. CHAMBERLIN
The Problem of Union Power	420	MELCHIOR PALYI
A Modern Marcus Aurelius	424	WARNER G. RICE
Miss O'Connor and the Scandal of Redemption	428	ROBERT Y. DRAKE, JR.
Politics and Behavioral Analysis	431	THOMAS MOLNAR
The Pattern Within the Blank Page	434	DEAN TERRILL
The Burke Newsletter, No. 6	438	
Notes on Contributors	443	
Index to Volume 4	444	

Introducing Eugene Davidson

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS of the Institute for Philosophical and Historical Studies has a very pleasant task: it finds itself able to announce that effective with the issue you now have in hand Eugene Davidson has become the editor of MODERN AGE: A CONSERVATIVE REVIEW.

The directors of the Institute are exceedingly happy about this event and are certain that the readers of MODERN AGE will join with them in this expression, for Mr. Davidson brings to his task as editor a wealth of editorial experience as well as a serious dedication to the mission which lies imposingly before us.

Mr. Davidson was editor-in-chief of the Yale University Press for some thirty years and during this period achieved recogni-

tion as one of America's outstanding editors and writers. Under his editorship at Yale, first published in this country were the works of Ludwig von Mises, David J. Dallin and Karl Wittfogel. Among the books by these and other authors which came out under Mr. Davidson's editorship are ten works of David J. Dallin written after his coming to this country in 1941, including *Soviet Russia and the Far East*, *Forced Labor in the Soviet Union*, and *Soviet Espionage*; Charles Beard's *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War*, Karl Jasper's *Reason and Anti-Reason in Our Time*, James Conant's *On Understanding Science*, Ludwig von Mises' *Human Action*, and Karl Wittfogel's *Oriental Despotism*.

Mr. Davidson has been a frequent contributor to *Yale Review*, *The Freeman*, and other serious journals, and recently completed a book entitled *The Death and Life of Germany*, published by Alfred A. Knopf and widely acclaimed as a significant contribution to the study of post-war Germany and German-American relations. The directors are especially pleased to announce that Mr. Davidson has come to Chicago in order to execute his new task. This follows closely upon the completion of a year and a half's intensive research, writing and lecturing in the West German Federal Republic, during which time he has been developing an important new work concerning the Nuremberg trials.

The following editorial by Mr. Davidson is an indication of the background against which he presents himself to the problems of editing a serious review such as ours. Indeed it is clear that he shall lend to our publication capable and experienced hands, permitting us to make great strides forward. Herewith we welcome him "aboard."

And at this point the directors wish to convey an expression of deep appreciation and thanks to Charles E. Lee, who was the very able managing editor of our publication for three issues. Mr. Lee has left for the East for an important new assignment within the broad mission of our cause; we wish him every success.

—D.S.C.

A Look at East Germany

WHILE I was reading through the proofs of this issue of MODERN AGE, which I could admire objectively, having had nothing to do with the selection of the articles, it occurred to me, after thinking about Mr. Burnham's account of the professors' journeys into their own night, that there might be room for another first-hand report on a section behind the Iron Curtain. For comparison perhaps.

Some months ago, as I drove through the East Zone of Germany with my wife and daughter, we had to turn off the Autobahn because a stretch of it was under repair, otherwise you are forbidden to leave it, and armed guards patrol it to see that you don't. The detour took us through silent villages, with none of the bustle and traffic of West Germany: the houses were dingy, the people drab. As we neared the border, after a sharp bend in the road, three burly figures in the uniform of the People's Police barred the way with an upraised "*Halt!*" sign. Our passports and papers were checked item by item, along with the license plates and motor numbers; one policeman demanded to know why my driver's license, issued in West Germany, was unsigned; he had looked in the wrong place, but that seemed to him manifestly

my fault, not his. The conversation was conducted unsmilingly, in frigid, you-are-the-enemy-traveling-under-a-flag-of-truce negotiations. When we were allowed to drive on, one of the men said "*Gute Reise*," the formula that sends all travelers in Germany, East or West, on their way, but this was a command, not a wish. A few miles ahead we again had our papers "controlled" at the East German border station—this was the regular stop; the other was unexpected and if we had been driving a little too fast around the curve could have been unpleasant as well, since these men were part of the apparatus that continually demonstrates Communist *Herrschaft* and the slender and precarious nature of the lines of communication with the West.

At the border stations, while you are waiting for permission to enter or leave the Zone, you may read give-away newspapers and pamphlets telling of the progress of the People's Democratic Republic and how it works for peace in concert with the other "People's Democracies" in Europe and Asia. One of these pamphlets quoted a passage from a book I had written in which I said that a single hydrogen bomb had more power than all the bombs and shells exploded during World War II.

But in order to make their point on behalf of the peace offensive as scientific as possible, the authors quoted from a book written by "Professor Davidson, the nuclear physicist"; the "truth" the State needs, the State creates.

In restaurants in East Berlin, people rarely speak to one another, although they sit five and more to a table, nor do they readily answer questions in the streets, even an inquiry of the most harmless nature, such as the way to a nearby museum. The place you are looking for may be only a block or two distant, but I have had to ask as many as three passersby before one of them would admit to knowing where a well-known public building was to be found. The stranger is strange in the old sense: *fremd*, foreign, unknown, dangerous.

The theaters and opera in East Berlin are crowded; between acts, the East Germans can drink Crimean champagne at two marks a glass, and, together with the visiting foreigners from the West and the countries of the Communist orbit, they are likely to see a skillful production. In the night clubs, music is rationed: only one Western piece may be played for three from the East. The Russians in these places keep to themselves—aloof, self-certain, in the good seats of the conquerors.

Anything that has to do with *Kultur*—theaters, book and music stores, museums—is well patronized. The Pergamon Museum in East Berlin has been fully restored; the great altar of the Greek temple, the length of a city block, is in place, and the shards of the mosaics fragmented by bombs have been so cunningly put together that it is hard to believe they were so shattered. Here the experts could work without ideological trimmings.

Thousands of people come to East Berlin from the East Zone, not to buy authorized books or for entertainment, but because it

is the way to the West. They live under the same uncertainties, the same anxieties, as in the days of Hitler. A taxi driver—they are likely to answer questions freely because they are quick to judge visitors and can't be overheard in their cabs—told me he couldn't talk openly to his own children, both of whom belong to the Communist youth organization and are diligently studying Russian, the compulsory second language in East German high schools; what he said might be repeated to a youth leader in the same way that parents of "good" Nazi children were sometimes reported to the leader of the *Hitler Jugend* in the other time of totalitarianism. People like the cab driver often don't remain in the East; one day the worker or farmer or doctor finds the strain too much and he leaves. Some who do remain stay out of patriotism, out of their belief, paradoxically, in the West. They say the population can't all emigrate, and, much as the regime revolts them, they feel an obligation to family, friends, colleagues, patients, clients, or to their homeland, and they grimly hang on. One man I know, let us say that he is an architect, although he is not, needed to get a leave of absence from his job to undergo a surgical operation, which would, incidentally, be done for him without costs other than the hidden ones. When the letter of permission came, it said that he was granted the leave because of his Socialist zeal, although he, like his co-workers, stays as far from the Party as he can without moving to the West. What these anti-Communists have learned is how to keep out of trouble; they can talk among themselves without restraint because they know the Party members and the agents of the Secret Police who are in their midst.

But the East Germans do flee by the thousands. With the latest land reform, so many farmers have left that travel to East

Berlin has been placed under severe restrictions; the trains are combed by police for travelers who may be going further west than Berlin. The posters in East Berlin tell of the victories the "Socialist State" has won, of the rise in production of power, of coal, of industry, but the ordinary man sees little of its goods. The German miracle, said an English writer a few months ago, may be in East, rather than in West Germany. The East Zone has had no subsidies from the United States or Russia; what has been built or rebuilt has come, in effect, out of a capital levy on its own inhabitants. The East German smokes, if he can afford them, cigarettes from Chinese Turkestan; he may eat meat which has been imported from the Orient, too, often with unmistakable signs that it has not had enough refrigeration. This summer, butter was again rationed; in a country that was the breadbasket of pre-war Germany food was so scarce that the *Bundesrepublik* offered to send in supplies. Posters show too that prices are down; when a change occurs in a menu price, the new one is invariably lower than the old. As in the time of Hitler, the inflation is controlled. And the consumer spigot can be turned on when it seems politically desirable; since the uprising of June, 1953, more consumer goods have been made available, but 1953 was a subsistence year. There is no communal life comparable to that of West Germany; people live by and to themselves in the East Zone, with the exception, of course, of the Party members, who have endless opportunities to meet with and approve of one another. And a

fairly brisk tourist trade goes on between East Germany and the Soviet Union; the pilgrimage to Moscow is made by devout Party members to be confirmed, like Mr. Burnham's professors, in what they have believed for years.

There are a little over seventeen million inhabitants in the East Zone; twelve years ago there were nineteen million. Under the surface, as interviews with those who have fled from the East show and as visitors from there report, is the same unrelenting hatred of the regime and its terror that burst into flame in 1953. East Germany is a colony of the Soviet Union; its industry, exports, and imports are dictated not by German but by Soviet needs and the people know it. Communism has brought them a sparse living and no more, with the exception of the engineers, the technicians needed for planning, and the doctors, now that so many have gone to the West. Such favored ones, including university professors, can retire on pensions larger than those they would receive in the West—if they are not earlier retired to more remote places. I recently heard of one case in which a man merely used the word "satellite," not for a sputnik, but for a Soviet dependency, and this was enough (perhaps it was the last word needed) to send him to prison for three years as proof that he was spreading Western propaganda. Whatever stage of Communist evolution East Germany may represent to Mr. Burnham's academic travelers, to the millions who are living there it remains at the old concentration-camp level. —E.D.

MODERN AGE

A Conservative Review



The End of the Old Education

JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

*A report of the first battle at nineteenth-century
Yale between "classicism" and the social sciences.*

WHEN HARVARD UNIVERSITY went over to the Charles Eliot system of completely free electives in the decades after the Civil War, it was a portent of the end of the old compulsory classical education in all our colleges. As Robert Hutchins was to suggest at a later date, Eliot proved all too successful in "robbing American youth of its cultural heritage." Even Eliot's well-wishers were frightened by the thoroughness of his action. Nevertheless, to an age that was suddenly confronted with the need to prepare its young men for positions of responsibility in the strange new world of the railroad and the steel mill, the constricting effects of

four years of concentration on Latin, Greek, mathematics and "natural philosophy" seemed to demand some change.

Accordingly, among those educators who felt that Eliot "had something" but had gone "too far," a compromise theory of the curriculum took shape. The leaders in the compromise movement were Andrew D. White of Cornell and William Graham Sumner of Yale. White, though advocating free choice among areas of specialization, insisted that separate "schools" of science, modern languages, history and the classics be planned by their several faculties in order to guarantee the student a well-rounded

command of his chosen field. And Sumner, who was willing to concede the desirability of a standard freshman-sophomore curriculum which would include the classics, felt that the upper class years should be freed, not for random choice, but for intensive work in the "newer" subjects including his own specialties of modern history, economics and sociology.

The laudable attribute of the White-Sumner type of compromise was that it proposed no sacrifice of the idea of "coherence" in education. It did not invite picking and choosing among "guts," cafeteria style. But in pushing for "equality of the subjects," both White and Sumner set in train a movement that was ultimately to prove even more insidious than the planless fragmentation which Eliot's ideas encouraged. It was all very well for White to insist that physics and chemistry should be considered on a par with Latin and Greek, and that English and the modern languages should be made fully as respectable as philosophy. These were all disciplines of a "generalist" nature. But the day would come when the doctrine of "equality of the subjects" would elevate such things as hotel keeping and home economics to an equivalence with Greek and calculus. The day of the B.A. for bee keeping was implicit in the White-Sumner theory.

Since Andrew D. White dominated the scene at his university, there was no particular attempt to save the day for the old order at Cornell. But at Yale, when Sumner was beginning his campaign for modern upper class "schools," the old order had a lusty champion in President Noah Porter.

For at least three generations Porter has been dismissed by "moderns" and "progressives" as a fuddy-duddy who refused to see that colleges should be something more than trade schools for Congregational parish ministries. The academic histories deal with him as an obstruction which had to be

blasted out of the way. But if one actually takes the trouble to read Porter's ideas on education, one is surprised by the breadth and freshness of his defense of basic "generalist" subjects. He had his cogent reasons for wishing to retain some compulsion in the ancient fields of Latin, Greek, mathematics and metaphysics. But he also had a modern view of the possibilities in other fields, psychology in particular.

The truth of the matter is that Porter and Sumner each had right on their seemingly opposed sides. Porter was correct in fearing that a sudden sanctification of the newer social sciences as "generalist" subjects would lead to a waste of many a good man's time on diffuse conjecture. But Sumner, for his part, was equally correct in his feeling that Latin and Greek, *as they had come to be taught in the post-Civil War college*, did not accomplish the results which Porter claimed for them.

As President of Yale in the Seventies and early Eighties, Porter liked to hark back to his own time as a student and teacher. He remembered a day when the subjects of the old curriculum had been imparted with passion and conviction. But what went on under his nose as an administrator was not always apparent to him. A man who acted as if he believed there was good in everybody, he was, as George Wilson Pierson has said in his *Yale College: An Educational History, 1871-1921*, "in many ways a sympathetic and winning product of old Yale." But Yale, in the Seventies and Eighties, though it retained the shell of the pre-Civil War times, had lost its old sense of mission.

Porter, in effect, was a leader whose army had vanished from behind him. Even without an army he believed in keeping his face to the sound of the guns. Considerably more than Yale had gone into the nurture of this gentle and affectionate man, and no

more than the next man could he shuck off his training. He had grown up in the bucolic world of the early century, passing his boyhood in Farmington, Connecticut, a town that still answers to Malcolm Cowley's description of it as "New England under a bell-jar." His grandfather, the first Noah Porter, had fought at Ticonderoga (the family's furthest venture from home) and had returned to Farmington to meditate upon the Bible as he followed his plough. The second Noah Porter had studied theology at Yale and had taken the Farmington church pastorate in preference to becoming a college tutor. The third Noah was drilled in the old classical Latin culture at Farmington Academy. But, like all boys in an age that lived close to the soil, he was at home in the blacksmith and carpenter shops of his neighborhood, and he learned the cause and effect rhythms of nature in the garden and by taking care of the family cows.

As the son of a Congregationalist minister Noah Porter was destined for Yale and, subsequently, the divinity school—in other words, for Latin, Greek, mathematics and metaphysical speculation. His class of 1828, however, was hardly an ingrown or sheltered class: it drew students from Virginia and the Carolinas, from Alabama and Louisiana, as well as from Yankeeland. To the cosmopolitanism fostered by a mingling of accents and attitudes there was added the ferment of the Romantic Movement. Greece was struggling to be free, the Bourbons in France were about to be toppled for a second time, England was on the verge of accepting the Reform Bill. Byron was a favorite undergraduate poet; Wordsworth was growing in reputation; the sciences were gaining favor, with the older Benjamin Silliman attracting many students to the new studies of geology and chemistry. And, in a college community not yet given to formal athletics, it was an al-

most universal relaxation to study "natural science" in long walks into the country.

Far from being a victim of pedantry, of the "textbook and recitation" squirrel cage, Noah Porter had plenty of time for Coleridge, not only Coleridge the poet but Coleridge the stimulating conservative thinker. It was Coleridge, a farsighted man who saw through the illusions of the French (as distinct from the American) Revolution, who made the most "modern" impression on Noah Porter's mind. As a divinity student, Porter was a "liberal" in terms of his day, i.e., he took his stand on the anti-Calvinist view that man, while he suffered in consequence of Adam's sin, did not automatically share the guilt of it. But disputations over Original Sin rather bored Porter—what really interested him was psychology, particularly as it related to the nature of the deliberative mind. He was not interested in taking New England back to the debates of Jonathan Edwards.

When he went to New Milford, Connecticut, after his marriage, to become the local pastor, Porter addressed himself faithfully to the duties of overseeing the spiritual life of a community that still lived in almost frontier simplicity. His own memoir of his pastorate is filled with a strong worldly sense of "sinewy, horse-taming young men and healthy matrons." He speaks of individuals with almost a novelist's appreciation of their salient characteristics (of the "Caylords, self-reliant, courteous and strong," of the "brothers Hine, abundant in enterprise and intelligence"), and his eye for the old rural life of New England before the drain of population to the West and the cities had begun—the life which was "fairest just before it began to wither"—was keen. Later, as pastor of a church in Springfield, Massachusetts, when the old river town was springing to life again with the coming of the railroad, Porter encountered entirely new problems.

Noah Porter, then, had had his experience of men and the world before he became a professor and, later, the President of Yale. If, after the Civil War, he criticized the new philosophies which developed in the wake of Darwin's 1859 *Origin of Species*, he at least criticized them after reading them. He disliked struggles involving personalities, but he loved the cut-and-thrust of philosophical controversy. His own book on psychology—*The Human Intellect*—has an antiquarian flavor today simply because the names with which it takes issue are of interest primarily to literary and scientific archaeologists. But Porter had the true scientific spirit. Holding with the Baconians on induction, he believed that psychology was an inductive science. As such, it must precede any metaphysical speculation about the meaning and destiny of man.

Contrary to other fact-grubbing psychologists, however, his own induction led him to take a position against the passive school of Mill and Locke which taught that the human mind was a *tabula rasa* on which impressions were scribbled in a heterogeneous manner before anything could be made of them. He argued from common-sense premises that without the control of the rational will nothing whatsoever could be made of impressions on any clean slate. Even as the impressions were recorded, so it seemed to Porter, the rational will was already at work. A *gestaltist* ahead of his time, Porter argued that "in knowing we are not so much recipients as actors." As actors, we perceive things in combination—as "wholes"—before we begin to pull them apart. In other words, knowledge "begins in a judgment." It is the judgment that permits analysis to begin its reduction of complexity to simpler elements.

Since no one has ever seen a "mind" or a "soul"—or, for that matter, a Freudian "psyche" or "id" or "superego"—the argu-

ment between the *tabula rasa* school of the two Mills and the rational-faculty school of Porter will probably never be definitively settled. There are things that don't yield to the dissection of the brain anatomist or the student of conditioned reflexes. But any painter can tell any psychologist that the eye itself is a physiological "whole" that is built to focus immediately on an object in its formal space relationships, and any dance choreographer knows that movement in time is experienced as a "whole" before the spectator can split it up into the entrechats and arabesques of different performers. It must seem obvious to common sense that many kinds of knowledge begin with the "sizing up" of situations at a glance. The hand grasps an object in its contours before detecting subtler aspects, the ear accepts sound as melody before it recognizes sharps and flats.

There is much more to Porter's common-sensical psychology than this—but there is enough here to make it plain that he thought of human beings as volitional and design-perceiving animals of a high order. Freud would have seemed to him a student of sick people who had let sexual associationalism proceed to the point of disintegration of the personality; and as for the behaviorists, they would have seemed false describers of behavior. Like Alfred North Whitehead at a far later date, Porter asserted that induction itself is impossible without an intuitive feeling that order and design are the basis of the universe. Cause and effect need design in which to form a chain. If the ultimate end did not inhere in the first cause, then like conditions would produce entirely random results. "Law" would be impossible to discover if, lacking an inbuilt pattern of fulfillment, an apple seed might produce a sunflower one day and a pine tree the next. But "laws" are constantly discovered—and design is thereby indicated. Porter, no fatalist, felt

that there is nothing automatic about the fulfillment of design—a forward impulse, amounting to volition in man, is needed to accomplish results. The mystery of free will within predestined patterns was accepted as a mystery by Porter, who was humble enough to leave some things to God.

It was as a mind that Porter tackled the subject of the Yale curriculum when he became the eleventh president of his alma mater in 1871. He had thought it all out as Clark Professor of Moral Philosophy and Metaphysics in a book, *The American College and the American Public*, which was first published in 1869 and added to in subsequent editions. Porter's argument against State domination of education—that the teachings of a State university would inevitably be called into question on every point where they touched upon current shibboleths of science, or religion, or finance, or health, or education itself—remains as cogent today as it was eighty-odd years ago. For Yale, a private institution, Porter held to ideas and ideals that were already crumbling when he assumed the presidency. Along with McCosh of Princeton, Porter was doomed to fight a long rearguard action against the free elective system already in bloom at Harvard, and against the system of early specializing that had been tentatively pioneered at the University of Michigan before it had been picked up by Andrew White and Sumner.

Above all, Porter wanted to keep Yale primarily a college. Science, in its ramifications, could be left to the Sheffield Scientific School; graduate work might be welcomed after the full four-year instruction had been completed. But the college itself must be inviolate. To Porter's mind, the cafeteria-style system championed by Harvard's Eliot gave Harvard students university privileges of choice long before they were sufficiently mature to handle them.

The object of college, said Porter, was not to treat the student as a man, but to "make him a man." As for pushing elective specialization—the ancient mark of the university—too far down into the college years, this might be done with impunity at European centers of learning. Secondary education in Europe was far more thoroughgoing in its disciplines than happened to be the case in American high schools and academies, and the European student consequently entered the university with a one- or two-year jump on his American brother.

Optional courses for juniors and seniors did begin early in Porter's regime, but they were rigidly limited to a very few hours. Porter defended the old required curriculum on the ground that it was specially designed to make up for the irregular and spotty high school performance of the average boy who matriculated as a freshman. As he saw it, it took up the slack in short order, and after four years of it even the most delinquent student might be assumed to have developed the power to generalize. But it was the "whole man," not the generalizing intellectual, that was Porter's chief concern. He inherited a Christian college that had been condemned as "sectarian." But far from being a narrow theologian, Porter had a concept of Christianity as "Hebraism Hellenized," and he taught his students in accordance with his feeling that it was a Christian's duty to "mediate between Judaism and Hellenism."

He liked a compact Yale where everyone could test his character in direct competition with all of his fellows, a far from ascetic ideal. He gloried in the "capstone courses" of mental and moral philosophy presented in senior year by himself, and he wanted everybody to take them. The combination of discipline, exact knowledge, the power to generalize and the inculcation

of good morality was calculated to prepare a "man for the most efficient and successful discharge of public duty." Formed on Latin and Greek republican models and Porter's own work on *The Human Intellect*, the Yale graduate would know himself "in his constitution, his duties and his powers." He would know "society in its history and institutions, its literature and art," all of which came out of Graeco-Roman-Christian antiquity. And, by the addition of mathematics and the upper class courses in "natural philosophy," he would know nature in its "development and scientific relations." Thus equipped as a "gentleman," the Yale student might go forth into the world to take up any public position, as "legislator or magistrate, diplomat or soldier." Or, if graduate study loomed, he was ready to plunge into professional training for the Church, medicine or the law.

Specifying more exactly, Porter praised the classic languages as conducive to increasing one's power of subtle analysis; mathematics because it strengthened the continuity and rigor of attention; physics (the main concern of "natural philosophy") because it provided power over nature and enabled man to "predict her phenomena and enforce her laws"; ethics because it led to correct direction of the springs of action; the "science of religion" because it justified "our faith to the instructed reason"; and political science because it taught us to know the State as to the ground—and limits—of its authority. As for the small amount of more or less modern history that was permitted to invade the curriculum, it was supposed to teach the development of man and "the moral purpose of God."

If, in all this, there seemed little room for cultivating the imagination or for refining the esthetic impulses, or for the free play of simple curiosity, Porter did allow

for the development of pleasing and forceful exposition. He left plenty of scope for logic, rhetoric and literature in order that the powers that had been "enriched" by the classical-mathematical regimen might "express themselves aptly and skilfully."

What was wrong with all this? Nothing at all, provided it was taught with the comprehension that Porter had brought to it in his own lifetime as a student. The fact that such subjects as political science and English and American constitutional law were all crammed into two-thirds of the senior year would not have been an insuperable drawback if the years of Greek and Latin had incidentally schooled the student in Aristotle's and Cicero's politics, which are more or less repeated in John Locke's essays on civil government and in the thinking of James Madison and the rest of the Founding Fathers. In a sense, the ancients had boxed the compass in most things of a basic nature. Even John Stuart Mill, described by Porter as "that steady-going wheel-horse among the reformers," had had good words to say about the all-purpose utility of the old classical training.

Properly taught, the classics as praised and defended by Porter had done considerably more for whole generations of students than provide them with intellectual chess games to sharpen their wits and to develop their retentive powers. Indeed, the "disciplinary" arguments in favor of the classics are hardly conclusive if taken alone—discipline, after all, can be had from carrying out the quarterback assignments of an ingenious and tyrannical football coach, or from mastering old Slavonic or modern Dano-Norwegian, or from pretending that the social sciences can be reduced to algebraic formulae. But when, in addition to their disciplinary value, many other values emerge from the classics without doubling or trebling the demands upon a

student's time, then the case for teaching the ancient cultures becomes irrefutable. As Porter said, "it brings the mind into familiar acquaintance with the literature, the history and the life of the two most important nations of the world." The argument has been well put by Albert Jay Nock, who insisted that no perceptive student of old Rome — or old Athens — could ever be beguiled into thinking that the State can become an adequate stand-in for the *paterfamilias* in taking responsibility for the conduct of life. Rome under the edicts of Diocletian is certainly no argument for the good intentions of an economic dictatorship, a socialist party or a charismatic Franklin Roosevelt. And Athens, in the years after Pericles had drained it of individual will, is an eternal warning that great men with a "do it all" complex are paid for in the subsequent coin of weak citizenship.

As a fledgling professor in Porter's college the young William Graham Sumner might originally have agreed with official views about the values of the old curriculum. Indeed, it was only by chance that Sumner returned to Yale in 1872 as a teacher of political science instead of the classics. When the faculty seemed evenly divided on Sumner's name and that of Professor John Lewis Diman of Brown for the newly created chair of political science, Porter himself wrote to Sumner that "some . . . think it practicable to secure another post in Greek for you." It was not until the supporters of Diman desisted, for reasons that are unknown, that Sumner got the political science post instead of a professorship of Greek.

Bidding farewell to the ministry, Sumner spoke of the "true revelation of spiritual and universal truths" in the Bible, whose text comprised a "record of doctrines won by men of the purest spiritual insight . . . and ratified again and again

in the experience of families and individuals." Porter couldn't have asked for a more pious certification. In the years to come Sumner never retracted these words, nor did he ever resign from the Episcopal church in which he had grown up. But if Sumner never recanted, he did lose interest in his religious past. A believer in "keeping school," he sprang at once to the task of making his new subject one of the more solid and rewarding parts of the curriculum. Prior to Porter's presidency, political science had been handled in an offhand manner by President Woolsey, who took it on in addition to his many other duties. Sumner proposed to make a lot more of it than had ever been made before. Under its elastic heading he managed to combine the subjects of history (mainly American), economics, political science proper and sociology—or, as he later preferred to call it, "societology." Before he was through whole departments had blossomed from his single chair of the early Seventies.

If he had been provided with plenty of upper class elbow room for his own new specialties Sumner would probably have been willing to follow a course of "live and let live" insofar as compulsory freshman and sophomore classical routines were concerned. But when the elbow room was not forthcoming Sumner made forays on his own. He and Porter were fated to clash. The new professor of political science had studied theology, philosophy and church history, and he could have taught Hebrew, Latin, Greek or even mathematics fully as competently as anyone on the faculty. But his whole background predisposed him to secular and contemporary interests. As a minister in Morristown, New Jersey, he had come to think of sin as having a very ascertainable locus in the behavior of economic and social men. He wanted to have his say on the dishonesty inherent in cur-

rency inflation, or on the thievery that he deemed inseparable from the tariff. ("There was a good deal of political economy in that sermon," said a banker to Sumner one day when he came down from his pulpit.) The classical curriculum of the mid-century college had obviously not taught Americans that the laws governing economic transactions do not admit of the same loose exceptions that can be found to most rules of syntax or grammar. To those who took a whimsical view of law in economic and sociological matters, Sumner would have responded that inflation, for example, cheats people of their savings without any "ifs" or "buts," that bad money invariably drives out good and that foreign trade is always maximized if nations follow the law of comparative advantage.

Sumner tangled with Porter not on theory but on the fact that classical students were frequently illiterates in practical matters. He carried his fight to the public in a muscular article, "Our Colleges Before the Country," which was printed in the *Princeton Review* for March, 1884. Where Porter had lamented the lack of good college preparatory work in the high schools and academies, Sumner snorted that the lower schools were doing their duty far better than the colleges, which had succumbed to "mandarinism" in education and were encouraging the view that whatever was useful was vulgar. The whole topic of education, so Sumner insisted, was swathed in "cant and humbug"; students, subjected to four years of a supposedly liberalizing curriculum, ended by becoming a "caste" that was no better prepared for American life than the non-college man. As a result, college education was held in popular contempt in many quarters. The whole rigmarole reminded Sumner of a day when the only learning judged fit for a "gentleman" was heraldry,

and the only polite accomplishments were "arms, music and gallantry."

Sumner's sardonic words about conspicuous waste in college education undoubtedly had their effect on the young Thorstein Veblen, who studied briefly at Yale before going on to develop similar views of traditional education in his theory of the "leisure class." As for Sumner's own comparison of the classically trained young college flaneur and the Siamese belle who let her fingernails grow inches long so she would never be able to dress herself, it had the Veblenian touch.

Sumner's irony had its parallel in a popular verse of the day about the lad whose father had kept him from becoming a plumber:

. . . . nine dollars a day I'd be getting,
For half a day's work, it is said.
But alas, in his blindness,
He thought it a kindness
To send me to college instead.

The officers of the American college, the "mandarins," were, in Sumner's opinion, "unfit for college management." They were exposed to the "vices of dogmatism, pedantry, hatred of contradiction, conceit and love of authority." Each came to "love his own pursuit beyond anything else on earth." Each thought the "man who is ignorant of *his* specialty is a barbarian." "Rarely forced into a fight or into a problem of diplomacy," the teacher who ran the nineteenth century college had "little contact with active life." "Such men," said Sumner, were dupes of "a priori reasoning," helpless in the face of any "practical undertaking."

Relenting a bit for a moment, Sumner admitted that the classics, even as taught by "mandarins," might offer good training for literary men and some kinds of journalists; probably they needed not less Latin but more. As for Greek, it made for "delicate power of turns in the phrase,"

and "subtle shading in synonym and adjective"; and knowledge of the life and polity of the Greek State (if any rubbed off on the student of Greek) would always be of value to the political economist.

For most students, however, Sumner thought the classical curriculum was "rubbish of the schools." In place of this "rubbish," he offered such things as biology, physics, constitutional history, anthropology, economics, sociology and archaeology—subjects which depend on a study of causes, consequences and relationships in the real world. Sumner sniffed at "big doses of 'moral science,'" inferentially accusing Noah Porter of "wearing armor." He argued that science taught its own morality when it disciplined the student to weigh evidences and to seek for truth in fact, word, character and motive. At the end of his long indictment of the nineteenth century college, Sumner said "no one proposes to do away with the classics." But he had certainly done his best to put them in a very low place.

For all the deadly talk about "rubbish," however, it should be quite obvious to us that Sumner's animus against the classical curriculum derived not from the contents of Greek and Roman literature as such but from the way the ancient literatures had come to be taught. Comparing the college generations, Sumner noted that older college graduates seemed to know more about classical life and history than the newer classical students. When Sumner remarked that "classical studies, having sunk to a perfunctory character, now stand in the way of faithful study of anything," he implied that they had once been far more vigorous. The decline, presumably, had already set in when Sumner was himself an undergraduate, for he spoke of the trouble he had had "to emancipate my mind from the limited range of processes in which it had been trained." When "history was still

only a record of curious and entertaining incidents in war and diplomacy . . . when no notion of law had yet found footing in the conception of society," the classics had served as educational pabulum *faute de mieux*. But read with a "pony," they developed a superficial scholarship that trained students in "tricks of speech and memory." The student who had spent years in sweating out grammar "hardly ever knows what a 'law' is in the scientific sense of the word." Such students envisaged "law" as "like a rule in grammar, and they are quite prepared to find it followed by a list of exceptions." There was no precision or force or muscularity to the classical student's thinking—"things do not fall into order . . . in their minds."

Sumner's *Princeton Review* article was written at the climax of a bitter faculty struggle to put a memorial to the Yale Corporation on the need for revision of junior- and senior-year education, and it had its revolutionary impact. Despite Porter's noble defense of the classical curriculum, it was quite obvious that the contemporary reality of Greek and Latin teaching made little contact with Porter's idealized memory of the brave teachers of old. The old curriculum—Yale's adaptations of the *Trivium* of Latin grammar, rhetoric, and logic and the *Quadrivium* of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music, followed by upper class physics, ethics and political economy—still boasted a few good teachers. No doubt Professor Thomas Anthony Thacher, the "great-hearted Tommy," brought everything to Latin that Porter had claimed for the subject. Thacher was a disciplinarian, but by all accounts he not only helped his students to increase their "power of subtle analysis" but to know also that civilization had deep roots and that the world was a wide and ancient place. Unfortunately, a great gulf obviously yawned between the likes of

Thacher and the tutors who were hired to support him.

The ideal that had been outlined in Porter's book was one thing; the pettifogging nature of Latin as imparted by a tutor of the Seventies and the Eighties was quite another. Sarcasm was used pedagogically not to prick the mind but to alienate the tender student and to push the ingenious to complete reliance on "trot" and "pony." The hazing of tutors was a common thing—in one class the students even set fire to the instructor's notes when he turned to put something on the blackboard. Far from bringing the student into prolonged and discriminating contact with the virtues and foibles of men, the classics, as taught in the Seventies, had all the deadening effect that Sumner had revolted against. Though Porter had insisted that classical authors should be taught as "living and breathing men," not as "stiff and swathed mummies," there were few to carry out his bidding. He was against teachers who had never read Virgil and Homer for pleasure, but the Yale budget was such that he had willy nilly to accept them.

The testimony to bad teaching is almost universal in the memoirs of Sumner's day. Andrew D. White, the founder-president of Cornell, was apparently quite aware as a Yale undergraduate of the famous Yale Report of 1828, which had extolled the classics as "employing" every faculty of the mind, "not only the memory, judgment, and reasoning powers, but the taste and fancy. . . ." But White's own instructor in Greek had ignored the student who concentrated on giving a smooth and sensitive literary translation. It was the day of the so-called gerund-grinder; as White observed in his autobiography, the academic awards went to the person who could go through moods and tenses with his "tongue rattling like the clapper of a mill." The few bright students were held back by those

who "dreamed" or "ponied" or "smouged through" the courses.

To White, a member of the Yale Class of '53, the "traditional" college had become as "stagnant as a Spanish convent, and as self-satisfied as a Bourbon duchy." Far from "imbuing" the student's mind with "the principles of liberty," far from inspiring "the liveliest patriotism" or exciting "noble and generous action" (all phrases from the Yale Report), the curriculum functioned as a sterile introduction to the professions of the ministry and the law. The students of the old American college, on the evidence of White and others, went through four undergraduate years without reading a single play by Shakespeare or learning that there were modern literatures in French, German and English.

Even those who loved the classics found themselves chewing on husks. When William Lyon Phelps entered Yale in 1883, just prior to the great anti-Porter revolution, the college had, as we have noted, surrendered to a few "optionals" for juniors and seniors. But Greek, Latin and mathematics were still compulsory for Phelps in his freshman and sophomore years. Phelps, a young man from Hartford, Connecticut found it "wildly exciting" to be away from home—and he was not unwilling to sweat out declensions as part of the price to be had for an education. But a Phelps who was already in love with literature wanted more than technical proficiency from his Latin and Greek.

"Most of our classrooms were dull and the teaching purely mechanical," he complained years later in his *Autobiography With Letters*; "a curse hung over the faculty, a blight on the art of teaching. Many professors were merely hearers of prepared recitations; they never showed any living interest, either in the studies or in the students. I remember we had Homer

three hours a week during the entire year. The instructor never changed the monotonous routine, never made a remark, but simply called on individuals to recite or to scan, said "That will do," put down a mark; so that in the last recitation in June . . . I was surprised to hear him say . . . "The poems of Homer are the greatest that have ever proceeded from the mind of man, class is dismissed."

Phelps's instructor in Homer might, of course, have been an exception. But the evidence is that the exceptions ran the other way. Phelps did have a Greek professor, Horatio ("Limpy") Reynolds, who got him to read Grote's *History of Greece* outside the classroom. And he managed to get something out of the course in Sophocles with the reserved and fastidious Frank Tarbell, who was later dropped because of his independence. Phelps even had a freshman instructor who made Latin interesting—young Ambrose Tighe, the father of a future treasurer of Yale. According to Phelps, Tighe tried to combine the teaching of Latin grammar with a course in Roman history that was well spiced with revealing remarks about Latin authors. "He talked about Horace," says Phelps, "as though Horace was a man about town, and he himself looked and acted like a man of the world. . . . The older members of the faculty looked upon Mr. Tighe with suspicion. . . . They got rid of him." It was not until Phelps's own generation had come of teaching age that men like Tighe—or Phelps himself—were welcomed to the humanities departments of the Yale faculty.

With the teaching of the classics in such widespread decay, Sumner and his group were destined to win more of a victory than they had counted on. Yale continued to prescribe some subjects, but, as modification succeeded modification over the decades, random choice became the

rule after one had satisfied certain fairly limited "core" requirements. The "core curriculum," in turn, became softer and softer; eventually both Greek and Latin were made electives which competed even-up with French, Spanish and German for the favor of candidates for the A.B. degree. Eventually the pendulum came more or less to rest with the modern major-minor selections, with electives permitted only after a certain basic coherence had been satisfied.

In producing the final result Sumner may have played more of a part than he had originally intended. In his less contentious moods he admitted he had "profited fairly by a classical education." What was to give solid value to his essays and to his more formal works in sociology was his ability to draw on a vast reservoir of information about the ancient world. His ability to learn modern languages during his summer holidays surely profited much from his early immersion in Latin, Greek and Hebrew—and if he could so confidently plunge into the study of Russian in his old age it was because of a habit of linguistic discipline which he had learned as a young man under the compulsion of the ancient order. Sumner never quite realized how much he owed to what he decried.

He himself had taught Greek as a "living language" when he was a young tutor at Yale in the Sixties, and he had used Plato as an introduction to the whole world of ancient and modern philosophy in a course that was well remembered in later years by Professor Henry A. Beers. But he happened to be a genius at teaching among a lot of routine job-holders. In the period after the Civil War, when industry offered high prizes to young men, the candidates for Yale's tutorial posts were not known as a rule for their intelligence. Most of them were mere interim time-

servers. These time-servers, as Sumner observed, were actually responsible for half the teaching of the college.

The "Puritan theological crowd" around Sumner in the Sixties seemed quite complacent about the tutorial system. They disliked Sumner's Episcopal affiliations; they were suspicious of his smartly groomed appearance; they were afraid of his opinions about the value of the scientific spirit even in the Greek classroom. Moreover, his habit of mixing direct personal teaching with the recitation method was not in the tradition.

The curious thing about it is that when Sumner launched his attack on Porter, he confused poor methods of projecting the classics with the content of the old curriculum itself. If the teaching at Yale improved rapidly in the late Eighteen Eighties and after, it was not because the courses were changed. It was because the old methods of teaching were modified. Personalities were welcomed, both in the old classical subjects and in the newer scientific and social studies which Sumner and his group sponsored. The recitation system was mixed with lectures, reading and the personal approach; and Homer, in common with Tennyson and Browning, was no longer considered merely as a text for parsing.

In talking with his successor and disciple, A. G. Keller, Sumner contemptuously dismissed Noah Porter as a man who couldn't tell truth from falsehood. He bitterly resented Porter's attempt in 1879 to keep him from using Herbert Spencer's *The Study of Sociology* in the classroom. Porter had complained about the "cool and yet sarcastic effrontery" with which Spencer had assumed "that material elements and laws are the only forces and laws which any scientific man can recognize." But this was another fight, one which did not call into question the curriculum

as such. The truth is that in the battle over the curriculum of the Eighteen Seventies and Eighties, neither Sumner nor Porter was entirely on the side of truth. Porter thought the teaching of the classics was better than it was; Sumner thought that a change in the subject matter offered to the undergraduates would automatically result in a better education.

Yet Sumner himself had said, in 1871 in the *Nation*, that what Yale really needed was better teaching regardless of subjects. This demanded new money that would permit the elimination of the creaking tutorial system, not any specific change in the courses. He offered a prophetic solution: let the alumni fund be swelled annually by small contributions as well as by big donations from captains of industry. In presenting his "business plan," Sumner made it clear that he had no animus against the officers of the college, Porter included.

Because Sumner would not admit there was something to be said for Porter's defense of the old curriculum, the movement toward "equality of the studies" went too fast and too far; because Porter could not recognize that the recitation system had become lifeless, he was eventually bowled over by a committee dominated by Sumner. Sumner failed to get his "schools" within the college; half of the junior-year and practically all of the senior-year courses were made elective, which meant that Yale had gone some of the way toward the Eliot system. When it moved back toward Sumner's idea of "schools"—in the form of linked majors and minors—it was too late to retain Latin and Greek as compulsory preparation for the years of specialization. Depth was lost. And Sumner's own science of society, which had its beginnings in Aristotle, was thereby cut off from its fountainhead before it had a chance to grow.

CONSERVATISM AND FREEDOM

Freedom, Tradition, Conservatism

FRANK S. MEYER

A reasonable solution of the reordering of differences among conservatives.

THE LAST HALF-DOZEN years have seen a development of conservative thought in the United States unparalleled in a century. It is ironic, although not historically unprecedented, that such a burst of creative energy on the intellectual level should occur simultaneously with a continuing spread of the influence of liberalism in the practical political sphere, to the point

where it has now captured the decisive positions of power in the Republican as well as in the Democratic party. But ironic or not, it is the fact. For the first time in modern America a whole school has arisen that consciously challenges the very foundations of collectivist liberalism; two intellectually serious journals, *Modern Age* and *National Review*, have established

themselves integrally in the life of the nation; and an increasing number of the newer generation of undergraduates, graduate students and young instructors in the universities openly proclaim themselves conservatives. Most important, perhaps, an intense and far-ranging discussion has been taking place among conservatives on the meaning and matter of conservatism in the circumstances of mid-twentieth-century America.

It is to this discussion that I want to address myself. In the course of it there have developed doctrines apparently sharply opposed to each other, and sometimes presented as mutually incompatible, but which I believe can in reality be united within a single broader conservative political theory, since they have their roots in a common tradition and are arrayed against a common enemy. Their opposition, which takes many forms, is essentially a division between those who abstract from the corpus of Western belief its stress upon freedom and upon the innate importance of the individual person (what we may call the libertarian position) and those who—drawing upon the same source—stress value and virtue and order (what we may call the traditionalist position).

But the source from which both draw, the continuing consciousness of Western civilization, has been specifically distinguished by its ability to hold these apparently opposed ends in balance and tension; and in fact the two positions which confront each other today in American conservative discourse both implicitly accept, to a large degree, the ends of the other. Without the implicit acceptance of an absolute ground of value, the pre-eminence of the person as criterion of political and social thought and action has no philosophical foundation; and freedom would be only a meaningless excitation and could never become the serious goal of a serious poli-

tics. On the other hand, the belief in virtue as the end of men's being implicitly recognizes the necessity of freedom to choose that end; otherwise, virtue could be no more than a conditioned tropism. And the raising of order to the rank of an end overshadowing and subordinating the individual person would make of order not what the traditionalist conservative means by it, but the rule of totalitarian authority, inhuman and subhuman.

On neither side is there a purposeful, philosophically founded rejection of the ends the other side proclaims. Rather, each side emphasizes so strongly the aspect of the great tradition of the West which it sees as decisive, that distortion sets in. The place of its goals in the total tradition of the West is lost sight of, and the complementary interdependence of freedom and virtue, of the individual person and political order, is forgotten.

Nevertheless, although these contrary emphases in conservative thought can and do pull away from each other when the proponents of either forsake one side of their common heritage of belief in virtue as man's proper end *and* his freedom under God as the condition of the achievement of that end, their opposition is not irreconcilable, precisely because they do in fact jointly possess that very heritage. Extremists on one side may be undisturbed by the danger of the recrudescence of authoritarian status society if only it would enforce the doctrines in which they believe. Extremists on the other side may care little what becomes of ultimate values if only political and economic individualism prevails. But both extremes are self-defeating: truth withers when freedom dies, however righteous the authority that kills it; and free individualism uninformed by moral value rots at its core and soon brings about conditions that pave the way for surrender to tyranny.

Such extremes, however, are not the necessary outcome of a dialectic between doctrines which emphasize opposite sides of the same truth. Indeed, a dialectic between different emphases based upon the same fundamental understanding is the mode by which finite men have achieved much of the wisdom contained in tradition. Such a dialectic is in the highest degree necessary today between the libertarians and the traditionalists among conservatives. It cannot fail to achieve results of the greatest significance, if only the protagonists, in pressing that aspect of the truth which each regards as decisive, keep constantly in their consciousness other and complementary aspects of the same truth.

THE TENDENCY TO ESTABLISH false antitheses obstructing fruitful confrontation arises in part from an inherent dilemma of conservatism in a revolutionary era, such as ours. There is a real contradiction between the deep piety of the conservative spirit towards tradition, prescription, the preservation of the fibre of society (what has been called "natural conservatism") and the more reasoned, consciously principled, militant conservatism which becomes necessary when the fibres of society have been rudely torn apart, when deleterious revolutionary principles ride high, and restoration, not preservation, is the order of the day. For what the conservative is committed to conserve is not simply whatever happens to be the established conditions of a few years or a few decades, but the consensus of his civilization, of his country, as that consensus over the centuries has reflected truth derived from the very constitution of being. We are today historically in a situation created by thirty years of slow and insidious revolution at home and a half-century of violent open revolution abroad. To conserve the true and the good under these circumstances is to restore an

understanding (and a social structure reflecting that understanding) which has been all but buried, not to preserve the transient customs and prescriptions of the present.

It is here that the dilemma of conservatism affects our present doctrinal discussion. The need in our circumstances for the most vigorous use of reason to combat the collectivist, scientific, amoral wave of the present tends to induce in the libertarian an apotheosis of reason and the neglect of tradition and prescription (which he identifies with the prevailing prescriptions of the present). The traditionalist, suspecting that he sees in this libertarian tendency the same fever to impose upon men an abstract speculative ideology that has characterized the revolution of our time—as well as the French Revolution and its spiritual forbears—tends to recoil, and in his turn to press a one-sided position. Too often he confounds reason and principle with "demon ideology." Rather than justly insisting upon the limits of reason—the finite bounds of the purview of any one man or any one generation, and the responsibility to employ reason in the context of continuing tradition—he seems sometimes to turn his back on reason altogether and to place the claims of custom and prescription in irreconcilable opposition to it.

Both attitudes obscure the truth; both vitiate the value of the dialectic. The history of the West has been a history of reason operating within tradition. The balance has been tenuous, the tension at times has tightened till it was spiritually almost unbearable; but out of this balance and tension the glory of the West has been created. To claim exclusive sovereignty for either component—reason or tradition—is to smirch that glory and cripple the potentialities of conservatism in its struggle against the liberal collectivist Leviathan.

Abstract reason, functioning in a vacuum of tradition, can indeed give birth to an arid and distorting ideology. But, in a revolutionary age, the qualities of natural conservatism by themselves can lead only to the enthronement of the prevailing power of the revolution. Natural conservatism is a legitimate human characteristic and in settled times it is conducive to good. It represents the universal human tendency to hold by the accustomed, to maintain existing modes of life. In settled times it can exist in healthy tension with the other equally natural human characteristic, the impulse to break beyond accepted limits in the deepening of truth and the heightening of value. But this is only possible before the fibres of society have been loosened, before the "cake of custom" has been broken. Then these two human tendencies can be held in just proportion, since men of all conditions believe, each at the level of his understanding, in the same transcendent Ground of truth and value, eternal and dynamic. But when, through whatever cause, this unity in tension is riven, when the dynamic takes off into thin air, breaking its tension with the perpetual rhythms of life—in short, when a revolutionary force shatters the unity and balance of civilization—then conservatism must be of another sort if it is to fulfill its responsibility. It is not and cannot be limited to that uncritical acceptance, that uncomplicated reverence, which is the essence of natural conservatism. The world of idea and symbol and image has been turned topsy-turvy; the life-stream of civilization has been cut off and dispersed.

This is our situation. What is required of us is a *conscious* conservatism—a clearly principled restatement in new circumstances of philosophical and political truth. This conscious conservatism cannot be a simple piety—although in a deep sense it must have piety towards the constitution of

being. Nevertheless in its consciousness it necessarily reflects a reaction to the rude break the revolution has made in the continuity of human wisdom. It is called forth by a sense of the loss which that cutting off has created. It cannot now be identical with the natural conservatism towards which it yearns. The world in which it exists is the revolutionary world. To accept that, to conserve that, would be to accept and conserve the very denial of man's long-developed understanding, the very destruction of achieved truth, which are the essence of the revolution.

Nor can the conscious conservatism required of us appeal simply and uncomplicatedly to the past. The past has had many aspects, all held in measured suspension. But the revolution has destroyed that suspension, that tradition; the delicate fabric can never be re-created in the same identical form; its integral character has been destroyed. The conscious conservatism of a revolutionary or post-revolutionary era faces problems inconceivable to the natural conservatism of a pre-revolutionary time. The modes of thought of natural conservatism are not by themselves adequate to the tasks of a time like this. Today's conservatism cannot simply affirm. It must select and adjudge. It is conservative because in its selection and in its judgment it bases itself upon the accumulated wisdom of mankind over millennia, because it accepts the limits upon the irresponsible play of untrammelled reason which the unchanging values exhibited by that wisdom dictate. But it is, it has to be, not acceptance of what lies before it in the contemporary world, but challenge. In an era like ours the existing regime in philosophical thought, as in political and social actuality, is fundamentally wrong. To accept is to be, not conservative, but acquiescent to revolution.

Situations of this nature have arisen

again and again in the history of civilization; and each time the great renewers have been those who were able to recover true principle out of the wreck of their heritage. They were guided by reason—reason mediated, it is true, by prudence, but in the first instance reason. Like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, confronting the chaos in the body politic and in the minds of men created by the overweening pride of the Athenian *demos*, we do not live in the happy age of a natural conservatism. We cannot simply revere; we cannot uncritically follow tradition, for the tradition presented to us is rapidly becoming—thanks to the prevailing intellectual climate, thanks to the schools, thanks to the outpourings of all the agencies that mould opinion and belief—the tradition of a positivism scornful of truth and virtue, the tradition of the collective, the tradition of the untrammelled state.

The conservative today, like the conscious conservative of all revolutionary eras, cannot escape the necessity and the duty to bring reason to bear upon the problems that confront him. He has to separate the true from the false, applying basic principle to the task of cutting through the tangled mass of confusion and falsehood; he has the responsibility of establishing in new circumstances forms of thought and institutional arrangements which will express the truth of the great tradition of the West. Respectful though he is of the wisdom of the past and reverent though he be toward precedent and prescription, the tasks he faces can only be carried out with the aid of reason, the faculty which enables us to distinguish principle and thus to separate the true from the false.

The projection of a sharp antithesis between reason and tradition distorts the true harmony which exists between them and blocks the development of conservative

thought. There is no real antagonism. Conservatism, to continue to develop today, must embrace both: reason operating within tradition: neither ideological *hubris* abstractly creating Utopian blueprints, ignoring the accumulated wisdom of mankind, nor blind dependence upon that wisdom to answer automatically the questions posed to our generation and demanding our own expenditure of our own mind and spirit.

CLOSELY RELATED to the false antithesis between reason and tradition that distorts the dialogue between the libertarian emphasis and the traditionalist emphasis among conservatives is our historical inheritance of the nineteenth-century European struggle between classical liberalism and a conservatism that was too often rigidly authoritarian. Granted there is much in classical liberalism that conservatives must reject—its philosophical foundations, its tendency towards Utopian constructions, its disregard (explicitly, though by no means implicitly) of tradition; granted that it is the source of much that is responsible for the plight of the twentieth century: but its championship of freedom and its development of political and economic theories directed towards the assurance of freedom have contributed to our heritage concepts which we need to conserve and develop as surely as we need to reject the utilitarian ethics and the secular progressivism that classical liberalism has also passed on to us.

Nineteenth-century conservatism, with all its understanding of the pre-eminence of virtue and value, for all its piety towards the continuing tradition of mankind, was far too cavalier to the claims of freedom, far too ready to subordinate the individual person to the authority of state or society.

The conservative today is the inheritor of the best in both of these tragically bifur-

cated branches of the Western tradition. But the division lingers on and adds to the difficulties of conservative discourse. The traditionalist, although in practice he fights alongside the libertarian against the collectivist Leviathan state of the twentieth century, tends to reject the political and economic theories of freedom which flow from classical liberalism, in his reaction against its unsound metaphysics. He discards the true with the false, creating unnecessary obstacles to the mutual dialogue in which he is engaged with his libertarian *alter ego*. The libertarian, suffering from the mixed heritage of the nineteenth-century champions of liberty, reacts against the traditionalist's emphasis upon precedent and continuity out of antipathy to the authoritarianism with which that emphasis has been associated—although in actuality he stands firmly for continuity and tradition against the rising revolutionary wave of collectivism and statism.

We are victims here of an inherent tragedy in the history of classical liberalism. As it developed the economic and political doctrines of limited state power, the free-market economy and the freedom of the individual person, it sapped, by its utilitarianism, the foundations of belief in an organic moral order. But the only possible basis of respect for the integrity of the individual person and for the overriding value of his freedom is belief in an organic moral order. Without such a belief, no doctrine of political and economic liberty can stand.

Furthermore, when such a belief is not universally accepted, a free society, even if it could exist, would become licentious war of all against all. Political freedom, failing a broad acceptance of the personal obligation to duty and to charity, is never viable. Deprived of an understanding of the philosophical foundations of freedom, and exposed to the ravaging of conscienceless

marauders, men forget that they are fully men only to the degree that they are free to choose their destiny, and they turn to whatever fallacy promises them welfare and order.

The classical liberal as philosopher dug away the foundations of the economic and political doctrines of classical liberalism. But however much he may thereby have contributed to our misfortunes, he himself continued to live on the inherited moral capital of centuries of Christendom. His philosophical doctrines attacked the foundations of conscience, but he himself was still a man of conscience. As Christopher Dawson has said: "The old liberalism, with all its shortcomings, had its roots deep in the soul of Western and Christian culture." With those roots as yet unsevered, the classical liberal was able to develop the theories of political and economic freedom which are part of the conservative heritage today.

The misunderstandings between libertarian and traditionalist are to a considerable degree the result of a failure to understand the differing levels on which classical liberal doctrines are valid and invalid. Although the classical liberal forgot—and the contemporary libertarian conservative sometimes tends to forget—that in the *moral* realm freedom is only a means whereby men can pursue their proper end, which is virtue, he did understand that in the *political* realm freedom is the primary end. If, with Acton, we "take the establishment of liberty for the realization of moral duties to be the end of civil society," the traditionalist conservative of today, living in an age when liberty is the last thought of our political mentors, has little cause to reject the contributions to the understanding of liberty of the classical liberals, however corrupted their understanding of the ends of liberty. Their error lay largely in the confusion of the temporal with the

transcendent. They could not distinguish between the *authoritarianism* with which men and institutions suppress the freedom of men, and the *authority* of God and truth.

On the other hand, the same error in reverse vitiated the thought of nineteenth-century conservatives. They respected the authority of God and of truth as conveyed in tradition, but too often they imbued the authoritarianism of men and institutions with the sacred aura of divine authority. They gave way to the temptation to make of tradition, which in its rightful role serves as a guide to the operation of reason, a weapon with which to suppress reason.

It is true that from their understanding of the basis of men's moral existence, from their reverence for the continuity and precedent that ties the present to the past, contemporary conservatism has inherited elements vital to its very existence. Yet we can no more make of the great conservative minds of the nineteenth century unerring guides to be blindly followed than we can condemn out of hand their classical liberal opponents. Sound though they were on the essentials of man's being, on his destiny to virtue and his responsibility to seek it, on his duty in the moral order, they failed too often to realize that the *political* condition of moral fulfillment is freedom from coercion. Signally they failed to recognize the decisive danger in a union of political and economic power—a danger becoming daily greater before their eyes as science and technology created apace immense aggregates of economic energy. Aware, as the classical liberals were not, of the reality of original sin, they forgot that its effects are never more virulent than when men wield unlimited power. Looking to the state to promote virtue, they forgot that the power of the state rests in the hands of men as subject to the effects of original sin as those they govern. They could not, or would not, see a truth the classical liberals

understood: if to the power naturally inherent in the state, to defend its citizens from violence, domestic and foreign, and to administer justice, there is added a positive power over economic and social energy, the temptation to tyranny becomes irresistible, and the political conditions of freedom wither.

The tendency of the traditionalist conservative to insist that the crystallization of a conservative outlook today requires only that we carry on the principles of those who called themselves conservatives in the nineteenth century oversimplifies and confuses the problem. That the conservative is one who preserves tradition does not mean that his task is arid imitation and repetition of what others have done before. It is true that in ultimate terms, upon the basic issue of human destiny, truths have been given us that we cannot improve upon, that we can only convey and make real in the context of our time. Here indeed the conservatives of the nineteenth century played a heroic part in preserving in the teeth of the overwhelming tendency of the era the age-old image of man as a creature of transcendent destiny.

In the political and economic realm, however, these truths establish only the foundation for an understanding of the end of civil society and the function of the state. That end, to guarantee freedom, so that men may uncoercedly pursue virtue, can be achieved in different circumstances by different means. To the clarification of what these means are in specific circumstances, the conservative must apply his reason. The technological circumstances of the twentieth century demand above all the breaking up of power and the separation of centers of power—both within the economy itself, within the state itself, and between the state and the economy. Power of a magnitude never before dreamed of by men has been brought into being. While

separation of power has always been essential to a good society, if those who possess it are to be preserved from corruption and those who do not are to be safeguarded from coercion, this has become a fateful necessity under the conditions of modern technology. To the analysis of this decisive problem and to the development of political and economic solutions of it, classical liberalism contributed mightily. If we reject that heritage, we should be casting away some of the most powerful among our weapons against socialism, Communism, and collectivist liberalism. The traditionalist who would have us do so because of the philosophical errors of classical liberalism, like the libertarian who rejects tradition because it has sometimes been associated with authoritarianism, seriously weakens the development of conservative doctrine.

The historical fact is—and it adds to the complexity of our problems—that the great tradition of the West has come to us through the nineteenth century, split, bifurcated, so that we must draw not only upon those who called themselves conservatives in that century but also upon those who called themselves liberals. The economists of the liberal British tradition, from Adam Smith through and beyond the vilified Manchesterians, like the Austrian economists from Menger and Böhm-Bawerk to Mises and Hayek, analyzed the conditions of industrial society and established the principles upon which the colossal power that it produces can be developed for the use of man without nurturing a monstrous Leviathan. Without their mighty intellectual endeavor, we should be disarmed before the collectivist economics of Marx, Keynes, and Galbraith. And in the sphere of political theory, who has surpassed the nineteenth-century liberals in their prophetic understanding of the looming dangers of the all-powerful state?

Conservatives today can reject neither side of their nineteenth-century heritage; they must draw upon both.

Differences of emphasis between libertarian and traditionalist cannot be avoided and should not be regretted. Conservatism has no monolithic party line. Our task is to overcome the nineteenth century bifurcation of the Western tradition in fruitful dialogue, not to perpetuate it by refusing to understand the breadth and complexity of our heritage, out of a narrow historicism that unearths outworn party emblems.

I AM WELL AWARE that what I have been saying can be criticized as eclecticism and attacked as an effort to smother principle. But it is not the laying aside of clear belief, either by the libertarian conservative or by the traditionalist conservative, in order to present a front against contemporary collectivist liberalism, that is here conceived. Rather, it is the deepening of the beliefs which each holds through the development of their implications in a dialectic free of distorting narrowness. That deepening—and the development of a common conservative doctrine, comprehending both emphases—cannot be achieved in a surface manner by blinking differences or blurring intellectual distinctions with grandiose phraseology. It can only be achieved by a hard-fought dialectic—but a dialectic in which both sides recognize not only that they have a common enemy, but also that, despite all differences, they hold a common heritage.

As Americans indeed we have a great tradition to draw upon, in which the division, the bifurcation, of European thought between the emphasis on virtue and value and order and the emphasis on freedom and the integrity of the individual person was overcome, and a harmonious unity of the tensed poles of Western thought was

achieved in political theory and practice, as never before or since. The men who created the republic, who framed the Constitution and produced that monument of political wisdom, *The Federalist Papers*, represented among them as great a conflict of emphasis as any in contemporary American conservatism. Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, Hamilton, Adams, Jay, Mason, Madison—among them there existed immense differences on the claims of the individual person and the claims of order, on the relation of virtue to freedom. But

their dialectic was conducted within a continuing awareness of their joint heritage. Out of that dialectic they created a political theory and a political structure based upon the understanding that, while truth and virtue are metaphysical and moral ends, the freedom to seek them is the political condition of those ends—and that a social structure which keeps power divided is the indispensable means to this political end. The debate from which our American institutions arose is a fitting model for our debate.

The classical liberals and the conservative tradition.

A Conservative Case for Freedom

M. STANTON EVANS

THERE IS widespread agreement nowadays on the fact that, somewhere along the way, Western society has taken a wrong turning—that it has strayed from the values which once made it strong and informed it with purpose. Unfortunately, there is considerably less agreement as to what, exactly those values are.

Those who have been most vocal in decrying our fallen state have usually been identified as “conservatives”—a term

which conceals a number of deep and inhibiting disagreements. In the case of anything so vast and disorderly as modern error, it is only natural that there should be some confusion as to what is the matter. And while the question is difficult and philosophical, it is of more than academic interest; for until we have some kind of agreed analysis, those concerned to correct things can hardly marshal the resources necessary for the job.

The confusion is greatly increased by the forces which error has thrust into power. Understandably enough, the ruling collectivists and "liberals," so called, have tried to conjure the protest movement out of existence. A whole school of literature has been developed attempting to define present-day conservatism either as a revenant classical liberalism, or else as a form of mental disorder. In either case, the point is to dispose of it as something too silly to be of much account. The more damaging of these criticisms, because the one more nearly containing a suggestion of truth, is the identification with classical liberalism. All those objecting to the growing dominance of government and the contraction of individual freedom are lumped together as descendants of Spencer and Sumner, and thus, presumably, disposed of. While labeling someone a classical liberal is not necessarily an insult, it must be pointed out that today's conservatives, while opponents of statism, are generally not Manchesterians. There are, to be sure, some classical liberals in the conservative camp, just as there seem to be some Metternichian strong men. Yet there are still other conservatives who are neither statist nor Manchesterians; and it is this three-way babel of ideas, now and again punctuated by a helpful shout from the far left, which has sundered conservative effort and diffused its strength.

The fundamental disagreement occurs over the problem of man and his nature: specifically, whether the imperatives of individual freedom can be reconciled with the Christian conception of the individual as flawed in mind and will, with its demand for individual subordination to an objective, non-secular order. Critics of the protest movement delight in pointing to what they consider an insoluble dilemma. They are joined by sectarians within the movement itself, urging on the one hand that

we abandon our insistence on individual freedom, on the other that we give up our Christianized view of man. The two, we are repeatedly informed, are simply not compatible. For the purposes of this essay, I shall call those who choose the first alternative "authoritarians," those who choose the second "libertarians."*

The authoritarian believes in the objective order, and is generally ready to limit individual freedom to follow its prescriptions. He prefers a hierarchical to a fluid society, conceiving some men as destined to rule, others to obey—all ordained by the objective order. The libertarian finds the idea of such an immobile society repugnant, and rejects the principles which have been used to sanction it. It is the argument of this essay that both positions rest on a form of illicit conversion—that they have not properly related first principles and conclusions. Patient inquiry will disclose, I think, that affirmation of a transcendent order is not only compatible with individual autonomy, but the condition of it; and that a skeptical view of man's nature not only permits political liberty, but demands it.

The problem can best be examined if we divide it in two: first, the question of

*I want to emphasize that my use of the word "libertarian" signifies the chemically pure form of classical liberalism, with all of its metaphysical implications. The term is sometimes used in a different sense, to identify those who insist on limited government and political freedom, without implying acceptance of the anti-religious philosophy here associated with it. I have used the authoritarian-conservative-libertarian terminology in order to establish a recognizable continuum of ideas, and intend no derogation of "libertarians" of the second sort. Indeed, I believe many of the people who call themselves "libertarians" would accept the position I describe as "conservative"—with its dual emphasis on freedom and moral authority. To the extent they do, I trust my terminology will not obscure the fact that the argument of this essay is not an attack on such "libertarians," but a vindication of them.

freedom as related to the existence of objective value; second, the question of freedom as related to the nature of man. The "libertarian," or "classical liberal," characteristically denies the existence of a God-centered moral order, to which man should subordinate his will and reason. Alleging human freedom as the single moral imperative, he otherwise is a thoroughgoing relativist, pragmatist and materialist. He puts considerable emphasis on economics. Man and his satisfactions, the libertarian maintains, are themselves the source of value—and other values cannot be imposed from without. Because the free economy best serves man, and best supplies his material needs, it is moral. It works.

There seem to be a number of reasons for libertarian devotion to these views. One no doubt is that some present-day libertarians are genuine descendants of Spencer and Sumner, and proceed—logically, as they believe—from relativist premises to a vindication of freedom. But I believe the more common occurrence is that other considerations, largely unspoken, incline the libertarian to his particular brand of relativism. I think many attacks on the idea of a transcendent order can be traced to fears about the uses to which any particular affirmation of truth may be put. The libertarian suspects that commitment to this or that ethical judgment will imply the need for having it enforced by the political authorities. Additionally, there seems to be considerable confusion between *value*, as received from tradition and the counsels of religious teaching, and *conformity*, imposed by the pressures of the group. The two may of course coincide—specifically, when group pressures aim at enforcing traditional value. But the fact that they may appear in conjunction does not mean they are the same; and in a time of triumphant revolution, inability

to make the distinction constitutes failure at the most elementary level of analysis.

The problem is akin to that created by obscurantists of the "new conservative" variety, who tell us that since conservatives are opposed to change, they should be in favor of the New Deal. The argument empties conservatism of all value content, and makes it simply a matter of technique. But conservatives who wish to conserve value generally have some particular value in mind, and must oppose any particular status quo which denies it. The libertarian falls into the converse error. Because he is opposed to the status quo of New Dealism, he determines that he must not be a conservative, and battles those who so call themselves. It is hard to believe anyone interested in conserving historic American institutions could become reconciled to the patchwork collectivism of the last 25 years. The conformity of statism represents a radical break with American tradition; those who wish to affirm the values embodied in the tradition must perforce be nonconformists and rebels, ready to brave the censure of the group. Moreover, it is only if they are motivated by deeply cherished values that they can manage to do so. So far are "value" and "conformity" from being identical that the second can rise to its current distasteful height only when the first declines. A man without the interior armor of value has no defense against the pressures of his society. It is precisely the loss of value which has turned the "inner-directed" citizen of the 19th-century America into the "other-directed" automaton of today.

Man, Ortega wrote, "is a being forced by his nature to seek some higher authority. If he succeeds in finding it of himself, he is a superior man; if not, he is a mass-man, and must receive it from his superiors." To exist in community, men must harmonize their desires; some kind of gen-

eral equilibrium has to prevail. Men who lose the "inner check," as Babbitt called it, must therefore submit to an outer one; they become mass men, ruled by their "superiors."

The erosion of value is doubly destructive. As it promotes statism by creating the need for an external force to order conflicting desires, it simultaneously weakens the individual's ability to withstand the state. Men without values are more than willing to trade their freedom for material benefits. That the loss of moral constraint invites the rule of power is surely one of the best-established facts of 20th-century history. Indeed, a number of quite unconservative witnesses have pointed out that the vigor of civilization is dependent on people who are guided by some internalized system of value, and who are thus capable of initiative and self-reliant behavior. This is the burden of David Riesman's celebrated study, *The Lonely Crowd* (in which the terms "inner-directed" and "other-directed" were coined), and the message of such critics of modern society as Pitirim Sorokin, William H. Whyte, and Professor Richard LaPiere.

The authoritarian, like the libertarian, believes that value and enforcement go hand in hand; unlike the libertarian, however, he accepts both. He merely wants to be the person doing the enforcing. The conservative, as I conceive him, rejects the common analysis. While he does not share the authoritarian's readiness to coerce his fellow men into virtue, neither does he share the libertarian's commitment to freedom at virtue's expense. The conservative believes man should be free; he does not believe being free is the end of human existence. He maintains that man exists to form his life in consonance with the objective order, to choose the Good. But "choice" of the Good can take place only in circumstances favoring volition. Free-

dom is thus the political context of moral decision; it is the modality within which the human mind can search out moral absolutes. In the conservative view, then, right choice is the terminal value; freedom an instrumental and therefore subsidiary value.

To the conservative, economic and political freedom per se are not "moral"; only willed human actions have moral content, and freedom dictates no particular actions. A freely acting man may or may not be moral, depending on what he does. But while freedom is morally neutral, the possible alternatives, i.e., varying forms of coercion, are not. By their nature, all coercive systems require certain actions which we hold immoral: the arbitrary exercise of power over men by other men. The free economy permits morality, but does not guarantee it; the coerced economy guarantees immorality. This formulation may prove distasteful to authoritarians accustomed to identifying all defenders of economic freedom as Manchesterians. Yet I can conceive of no other which can maintain the conditions of moral choice. It may prove equally distasteful to libertarians, accustomed to seeing all "true believers" as enemies of liberty. Yet I can conceive of no other that will insure the sanctity of freedom. If there is no value system with which we may rebuke the pretensions of despots, what is to prevent the rule of force in the world? If there are no objective standards of right and wrong, why object to tyranny?

The last argument needs to be taken a step further. The Manchesterians allege that man's self-interest, which flourishes under a regime of freedom, is sufficient sanction to keep liberty intact. But that calculus of desires is too subtle for most of mankind. It is the immemorial habit of man to be unable to see his long-term interest when a short-term one looms before

him. When he thinks he can achieve an immediate benefit, he is willing to give up some of his freedom to obtain it. Surely the entire trend of modern politics has demonstrated this point with disturbing finality. Only when there is widespread adherence to a consensus of value, and only when that value is one which sanctions the continuance of freedom, can freedom endure. As freedom is the condition of value, so is value the guarantor of freedom.

WHEN WE have examined the question of value to determine whether or not freedom is desirable, we must turn to the problem of man's nature to decide what political arrangements offer the best promise of sustaining it. Metaphysically, freedom is the context of choice—the ground of decision where one seeks to break through to transcendence. Politically, it is a physical condition existing between and among men. In conventional discourse, "freedom" usually means the absence of constraint by one man upon another. Since some form of constraint is necessary to let men live together, the degree to which it can be relaxed, and the conflict of what are variously defined as "freedoms," are problems for which there are almost as many answers as there are theorists.

But whatever our difficulties in defining it, freedom is obviously a product of the way men behave toward one another. If we want to maximize freedom, we can begin to do so only after examining the motives of human behavior; and the first task in the pursuit of political freedom is therefore to reach a reasoned position about the nature of man.

Again, there is a division of opinion on the right. The "libertarian," or classical liberal, affirms the natural goodness, or—in the more scientific forms—the non-evil, of human nature. He views gov-

ernment as the source of evil, the unfettered individual as the source of good. He has considerable faith in "progress" as the natural creation of free men, and tends to believe that material success and moral virtue are closely akin, if not identical. For all of these reasons, he concludes that government should let people alone to employ their natural goodness. In his extreme form, the modern-day libertarian is a philosophical anarchist—a free-enterprise Utopian.

The authoritarian holds precisely the opposite view. He believes people in their natural state are not good, but evil. Viewing human will as perverse and human reason as limited, he does not believe at all in automatic "progress." He does not accept the Darwinian equation of morality and economic prosperity, with its subordination of value to the observable relation of forces. Like Henry Adams, he thinks things more probably than not are tending to unravel—which is only to be expected if the natural direction of human choice is downward. For all these reasons, the authoritarian believes in strong government. Because man is feckless, he needs aristocratic guidance to force him to be good.

The conservative, again, believes the two schools have reached their positions through a shared mistake in analysis; they fail to relate the question of man's nature to the problem of government. Concretely, they fail to see that government cannot be treated as something apart from "men"—in the one case as the source of evil, in the other as the source of moral guidance. For what is government, after all, but men in the exercise of power? In the case of the libertarian, if men are naturally good, whence comes the evil of government? In the case of the authoritarian, if men are fundamentally evil, how

does government become a force for virtue?

The conservative agrees with the authoritarian that men are not to be trusted, and his constant concern is to restrain the destructive tendencies he discerns in a fallen humanity. But he does not agree that such a judgment means man should be ruled by an aristocracy. For if men are evil, then potential aristocrats are evil too—and no man, logically, can be said to have a commission to coerce another. "Absolute monarchs," in Locke's phrase, "are but men"—and as such heirs to the same weaknesses of the human kind as are their subjects. Moreover, their ability to inflict evil on others obviously increases with the amount of power they wield. The conservative wants political freedom precisely because he fears the fundamental nature of man.

I concede there is little difference between what I call the "conservative" philosophy on this point and the views of a number of men sometimes thought of as "classical liberals,"—Adam Smith, Lord Acton, de Tocqueville. The position of this "liberal" school, if such it be, is best suggested by F. A. Hayek's characterization of himself as an "old-fashioned Whig." Such "liberals" fear government because they fear man—and on the technical point of the relation between man's nature and the kind of government appropriate to him are indistinguishable from the conservatives.

Hayek divides the people we think of as "classical liberals" into two camps—the "true" and the "false" individualists. "True" individualism may or may not come coupled with the deeper moral affirmations of the conservative position, but it is a far cry from the alternately sentimental and mechanistic notions about man which convert themselves so easily to the uses of collectivism.

"The cultivated man," said Renan in a celebrated flight of false individualism,

"has only to follow the delicious incline of his inner impulses." This was the kind of fatuous self-love which prompted Jacob Burckhardt to reflect that mankind was losing its conception of the need for external standards—"whereupon, of course, we periodically fall victims to sheer power." The "true" individualist sides not with Renan but with Burckhardt. His chief concern in seeking freedom is not to liberate the "natural goodness" of man, but to localize as much as possible man's tendencies toward evil. "It would scarcely be too much to claim," Hayek says of Adam Smith, "that the main merit of the individualism which he and his contemporaries advocated is that it is a system under which bad men can do the least harm."

The mutual regard that existed between Smith and Edmund Burke is, of course, a matter of record. The similarity of their ideas suggests that, on the point of fearing man and his behavior in power, the camps of "true" individualism and "conservatism" are indeed one; and the rapprochement suggests, in turn, that a view of freedom as compatible with mistrust of human nature is recommended by a broad tradition as well as by the homely counsel of clear thought.

The conservative's task, then, is to insure that enough governmental authority exists to suppress criminal outcroppings of human weakness, but at the same time to insure that no man, or group of men, is vested with too much political power. It has proved, down the centuries, to be quite a task. There is very little difficulty in establishing either the authoritarian's ideal of a strong government, or the libertarian's contrary ideal of complete (if therefore temporary) freedom. The great problem is to set up a system of "free government," providing both order and freedom; and, as Burke said, "to temper together these opposite elements of liberty and restraint in

one consistent work requires much thought, deep reflection, a sagacious, powerful and combining mind."

This was, as it happened, the very problem which preoccupied the founders of the American nation, and the problem which achieved its highest resolution in the compact on which the United States was based. The dilemma of government, as our Constitution-makers saw it, was to restrain power in the very act by which it was granted: to establish an authority which could be used for certain limited purposes, but for those only; which would be hedged about by alternative centers of decision, jealous of their own prerogatives, and by constitutional proscription. The object was for power to be so diffused and equilibrated that each source of authority would limit and restrain another, while having sufficient strength to perform the tasks appropriate to it.

In a word, the model answer to the dilemma of "free government" is the American Constitution—founded in the counterpoise of interests of colonial North America, and fused in the powerful, sagacious, and combining mind of James Madison. It is

noteworthy that neither the "authoritarian" ideas of Hamilton nor the "libertarian" notions of Jefferson dominated the Constitution. Instead, the great conceptual balance struck by Madison prevailed in that document, and, for a time, in the nation. "The great desideratum of government," Madison said, "is such a modification of sovereignty as will render it sufficiently neutral between the different interests and factions, to control one part of the country from invading the rights of another, and at the same time sufficiently controlled itself, from setting up an interest adverse to that of the whole society."

Being itself a product of fallible men, and administered by others still more fallible, the Constitution has of course achieved less than perfection. But it has maintained a shifting equilibrium, and it is testimony to the founders' intentions that they are even today the center about which our political controversies revolve. Certainly, whatever its imperfections and whatever its current ravaged condition, the American Constitution has proved that the practice of "conservatism," beginning from a profound mistrust of man, and of men panoplied as the state, can well serve the ends of freedom.

*A revealing commentary on the place of Britain
in the post-war world.*

The Future of Britain

GEORGE SCHWARTZ

A DISCUSSION of the future of Britain really resolves into a long excursion on the past of the country. What will happen in the coming years will be determined in part, if not largely, by the verdict at home and abroad on the achievement of Britain in the era when she rose to power and affluence. We are in a stage of history when opinion is divided on the question whether Britain as a pioneer of the modern capitalist order and the industrial age served the world well or ill. Does she stand for something that mankind is repudiating or is she to get continuing credit for establishing and operating the principles of a free society and a free economy? If her prestige in this respect were confirmed, the British

peoples would move forward with their traditional confidence and assurance.

The fundamental facts in the record must first be registered. Britain consists of two small islands on the periphery of a great continental land mass, and their territorial insignificance is such that the wonder is they ever emerged from obscurity. A world planning organisation set up in 1500 would not have got round to these islands yet in any programme for development. They would have been left to pursue the primitive arts of agriculture and fishing for which they are seemingly designed and ordained. Larger and more promising islands, better favoured by nature, are still classified as under-developed

areas. Britain would have some excuse for being in that category to-day.

For a Briton whose life goes back to the beginning of the century it is interesting, if somewhat melancholy, to recollect that the standard map of the world at that time was Mercator's projection, which showed Britain proudly esconced, as if by Providence itself, at the very centre of things. The lines of communication ran out from here to every corner of the map, giving the impression, at least to the school-boy mind, that the old country held the strings of universal action and gave them a salutary tug when the occasion required.

It was customary, moreover, at this turn of the century to single out in red colour on the Mercator projection those parts of the world comprising the far-flung British Empire. (I doubt if we should choose red now.) This made a gallant show, with the implication that British writ ran in the remotest corners of the five continents and seven seas. And the fervent chant prevailed, "Wider still and wider shall thy bounds be set."

To-day world maps have to be put into proper perspective and proportion on sinusoidal or other recondite projections, if only to show the short cuts over the Polar regions for air routes, and these versions of the global lay-out do not flatter the location or the significance of Britain in the world environment.

Nevertheless the British writ did for many decades run over the globe at large, and the British navy could claim to be the guardian of world peace. This incontestable record of power and strength over more than a century is the marvel that deserves elaboration.

For centuries existence for the bulk of mankind was confined within the narrow limits determined by local harvest fluctuations, and the labour of humanity was analogous to that of animal toil. A margin

above subsistence did emerge for some peoples in some places at some times, permitting the addition of conveniences to the necessities of life, but this margin was rarely secure and the sombre judgment of "nasty, brutish and short" could fittingly be applied to the lot of humanity.

It was not until our so-called modern age that the possibility of lifting the burden of animal toil off the human back became a reality, and Britain was the leading pioneer in the development, which transformed the outlook for the peoples at large. This transformation was indeed revolutionary and is rightly immortalised as the Industrial Revolution.

This term has acquired a bad odour, and the nation mostly responsible for the establishment of this new order of society is pilloried in the text-books as the black author of an era of human misery, degradation and exploitation. The grime and smoke of the steam engines and factory chimneys are represented as a pall darkening the lives of the masses.

If this is the contemporary popular version of these events, lending force to extreme denunciations of the capitalist order, it should be noted that general acceptance of this interpretation is very recent in time. There were early critics of the new industrial order—the name of Marx comes immediately to mind—but orthodox teaching of the type undergone by the writer gave almost unqualified blessing to the economic and social transformation, according a major tribute to the contribution of Britain, Great Britain in this context.

Her inventions, it was claimed, altered the whole of the methods of industrial production, and no country remained uninfluenced thereby. The influence did not stop at that. Agriculture, the distribution of the population, the industrial code, sanitation, the labour movement and the

commerce of the globe were revolutionized.

Here are the conclusions of an English teacher, published as late as 1921, as a verdict on the whole era:*

The British reaction upon the world during the nineteenth century has been stupendous. By producing and exporting large quantities of coal, the necessity for reserving certain areas in every locality as fuel areas was removed, commons were broken up, and food areas increased. The application of machinery to agriculture enabled crops to be saved in better condition because it shortened the duration of the harvest and minimised the risks of weather.

The opening up of the interiors of North and South America by the railway and the linking up of the world by the steamship, both of which were worked out to a successful issue in Britain, temporarily relieved the world from the fear of famine. By lessening the famines Great Britain lessened the plague and pestilence which were their invariable consequences. New outlets at home and abroad were made possible for the European peoples just struggling out of serfdom and rapidly increasing in number. In the new industrial system copied from England they found new occupations in which they were trained by British foremen; Britain's demand for food and raw materials made it worth while for the growing populations to emigrate and open up new continents. Agricultural machinery assisted their development by enabling these continents to be cultivated in spite of the shortage of labour in a new country. This was true of both America and Australia. The invention of the railway set free an immense amount of labour in Africa which had been used in portage. The savings of the British people, invested, as they were, all over the

world, caused a far more rapid development of its resources than would otherwise have been possible.

The factory system did not create the evils of overwork and child labour, it brought them into prominence and possibly somewhat intensified them; nor did it create the insanitary state of the towns which had existed since the Middle Ages. It was the good fortune of this country to be the pioneer of much needed industrial and sanitary reforms which have been adopted all over the world.

The British developments of trade unionism and co-operation helped to mould the labour movement all over the world.

The British inventions of railways and steamships made the whole world one great trading area and ushered in a revolution in commerce and international trade.

There is no smack of apology in these large claims. They can be criticised as one-sided, incomplete, biassed, insular and even chauvinistic, but the spirit in which they were uttered was the spirit of the nation, confident in its achievement, in its mission and its role, right up to and beyond the turn of the nineteenth century.

It was in this confident mood that the country entered the war of 1914. There was nothing sombre in the attitude of the men who rushed to the colours, no sense that they were fighting for a discredited system, and no resolve that a new and different world would have to emerge from their sacrifices. They fought for the Britain they knew, and throughout the conflict they longed to return to the same Britain. "Take me back to dear old Blighty." Their impatience to get back to the old life manifested itself almost in mutiny after the armistice in November 1918, and the authorities had perforce to speed up the demobilisation programme.

In 1950 the Chairman at the annual

*L.C.A. Knowles, *The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions during the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 391-2.

Labour Party Conference had to record the jubilee of the Party's establishment in 1900. The Party had enjoyed—if that is the word—its first spell of real office as the Government of Britain, and although it had accomplished great changes between 1945 and 1950 it had encountered a formidable run of difficulties. It was on the eve of dismissal by an ungrateful electorate, and some explanation, if not excuse, was called for. The Chairman, Mr. Sam Watson, expressed it in these words:

Our founders thought we should enter into a country prosperous, enterprising and virile. In fact we took over a country brought to the brink of bankruptcy by capitalist mismanagement and war.

The significance of this lies not in the diagnosis of a bankrupt economy in 1945, but in the tacit admission that no such "prosperous, enterprising and virile" situation prevailed in 1900. Such was the heritage expected by the Left on its eventual, however remote, accession to power. The version given to-day, the gospel of extremists, that the capitalist order, inherently evil and vicious in its nature, had inflicted intolerable wrongs on the people, and that the primary task of a Socialist regime would be to overthrow this order and so avenge this sum of ancient wrongs, was no part of the Left creed in its first organised move towards political power. Yet Mr. (now Lord) Attlee, apologising for the shortcomings of his Ministry in its first full exercise of power between 1945 and 1950, fain would plead: "We could not in a few short years repair the mess of centuries," a singular display of the lack of a sense of history and a sense of proportion. An equally lamentable display was afforded by the then Socialist Chancellor of the Exchequer Mr. (now Lord) Dalton who on the occasion of the nationalisation of the railways described them

as "a poor bag of physical assets." They had been run almost to death during the four and a half years of war, and had emerged worn and battered, and this apparently sufficed to damn the whole record of this epoch-making invention. Possibly the implication was that George Stephenson, either through ignorance or greed, failed to start off with the diesel-electric, which a planned economy would have furnished at the outset. The final refuge of these two critics in the House of Lords is a sardonic comment on the Revolution of Our Times as it affected Britain. They had spent most of their political lives in denouncing the Second Chamber as feudal in its origin, a continuing buttress of plutocracy, and superfluous in a true democracy.

It was, then, in the flush of victory, that Britain in 1919 set out to take up where she left off in 1914. There was leeway to make up, but the base-line was indicated in the statistics, viz., 1913 = 100. An immediate boom of re-stocking set a lively pace, but its swift collapse left the country vainly struggling to regain its pre-war footing. What was not realised was that war on the scale just experienced was not just an interlude, not just an interruption, but a break, in all likelihood an irreparable break with the past. There had been no living experience of a previous major war, no informed recollection of the long distress and dislocation that had followed the Napoleonic era. The economic and social disorders from which the country did not effectually emerge until the 1850's were forgotten history. It is a tribute to the subsequent record in the second half of the century that this was so. By 1900 orderly prosperity was the accepted scheme of things.

In his book *Confident Morning* the late Sir Harold Butler records an incident which ironically goes against all popular belief

about military obtuseness. He was touring the war areas in France in 1918 with George Roberts, a trade union leader who had become Minister of Labour in the war-time coalition. George Roberts had been addressing the troops, encouraging them with promises of better houses, better wages, better social services on their return to the homeland. The troops, keyed up for final victory, were not concerned to dispute this forecast. It was at General Headquarters that Roberts received a shock. To his amazement the Generals advanced the view that the war would be disastrous economically to victors and vanquished alike. Norman Angell was, in their view, right in thinking that economic blight was an inevitable consequence. Roberts was horrified at this heretical doctrine. He had been portraying that afternoon, for the fifteenth time, the land of milk and honey, the myriad homes for heroes that would blossom on the earth once peace was restored. He stoutly refused to admit that the war could have destroyed much of the wealth needed for the realisation of his dream.

It was the staple industries—the backbone of the old economy—that betrayed hopes in the nineteen-twenties. Coal, cotton, iron and steel, shipbuilding—these were the basic industries on which British prosperity had reared. They were at their apogee in 1913, and it seemed axiomatic that their dominant role should be resumed. It was inconceivable that British industry should operate on any other foundation. They were the main pillars of the edifice.

They never recovered their former eminence. What was mistaken for a temporary dislocation was a secular decline in their fortunes, and the twenties were spent in a vain attendance on the favourable turn in events which would rehabilitate markets at home and abroad, and restore the *status quo* in industry. Informed belief and action

banked on the prior restoration of financial stability, and under the lead of Britain a gallant attempt was made to re-establish the European currencies. It is significant of the maintained faith in traditional economic conduct that Britain harked back to the old gold standard at the old parity. Very few discounted the triumph of once again looking the dollar in the face. The pound was itself again. The proper example had been set for the neighbours. When they had come into line the pre-war world would emerge in recognisable form, with Britain in its accustomed role as the leading international centre in trade and finance.

Meanwhile the depression had to be endured, with a hard core of one million unemployed largely represented by the staple industries. Britain was waiting for this depression to lift, under the impression that she was in the trough in a cyclical movement, whereas in reality the world environment was that of boom, an unhealthy and unbalanced boom, but nevertheless a bloom. This was proved by the collapse in 1929, which revealed that the British unemployment total of one million was not a peak, but the secular base for a total rising to three million in the early thirties, an unprecedented *débâcle* in our history.

There is no need to dwell on the course of the Great Depression, which culminated, it would seem inexorably, in the Second World War. If the British people went into this with the gallantry of old, it was not to fight for the peace that had been broken, for the known order of things. There was no going back this time. *Il faut en finir*—not only with the enemy but with a direction of affairs that made war appear almost as a purpose in life compared with the previous disorder and muddle. "Never glad confident morning again" was the quotation that furnished the title to the

book of Sir Harold Butler, who, writing in 1949 on the eve of his death, realised that the old order had already passed with the First World War.

So it was that to the consternation of the Conservative Party, which calculated with assurance that it would be confirmed in office, if only under the flaming banner and behind the emblazoned shield of Winston Churchill, it was summarily ejected by the electorate. All the odium of the sorry inter-war years was fastened upon it, and it was held unfit to deal with the problems of peace on the radical lines for which the country was not only prepared but on which it was resolved.

Then ensued one of the most remarkable passages in British history. The Labour Party, officially committed to a vague Socialism, unexpectedly found itself with an emphatic mandate to fashion a different order of society. At least that seemed implied in the contemptuous judgment on a generation's experience of the existing order.

It was a curious situation, still somewhat bewildering in retrospect. The Socialism of the British Labour Party was never, and is still not, a fashioned body of doctrine of the European type. It is doubtful if five per cent of its adherents could spell the word dialectic, let alone interpret it. At International Socialist Conferences the British delegates have perforce to explain that their Socialism derives more from Methodism than from Marxism. Its content is emotional rather than intellectual and it is in the tradition of the Nonconformist radicalism that has played such a large part in British political and social history.

The Party's Socialism was not even a practical policy ready to be put into effect. Its commitment to the nationalisation of all the means of production, distribution and exchange was commitment to a slogan

and nothing more, and at this very moment in 1960 the Party is convulsed by a conflict over the retention of the phrase in its constitution. Its leaders have confessed that when after 1945 they proceeded to nationalise various industries, not one line of draft of a projected Bill, to say nothing of one scheme of organisation or plan for administration, was in existence. Judge from the following admissions. "Unfortunately while the Labour movement has quite properly focused upon the fundamental principles and ideals of Socialism little attention has been paid to the extremely difficult administrative problems which the carry-out of nationalisation involved. We stated our principles when power appeared to be remote, but now that we have gained power we recognise our limitations and shortcomings in the field of preparation. There has been, I regret, very little guidance on detail, and so we have had to improvise in the light of existing circumstances." [1946]

"There was far too little detailed preparation in nationalisation, and we found ourselves with legislation that had to be completed without the necessary blueprints. . . . When the mining industry was nationalised, for example—this had been on the Labour Party programme for 50 years—we thought we knew all about it. The fact of the matter was, we did not." [1949]

This nebulous incoherent Socialism was fortuitously associated with the more modern concept of the planned economy, and here the new raw Government was on more favourable ground. For it had inherited the whole wartime apparatus of controls, the appropriate structure for centralised direction of the economy. This apparatus had been forged not by students of Socialist models, since these models did not exist, but by economists and administrators versed in the principles of a free economy. They realised that these principles, ap-

appropriate for the satisfaction of multitudinous, independent, individual choices in a free society, had in wartime to be subordinated to a single aim—victory in the war. The wartime regime of controls thus evolved was a supreme accomplishment, matched by no other belligerent. It passed intact to a Socialist Government which otherwise would have been totally incapable of conceiving it, let alone fashioning and administering it. Finance, production, trade, materials and labour were all at its command and disposal. The changes and reforms effected by the Socialist Ministry were largely a by-product from the administrative machinery it inherited. It had very little original contribution of its own. Even the expansion in the field of social services, which has resolved into the Welfare State, derived from wartime measures for mitigating and equalising the burdens of sacrifice.

The Socialist Government grasped at what appeared a lucky solution of its problems. Seemingly there was a system which could be represented as a democratic Socialist order of society, a planned order, the antithesis of the capitalist free-for-all. And all the apparatus for the conduct of such a system was in working order, readily adaptable to a peace economy.

So for five years the country was regulated on the wartime pattern of controls, with the intention and belief that much of the centralised planning and direction should prove enduring. Money and exchange controls, import controls and investment controls were envisaged as permanent institutions of the economy.

It must be conceded that it worked. It was working under the difficulties inevitable on the morrow of a great war and it worked badly, but it worked, and suggested that with increasing competence and the emergence from immediate post-war handicaps the system of a planned and regu-

lated economy would prove viable and acceptable. A lead would be given to the world in the arts of democratic Socialism.

The world should note this. If such a system could work anywhere it would be in Britain. For the country is the ideal place for such an experiment. It is a small compact island with a populace which, because it has long been accustomed to freedom, has acquired the habit not only of self-discipline but also of social discipline. There is a genuine respect for the law, even when it is thought to work prejudicially and to act harshly.

Moreover, the legislation is administered by a highly competent and incorruptible body of officials. If Prohibition had become statutory law in Britain the country would have gone and remained sober. As evidence of that there is the fact that today, with ferocious taxation of drink and tobacco, there is no illicit distilling or bootlegging and no surreptitious growing of the weed. With no land frontiers, smuggling is difficult, and in the tiny area of the land breaches of the regulations can be spotted almost from the roof-tops in Whitehall. If Britain would submit to the regime of the planned economy, that system would work. Can any other country say as much? We did the world an ill service by making it look feasible without being totalitarian.

But Britain did not submit, and the Socialist experiment was cut short after its first essay. Its Conservative successors have moved to a freer economy, and the electorate has confirmed their action in three successive General Elections.

Nevertheless there has been no return to the open system of the past. The enhanced role of Government is recognised and the prevailing mixed economy allows for a good deal of State intervention. Today, with a middle-of-the-road Tory Prime Minister, hostages are being given to a future Left government, which will be able

to point to cases of Conservative intervention on behalf of agriculture, shipping and various industries, and ask what difference there is from a Socialist policy of planning.

Internally the country is running comfortably with a sustained high level of employment. In respect of employment, policy has been as successful as, if not more successful than, anywhere else. It is a welcome change that the authorities are concerned with the problems of full employment and not with the dismal problems of depression and unemployment. Britain has not declined with the fortunes of the old staple industries; on the contrary she has taken up with vigour and success new lines such as chemicals, aircraft, automobiles, synthetic fibres and plastics. Native talent and skill are still manifest.

What has changed for good and all is Britain's place in the world. Perhaps the outstanding performance of the Socialist Government of 1945 was its recognition of this and the measures it took to conform to the change. By its action in India, Burma and elsewhere it paved the way for a run-down of Empire without accompanying disaster for the countries concerned and Britain itself. Its Conservative successors cannot reverse the process—the Suez episode was the last stand of the old guard—and events in Africa at this moment demonstrate the irreversibility of the trend.

The import of this, significant for the future of Britain, should not be ignored in the United States. The world hegemony of the English-speaking peoples has gone and will not return. There was, even as late as 1945, the chance and hope that this hegemony would be re-established, with the United States acting as the natural ally of the British Commonwealth. In some circles here there was the somewhat arrogant and patronising notion that Americans, still immature but reared on the English pattern, would, with suitable advice

and guidance from this end, take up and enforce the traditional exercise of world power as practised by Britain.

It is too late for this, since the outside world has shaken off this form of intervention, however benevolent in intention and appearance, and however beneficial in practice.

The British record in this respect needs little apology. The world was well served by what was a tremendous achievement, and resignation, from that role, even if it has been reluctant, has not been without dignity. This notable contribution to human development and welfare was marred by one thing, namely the air of superiority, unconscious or deliberate, with which it was performed by some representatives of the British presence.

It is more than uncomfortable to read some of the past spoken and written expressions of this superiority. The British people, it was asserted, were called upon to fulfil as the years went on "their great, their proud, their peculiar mission of diffusing among the peoples who were now or might later become subject to their rule, the blessings of civilisation, freedom and peace." This may be a worthy policy to pursue, but not to proclaim out loud.

Similarly one should not advertise that "it was the mission of England to make it part of our responsibility and heritage to care that the world, as far as it can be moulded, shall receive an Anglo-Saxon and not another character."

Anglo-Saxon in this context sounds ludicrous to-day, but it was pontifically employed in the hey-day of Empire, even to the point of forecasting that by 1970 there would be 370 million Anglo-Saxons, presumably engaged in fulfilling the mission entrusted to them by Providence.

"Certainly no one with any commonsense could envisage a state of affairs coming to pass in a generation, in two generations,

in a hundred years, in which Indians would be competent to govern themselves." Thus wrote Lord Birkenhead in 1929, and it is appropriate to append to this an early comment by Mr. Nehru. What fascinated (even while it irritated) him in the British approach to Indian problems was "the calm assurance of always being in the right, faith in their racial history, and contempt and anger at the unbelievers and sinners who challenged the foundations of the true faith—there was something of the religious temper about this attitude."

The attitude cuts no ice to-day in Russia, Asia, Africa or South America, and the question is how Britain will fit into the changed order of the world. Not even in Europe does she wield her former influence, and because of her indecision she now has to dither on the doorstep of the Common Market.

There is still the notion that the British Commonwealth, with America, Russia and China, will constitute the Big Four in the

world arena. This assumes a cohesion of the Commonwealth which is far from assured. Can this diffused collection of communities range alongside the compact units of the other Three? It might make a political bloc, but very doubtfully an economic bloc. Great traditions of liberty, justice, order and duty will hold, and they will not be lost on the world at large, but they must not be imperiously proclaimed as moral leadership to peoples who want to judge these matters for themselves.

It would be wrong to conclude on a note of pessimism. In the final chapter of his *Wealth of Nations*, a monument in itself to British renown, Adam Smith, in the very last sentence, counselled Britain to give up imperial illusions "and endeavour to accommodate her future views and designs to the real mediocrity of her circumstances." This heralded not the decline but the rise of Britain to power, prosperity and greatness in the most glorious chapters in her history.

*A critique of the writings of the professors who
lately journeyed behind the Iron Curtain.*

The Circular Travels of the Professors

JAMES BURNHAM

IN THE AUTUMN of 1959 Professor of History Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., editor Edward Weeks, literary critic Alfred Kazin and playwright Paddy Chayevsky paid a month's visit to the Soviet Union, Poland and Yugoslavia as the first "American writers' delegation" under "the Lacy-Zarubin agreement," which put into effect President Eisenhower's cultural exchange program. The choice of this group—all its members of the far Left and all critics of both American culture and Administration policy—is no doubt a tribute to Mr. Eisenhower's non-partisanship in foreign affairs, or perhaps to his indifference, though it does seem a rather narrow cross-section for the "people to people" togetherness that the President has long advocated as the solution to Russo-American "mis-

understanding." A few months later, Prof. Schlesinger wrote an account of the odyssey for *Harper's* and the English (US-subsidized) magazine *Encounter*.

Our returned traveler promises, at the outset, to stick to "new and concrete impressions," to the "complexities of experience" in place of the "easy abstractions which rule [the] thought" of stay-at-homes. "So superficial an inspection," he disarmingly grants us, "could hardly be expected to yield profound conclusions." However hardly to be expected, though, it does seem to have yielded a good many that are, if not exactly profound, at any rate portentously worded.

As early as his opening paragraph, Prof. Schlesinger has discovered from his officially guided tour of a few cities in three

of the two dozen Communist countries that there is a universal "heterogeneity of Communist practise"—which fact, moreover, such is the acuteness of his concrete impressions, he realized to be "the best, if not the only, hope for eventual world peace." And he must have brought in his equipage an outstanding telescope, for half of his second paragraph records his findings on China.

So it goes. "Power, of course, settles heavily on the Sino-Russian side of the spectrum. . . . The heart of Soviet dogmatism is the principle of infallibility. . . . The platonic essence of 'capitalism' does not correspond to the many mutations of a ceaselessly changing economic system. . . . Human nature is too obstinate, various, and elusive to be efficiently mastered by any technique thus far devised short of physical obliteration." Finally, God save the mark: "The one safe generalization about the Soviet Union is that it is in flux." If it were not for Prof. Schlesinger's initial disavowal, one might almost think that these were "easy abstractions." Toward the end of his narrative, our author harks back to his opening candor: "The great value of a few weeks behind the Iron Curtain is to remind oneself of the treachery of abstractions." *Ipse*, that time, surely *dixit*.

It is disappointing, really, that Prof. Schlesinger doesn't tell us a little more about what he saw and heard and smelled. When precisely made and accurately expressed, direct observations of unfamiliar places—"concrete impressions"—can be wonderfully interesting in themselves, as well as occasionally instructive. But even the rare sentences where Prof. Schlesinger seems merely to be recording observations rather than proclaiming abstractions are suspect on closer notice. "The streets of Moscow are filled with people trickling back from exile and hard labor in Siberia." It may be so, but it is certain that Prof.

Schlesinger did *not* observe, and could not have observed, anything of the sort. What percentage of Moscow streets did he see? Among the passers by, how many did he, personally, confirm to be returned exiles? Could he, who does not speak Russian and to whom returned exiles would be most unlikely to pour out their life stories even if he did, have confirmed such a generalization in any case? In similar fashion, most of the assertions about "life and comfort," "consumer goods," Khrushchev's wanting "very much to be liked," about the new Soviet citizens who feel "so free and so affluent" and who "are reaching out for beauty and gaiety, for speed and risk, for autonomy, privacy, and self-expression," dissolve into semantic dust at the lightest touch of a critical finger. True or false, these were not things seen, but conclusions deduced from hearsay or pre-formed beliefs.

Nor was it from Russia but from his colleague across the Harvard Yard, Prof. John Kenneth Galbraith, that he got the "impressions" out of which, in the rhetoric of the inside-stuff observer, he cast a key paragraph: "It is impressive and scary to see [*sic*—it takes X-ray eyes for this depth of seeing] what energy a great nation can generate when it allocates its talent and resources according to an intelligent [a strangely selected word] system of priorities. . . . The Soviet leadership thinks it important to send a rocket to the moon and not very important to supply tourists with tickets to Odessa, so they apportion their talent and resources accordingly. The able men work on rockets, the dopes on tickets. . . . Our own beloved country meanders along on the opposite theory: we allow the market to determine our national priorities, which means that we allocate a major share of our talent and resources to consumer services and too often leave the sending of rockets to the moon to men who

might be better employed [N.B. Dr. Braun and General Schriever] selling tickets to Odessa. If three-quarters of the national energy now dedicated to creating and satisfying consumer wants were dedicated instead to building national power, we would not have to worry about the Soviet campaign to 'overtake and surpass' the United States." We would not have to worry, it might be added, because if three-quarters of the energy were so allocated, we would all starve to death. But statistics have never been one of Prof. Schlesinger's strong points.

Actually, the only sentences that seem derived from direct, behind-the-Curtain observation are those which describe meetings with Soviet writers (whose words were presumably filtered for Prof. Schlesinger—though this detail is not mentioned—by translators). Curiously, nearly all the facts observed in these meetings contradict the generalities and the abstractions.

In abstractu, Prof. Schlesinger repeatedly informs us that "Soviet citizens talk freely" and "feel free," that "freedom of comment has unquestionably improved since the death of Stalin," that Soviet youth, "as against the bleak and sterile dogmatism of their fathers . . . appear to be reaching out for concreteness, variety, spontaneity," that in sum, "nearly all the changes which have taken place since the death of Stalin have been in what the Western liberal must call the right direction." But whenever Prof. Schlesinger gets down to cases and tells about actual meetings with actual human beings, he invariably finds: "What seem as ascertainable facts to the Westerner are believed in the Soviet Union only when they conform to the official stereotypes"; "Within the elite, manners tend to be pompous and hectoring, and the conception of discussion is hopeless" (if "hopeless," why, then, a cultural exchange program?); "I have never been

lied to as casually, contemptuously, and persistently as in the Soviet Union"; "The style in which they discussed such matters [politics, economics, peace] was as discouraging as the substance"; "The hard fact is that the last thing the Soviet Union cares about is a free exchange of ideas." But hard facts make no lasting impression on soft minds.

Prof. Schlesinger is too faithful an ideologue to be able to observe. Like all ideological travelers, he brings back only what he takes with him. What he took on this visit to the other side were his Liberal axioms and values, a theory of Soviet development, and a passionate commitment to a policy of coexistence-at-all-costs—i.e., appeasement.

The theory of Soviet development is a refurbishing of Trotsky's theory of Thermidor—of the inevitable bourgeoisification of revolutions. The rise of Khrushchev—so the theory goes in the Schlesinger adaptation—marks an essential break with the Stalin era. "Since the death of Stalin, [the Soviet Union] has been divesting itself of much of the irrationality which we considered its essence. . . . The implication of the talk about the 'bad times' [of Stalin] is that times are better now. This cannot be gainsaid. . . . It would be a great mistake to suppose that there is no 'real difference' between Stalin's Russia and the Russia of Khrushchev."

On the one hand, Khrushchev has "normalized" the regime and led it in a liberal direction, if not yet all the way to the "liberal Communism [which] Poland and Yugoslavia forced this observer to concede the feasibility of."

On the other hand, and more fundamentally, Khrushchev not merely strengthened the Soviet economy but "took over the Malenkov program . . . and in the last two years has been making a prodigious effort to raise standards of life and comfort. . . .

There can be no question [no question, mind you, and don't give me any of your statistics on gadgets per capita] that Khrushchev has committed his country to the consumer-goods merry-go-round." The easy life promises, given time, to crack the hard shell of Communism. "One cannot help feeling that the movement towards a consumer society will in the long run begin to erode the dogmatic monolith. . . . The critical question is whether . . . the consumer-goods passion may not upset the system of priorities and sap the single-minded intensity with which the Soviet economy dedicates itself to the building of national power. One detects already [on sensitive Harvard seismographs, apparently] a new deference to consumer motives."

The consumer-oriented economy and liberalized internal regime promote and indeed demand a peaceful foreign policy. "Stalin *required* international tension: only an overhanging external threat could reconcile his people to his savage interior tyranny. Khrushchev, by diminishing the interior tyranny, diminishes at the same time the need for external crises. . . . I would guess that Khrushchev deeply wants a *détente*."

Now comes the policy payoff. We must "reject the mystique of Either/Or," stop dividing "the world too glibly between the 'democratic' or 'capitalist' and the 'socialist' or 'Communist' camps," and accept a *détente*, so that Khrushchevian Communism can complete its evolution to affluent, liberal and peaceful "de-totalitarianization." The sure way to disaster is for us to try to get tough. "Surely one of the strongest arguments for a *détente* is precisely the fact that relaxation might give the forces of pluralism and tolerance a chance to dissolve the ideological dogmatism of Soviet society. . . . The one thing above all indispensable for the victory of the Polish-Yugoslav [liberalizing] tendency

is the relaxation of international tensions. The resumption of the cold war would snuff out the inchoate burgeonings in the Soviet Union."

II

No one will suppose that Prof. Schlesinger could have "observed" all *that* on a month's whirlwind tour. Where, then, did he get in particular this theory of Soviet development that he carried in his knapsack? We have noted that his theory of national power and consumer affluence was borrowed from his campus colleague, Prof. Galbraith. For the theory of development, he had only to drop a couple of miles further down the Charles River to Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the offices of Prof. W. W. Rostow.

In the autumn of 1958 Prof. Rostow delivered a series of lectures at Cambridge University. These were printed by *The Economist* last summer and published this year as *The Stages of Economic Growth*. Therein he "presents an economic historian's way of generalizing the sweep of modern history . . . a theory about economic growth and a more general, if still highly partial, theory about modern history as a whole." The treatise is a neo-Marxian Manifesto, a work of what *Pravda* nowadays calls "revisionism"—that is, watered-down Leninism.

In summary, the Rostow theory identifies "all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories: the traditional society, the preconditions for the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption." Each society waits around for millennia in the traditional category. In post-Renaissance times one after another has been somehow stirred to set up the preconditions for industrial take-off. From that point on, caught in the gears of compound interest, it mounts more or less inevitably through

the successive stages to the high mass-consumption level which the United States and Canada are said to have reached in the 1920's, Britain and Australia in the '30's, and Sweden, Germany, France and Japan a few years ago.

From the point of view of economic history, the Rostow Stages theory seems to be a linguistic device for the arrangement of data, analogous to Toynbee's "challenge and response" terminology or the Hegelian-Marxian "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" triad. As such it is not very elegant—Prof. Rostow not sharing the Schlesinger-Galbraith literary flair—nor does it tell us anything much about the subject-matter, other than the rather obvious point that some nations have become industrialized and concomitantly raised their material standard of living. It may have a certain utility in planning the topics for a course of lectures or suggesting the table of contents for a book.

Prof. Rostow, however, is by no means willing to restrict his theory to so modest a role. Though with a running diversionary fire of qualifications, "on the other hands" and "other things being equal," Prof. Rostow is in reality proposing a hypothesis not of linguistics but of substance: a neo-Marxian economic determinism as an inclusive theory of history. If that were not the way in which both he and his readers were understanding it, his book would have little interest for anyone but specialized scholars, instead of the large and still expanding influence that it is in fact having on publicists, chancelleries and Presidential candidates.

Not only are the five stages an economic growth pattern through which every society all but inevitably passes, but the economic transformations are, in turn, all but inevitably correlated with—are the cause of, *tout court*—transformations in customs, politics, beliefs, and so on.

When driving up through the early stages, a nation is terribly aggressive and dangerous to outsiders. But as it enters the affluent stage of automobiles and high mass-consumption, it relaxes. War is no longer in the national interest, no longer "rational." If it is able to do so, the high mass-consumption society prefers to live in peace with others in order to focus on its "inner frontiers" and enjoy its flesh pots, cars, ranch homes, outboards and babies.

So the United States. And Russia now is moving from the stage of maturity to the stage of high mass-consumption: that, at bottom, is the meaning of the change from the Stalin to the Khrushchev era. The Russians want the flesh pots and cars, and Khrushchev wants to give them what they want. Russia's "criteria of national interest" dictate an acceptance of controlled arms limitation, subordination of sovereignty, and a peaceful world of "diffused power." *Our* problem is to carry out "the great act of persuasion" that will get the Russians "to accept the consequences of peace and the age of high consumption, so that they can go forward with the rest of the human race in the great struggle to find new peaceful frontiers* for the human experience." This we can do if we give the newly taking-off nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America lots of help in rushing through *their* stages, and if we "demonstrate to the Russians that there is an interesting and lively alternative . . . to either an arms race or unconditional surrender." (More briefly: foreign aid and appeasement.) Communism in the disagreeable, the aggressive, sense is only—as a subhead puts it, "A Disease of the Transition." It will fade away as the stages of growth unfold, so long as we don't upset

*The appearance of the term "new frontier" as central concept in Senator John F. Kennedy's speech accepting the Presidential nomination is not coincidental.

the appletart by challenging it during this "century or so until the age of high mass-consumption becomes universal."

III

Professors Schlesinger, Rostow and Galbraith are leading fellows in the contemporary school of social scientists who write political tracts in the form of history, economics and sociology: a defense of the New Deal in the form of a history of Andrew Jackson; an apology for statism in the guise of an analysis of the new economic equilibrium; a call for recognition of Communist China masked as a scholarly survey of Chinese "prospects."

The essay of Prof. Schlesinger's that I have here examined is insensitive and pedantically abstract if taken as a first-hand account of the experiences of travel; Prof. Rostow's book, taken as a historical theory, is pretentious, dull and almost empty of verifiable content. But it is naive to read them as if travel essay and historical theory. Both are in reality tracts that exploit a respectable, accepted form to propagandize for a political point of view that is unacceptable to most Americans—doubtless even to Messrs. Schlesinger and Rostow—when stated baldly and unadorned: the point of view of unconditional coexistence with Communism; that is, of appeasement.

The Schlesinger-Rostow-Galbraith concept of a Khrushchevian liberalization and *détente*-seeking induced by a growingly consumer-oriented economy falls into place in the long chain of concepts and theories that have served to justify our unwillingness to accept the truth about Communism. The unchanging objective of the Communist world enterprise is and has always been a monopoly of world power, and therefore our destruction. This has been the unchanging objective under all circum-

stances and in all "stages of growth": in 1903 when the enterprise was founded by a few dozen outcasts with a half-dozen revolvers as armament; in defeat and victory, war and peace, Five Year Plans, War Communism, New Economic Policy or Opening of Virgin Lands; under Lenin, Stalin, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Suslov or Mao.

This truth means that the only thing we can do about Communism, if we are unwilling to surrender, is defeat it. But we of the West have so far declined to face that cheerless conclusion. We therefore invent one theory after another to explain why Communism cannot win, will turn gentle, or will be defeated on our behalf by someone else. In pre-1917 years we explained to ourselves that Communism could not win because Communists were a powerless sect of crackpot fanatics. In 1917 they became patriotic Russian democrats overthrowing reactionary Tsardom. Lenin's New Economic Policy showed them to be reverting to capitalism. Stalin's Socialism in One Country was proof that they had given up world ambitions. With the Popular Front they were transformed into staunch anti-fascist allies. In China there was nothing to worry about, because Chinese Communists were agrarian reformers. After the war, Tito was heaven-sent as he-who-would-do-our-work-for-us: imperial, international Communism would split into a score of rival national Communisms. The Red Army is really Russian, not Communist, and will restrain Communist adventurism. The Sino-Russian conflict absorbs the energies of the Communist bloc, so that there is no excess for external aggression. At each and every moment there is always a theory, usually a choice of theories, to prove that we don't have to meet the challenge of Communism ourselves, because something internal to Communism or someone else or some great im-

personal force of History will do it for us.

The idea of Khrushchev the peace-needing, consumer-oriented liberalizer, risen to power in response to an increasingly affluent Russian economy and comfort-minded citizenry, is a postwar egghead link in this continuous chain of excuse and rationalization.

Then, after the weaving of so much fine ideological cloth by our busy trio, Khrushchev the Liberalizer tore it to pitiful shreds in a single morning in Paris last June. Khrushchev, worse luck, doesn't read Professors Schlesinger or Rostow, or even Professor Galbraith. We might be a good deal better off if he did, and we didn't.

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, JULY 2, 1946 AND JUNE 11, 1960 (74 STAT. 208) SHOWING THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION OF: MODERN AGE: A Conservative Review, published quarterly at Chicago, Illinois, for October 1, 1960.

1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business manager are: Publisher, David S. Collier; Editor, Eugene Davidson; Managing Editor, none; Business Manager, Hyung W. Pak; all of Room 634, 64 East Jackson Boulevard, Chicago 4, Illinois.

2. The owner is: The Institute for Philosophical and Historical Studies, Inc., (an Illinois not-for-profit corporation which issues no stock), Room 634, 64 East Jackson Boulevard, Chicago 4, Illinois.

3. The known bondholders, mortgages, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: None.

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustees or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge of belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner.

5. Not applicable.

/S/ Hyung W. Pak

/T/ Hyung W. Pak, Business Manager

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 4th day of October, 1960.

(Seal)

/S/ Dorothy W. Mickelberry

(My commission expires September 16, 1964)

A view of the great styles of the past in the divided world of today.

Some Reflections on the Problem of Universal Style

RUDOLF ALLERS

THE PAST APPEARS to the historian, on one hand, as an uninterrupted sequence of events, and, on the other, as divisible into eras, ages, periods or epochs. Although continuous, the changes whose study constitutes the subjectmatter of history, do not appear to proceed at an equal rate at all times. Certain features persist for centuries and this fact seems to justify times being comprised under a common name.

The principles determining the choice of such a name are most divers. Pre-history, for instance, in speaking of a stone age, an age of bronze or of iron, bases its division on the kind of raw material used for the fabrication of tools. It is a similar viewpoint which dictates the choice of a name, when one makes, in modern times, technological features the diacritical moment; in this manner the present times are designated as the machine age, subdivided according to the use of steam or of electricity, or, quite recently, as the atomic age.

To attempt a survey of all these various principles of division into ages, however interesting a task this may be, is far beyond the scope of this article. To illustrate the confusing multiformity of such divisions, it suffices to point out some of them. The history of ancient Egypt, for example, uses the dynasties as a principle of division. In other cases, it is an outstanding personality which gives the name to an age: the age of Alexander the Great, the century of Louis XIV, the Napoleonic era. Or the name is derived from certain events which are believed to have wrought deep changes in the structure of society; such events may be non-political, as when one speaks of an "age of discoveries," or political, like the religious wars or the Revolution. A prevailing conception of sociopolitical structures, as, for instance, absolutism, a generally accepted view on economics, or a philosophical attitude may likewise serve as denominators of certain periods; liberalism, free enterprise, Enlightenment are names of this kind.

Some of these ages refer to the whole of a civilization or of a continent, others to the history of a country or a nation. Feudalism is an example of the first kind, the division of the history of France illustrates the second kind: Ancien Régime, the four Republics, with the periods of the First and the Second Empires and the Restoration as intermediary phases.

There is one further way of characterizing an age which appears to be of particular interest and which posits problems of its own. Certain historical periods are given names derived not from political, social, or economic categories but from the artistic styles which then prevailed with a definite universality. When history speaks of a classic age, of a Gothic age, or of that of the Baroque, it applies to the totality of a phase of Western civilization names which primarily designate an artistic style. This fact deserves to be examined more closely, especially because in other instances it is not the style which gives the name to the age, but rather the latter, defined by means of other categories, which serves to designate the style: Empire, Regency, Victorian. The age of the Baroque has been the last one to justify such a characterization. Since the Baroque form of European civilization has come to an end, no new style of comparable universality has developed.

The term "universal style" is taken in the strict sense of a certain uniformity of thought and life manifesting itself primarily in the field of artistic creativity. The emphasis is to be placed on "universal"; in a loose sense one may, indeed, speak of a style within a certain school or even of an individual style. It can hardly be denied that there has been no universal style since the vanishing of the age of the Baroque.

The absence of a universal style does not preclude there being many other traits

which characterize an age. Evidently, certain conditions must be fulfilled for an age to permit its being designated by the style then prevailing.

Consequently, it becomes possible to correlate the absence of a universal style, as in the case of the last one hundred and fifty years, to the growth of the sense of freedom and to the intensified consciousness of individuality. Particularly if a work of art is thought of primarily as "self-expression" and great emphasis is placed on the absolute uniqueness of the individual, conformity to generally recognized rules appears as precluded and as contrary to the very essence of art. Whether or not this doctrine of self-expression is justified is a question not to be asked in the present context. One ought, however, to realize that the notion that individuality rose into consciousness only during the Renaissance cannot possibly be upheld, in spite of the popularity it has enjoyed and still enjoys. Pagan hellenistic thought had some definite idea of human individuality and personality; but the source of our conception of the human person is to be found in Christianity. The medieval mind did not think of the human person as submerged in some greater whole, as if individual man existed only insofar as he was a member of the Church or of society. And the full recognition of the individual in his uniqueness is perfectly compatible with the recognition of universal principles.

In fact, the existence of a universal style did not at all preclude the free display of individual creativity. Quite the contrary; a universal style is the very opposite of identical repetition. The great Gothic cathedrals of Chartres, Paris, or Strasbourg are born out of the same spirit, their architecture is ruled by the same principles, their symbolism is governed by the same ideas, but every one of them is

nevertheless absolutely unique, so much so that even the most common structural elements, like the ogive or the trefoil, appear different here and there in a subtle manner difficult to define. It is the same with all the other great universal styles.

If, therefore, there is a relationship between the disappearance of universal style and individualism, it cannot be individualism as such which plays the decisive rôle; it has to be a peculiar form of it.

The great universal styles receive their names from their manifestations in architecture. The fundamental categories, therefore, are primarily of a spatial nature or such as arise from analogies with structures in space. For an age to derive its name from style, it is necessary that the whole of human existence, private and public, be conceived somehow under categories identical with, or analogous to, those which determine spatial structure. As soon as these categories no longer are apprehended as commensurate with the living totality of man's existence, there is no longer the possibility of an age being characterized by a universal style.

It appears probable that the change Western mentality underwent around the middle of the seventeenth century is the most important factor that made impossible either the persistence of the universal style or the emergence of a new one.

Undoubtedly, for a cultural trait to spread over the whole of Western civilization, there has to exist a certain unity, a certain common spirit, in spite of and above all political and national diversities. European unity, even of a purely cultural nature, had become rather precarious, but it retained enough of its power to make possible the acceptance of the Baroque mentality on a continental scale. Dynastic aspirations and the rise of nationalism were forces destructive of this unity. To view them, however, as the only effective fac-

tors would amount to an unwarranted simplification and, hence, to a falsification. Nor can the change of mentality, of which some words must be said, be made exclusively responsible. It is, however, submitted that herein lies one of the main reasons why the "spirit of the Baroque" deteriorated and finally vanished and why nothing of the sort has emerged since that time; there is to be found here a plausible reason why the present age cannot produce a universal style. It has been tacitly assumed hitherto that our own times lack such a style; why that is true and why it must be so will become clear later.

However different seventeenth-century thought may have been from that of the Middle Ages, the medieval spirit was not yet dead. A work like the *Ethics* of Spinoza is much more akin to medieval Scholasticism than to the modern way of philosophizing. Both Catholic and Protestant theologians remained indebted to their medieval predecessors. So also persisted in many places the forms of life and political organization found in prior centuries. The new ideas of Galileo and his successors, the classical revival, the rise of Cartesianism had as yet been unable to transform the Western mind thoroughly. All this was but the prelude to the decisive shifting from a static conception of the world, and, hence, one exprimable in spatial categories, to one based on the principles of dynamics and, therefore, couched in terms of temporality.

When Leibniz declared that, forced by the logic of the calculus, he had to conceive of rest as a movement of the velocity zero, he dealt the death blow to the already shattered edifice of a hierarchically ordered, static system of substances of which every single one was neatly separated from every other by its specific substantial form. When he, furthermore, envisaged the principle of continuity, the

universal existence of imperceptible, infinitely small transitions, as one of fundamental ontological significance, he himself realized clearly the consequences of such a conception, even to the extent that he foresaw the inevitability of a generalized theory of evolution.

It is, in fact, not so much science, as it developed under the leadership of Leibniz and Newton, which destroyed the last remnants of the static world view inherited from the Middle Ages as it was this new metaphysics which rendered possible the scientific approach. Whether the generalization of a principle derived from mathematics and physics into one of metaphysics and whether the scientific conception as one of universal applicability were well founded are questions not to be debated here. What is relevant is that there arose a new world view, essentially different from that which had prevailed before. The world appeared no longer as an architectonically ordered static structure, but as the dynamic interplay of forces. Not stability but change became the most significant aspect of reality.

The idea of "progress" corresponds to the dynamistic interpretation of physical reality in the theory of politics, of society, of civilization. Not that the former would necessarily lead to the latter, if this is to mean an incessant, quasi-natural movement towards an increasingly better state of affairs. For it is equally possible to conceive of a dynamism resulting in deterioration and final destruction; the notion of "entropy" in physics points, for instance, in that direction. But the outlook of the late seventeenth century and that of the eighteenth were characterized by an enthusiastic optimism which the achievements of science and, soon, technology seemed to justify. Leibniz spoke of an "infinite progress of the whole universe" and the belief in the advent of a terres-

trial paradise—the "heavenly city of the philosophers," as it has justly been called—was shared by all the spokesmen of the new spirit.

The "myth of progress" may have lost much of its persuasiveness; man is today no longer convinced of moving towards an ideal state of society to the same extent as were Fontenelle, Condorcet, Voltaire, and their followers. But contemporary thought is dominated not less than that of the eighteenth century by the idea of continuous change. The key word of modern mentality is not "order" but "process."

One cannot think or speak of order without availing oneself of metaphors taken from spatial relations. Even the most elementary terms reveal this origin; to refer to the relation of whole and part, to an item as comprised in a class, of a species being subordinate to a genus, and many other expressions means to transfer to all facets of experience certain categories which originally are spatial relationships. To think in terms of order is equivalent to thinking in terms of stability—a word which also connotes spatiality—and, hence, to assuming the existence of some immutable principles or, as they have been called, of "absolutes."

To a mind intoxicated by an unrestricted belief in progress, nothing appears as a greater obstacle to "infinite progress" than the acceptance of any absolute, whatever its nature. Human life is not seen as governed by the principles which would remain unaltered throughout all the vicissitudes of history, but as the sequence of ever renewed efforts of "adjustment" to continuously changing situations. Reason is not conceived as a power enabling man to discover eternal and universally valid principles, but as an "instrument" to be used for solving the practical problems as they successively emerge in the course of ever changing situations.

The foregoing remarks, however sketchy they be, ought to have made it evident that the Western mentality, since the middle of the seventeenth century, is anything but conducive to the development of a universal style. For such one must think, at least to a certain extent, in the categories of stability, of space, and of order. The antagonism of a spirit capable of giving birth to a universal style, on the one hand, and the spirit reigning in modern times, on the other, is reinforced by the peculiar kind of individualism which has grown up since the end of the Ancien Régime. Be it said once more: it is not individualism as such which came to the fore in the last two centuries; one will not find in modern literature an appreciation of the uniqueness and dignity of the human person greater than that asserted, for instance, by St. Thomas Aquinas. What characterizes the modern conception, however, is the idea of an essentially unrestricted freedom, that is, one to which limits are set only because of the practical necessities of common life, limits which are to be reduced to the inevitable minimum to attain the true goal of a "progressing" and "progressive" humanity.

For the "situations" which each individual has to face and with which he has to cope are as much differentiated as are the individuals themselves. In a world void of universally valid principles, hostile to all "absolutes," freedom cannot know of any restrictions other than those imposed by the practical conditions of life. These conditions, too, are conceived of as subject to continuous change. A world view based on the categories of dynamism and transformation does not allow for the recognition of any stable rules, even if their stability is only relative. All stabilization appears, inevitably, as "petrification," as an arrest of the incessant move-

ment which makes up the very essence of human existence.

Where these restricting practical considerations may be disregarded, even a relative stability becomes not only meaningless but destructive. Art is that side of human creativity that appears least limited by practical needs. To conform to the principles embodied in a universal style, consequently, appears as an unwarranted restriction of freedom. It is noteworthy that the tendencies alive in modern art are often designated by way of negations; if one speaks of non-objective, abstract art and so forth, one uses terms of an essentially negative nature. The abandonment of classical forms in poetry, the preference for *vers libre*, and similar tendencies are phenomena of a similar kind.

Several objections may be raised against the views outlined on these pages. One may safely disregard the rather cheap and, in truth, meaningless idea that to have no universal style is precisely what constitutes the style of our times. This is mere verbiage, not even playing with words but misusing them. More sensible may appear, at first sight, the idea that the present times are of transition, even of revolution, and that a new universal style will emerge once a certain stabilization is attained. On closer examination, however, this prediction loses much of its plausibility. It would be difficult, to say the least, to discover any signs indicative of a new universal style. Of course there are common traits. The new apartment houses, for instance, beyond the Bois de Boulogne could as well stand in some American suburb, and the office buildings in Munich would not be out of place in Chicago. There is even a greater resemblance to be observed, amounting to a real uniformity, than existed in older times, for example in the age of the Baroque.

But uniformity alone does not constitute a universal style, which, quite to the contrary, is characterized by a far-going multiformity within the framework of generally recognized principles. Were it uniformity which makes up the essence of style, mass production would be the ideal condition for such a style to exist. But it is precisely mass production which is the deadliest enemy of style.

Furthermore, what makes it possible that things—buildings, furniture, all sorts of implements—be practically interchangeable is not only the factor of standardization but also the idea of "functionalism." Both of these ideas are heterogeneous to artistic creativity. It is one of the paradoxes of our age that the demand of "self-expression," of uninhibited unfolding of individual proclivities, of the elimination of all "frustrating" restrictions, co-exist with an ever increasing tendency toward "conformism." The "other-directed" man of today, to use Professor Riesman's term, is caught in the unsolvable dilemma between the societal pressure, enforcing conformity, and the urge of "self-expression." The interchangeability of things is related to conformism and rendered possible by purely utilitarian principles which disguise themselves in art and style by assuming the name of "functionalism." These principles, however, can be effective only in such fields of creativity where the pragmatic categories of use and usefulness come into play. Hence the cleavage between architecture (and allied activities) and other forms of artistic creativity.

It must be pointed out that the considerations submitted on these pages have no bearing on problems of aesthetics properly so called. Nor is it suggested that the presence of a universal style is more conducive to the emerging of "great" art than its absence. The approach is sociological rather than aesthetic.

But opinions on the value and significance of art, when proposed by a "leading minority" and adopted by a larger public, are themselves societal facts. In this respect, it is not uninteresting to note that modern art has been hailed as the final triumph of man over nature and the conditions of his existence. Thus André Malraux and others interpret modern art as the expression of a total liberation of man's creativity from the surrounding reality; now man has reached the point where he creates for himself a universe, independently of all external limitations. This view is not unrelated to certain other ideas that are current today, primarily to the notion of the absolutely free "project" in the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. But this line of inquiry cannot be pursued any further within the present context.

There is, however, one aspect of modern art which deserves attention. Since surrounding reality appears, at first, to be set in the frame of three-dimensional space, it is easy to understand that the attitude of modern art in regard to space has become one which differs profoundly from that of past times. In many contemporary paintings the third dimension disappears completely. In others one notices a disregard of the "natural" order of things in space; their relationships are arbitrarily changed, their order reversed, their elements arranged in a manner unknown to the given world. "Pictorial space," to use this convenient expression, has never been—with a few exceptions of questionable aesthetic significance—a "copy" of real space; it has not been the intention of the great masters to create an "illusion" of space. Quite the contrary, some have dealt with space in a rather high-handed manner. Nevertheless it was generally recognized that pictorial art had to take account of the three-dimensionality of the world.

Architecture, of course, is forced to obey

to a higher degree the laws of space. Artistic creativity became manifest, accordingly, in forms which imposed new spatial arrangements on things and by doing so overcame, by making a novel use of them, the physical laws of matter in space. The Roman arch, the ogive of the Gothic style, the often extravagant shapes of Baroque buildings and their ornaments are outstanding examples.

Modern architecture reveals, in many of its creations, a very different attitude in regard to space. It is as if the contempt of reality, which is so visible in pictorial art, entails an unwillingness on the part of the modern builder to avail himself of the opportunities to use or transform space and spatial relationships. There are, of course, exceptions, but many modern buildings give the impression that space appeared to the architect as something abstract, something widely apart from what one has called "lived space." To put it in a perhaps exaggerated but not inappropriate manner, the space to which such buildings belong is the pure geometrical space, the system of Cartesian co-ordinates, rigid, lifeless, unimaginative. For the category of "function" is not one of aesthetics or artistic creativity, but one of technology and utilitarianism.

While some may see in the present state of art a symptom of decline or even of decay, others believe that out of the multiformity of products there will emerge a new universal style which they fondly hope will be commensurate with the "new world" and the "new men," both still to be born.

The optimistic prediction of a style to come has two sources. Some people believe that with the arrival of the "classless society" of the future there will emerge, automatically, as it were, a new style. Others hope and firmly believe that this "age of troubles" will give way to a new period of

social harmony and stability and that then there will again be the possibility of a new universal style's developing.

Much more serious is another argument. It reads more or less thus: There is, in fact, no universal style. Nor is there any reason to assume that there will be one at a future time. This may be regrettable; but it is of the essence of history that certain features, even though they be endowed with an indubitable value of their own, disappear, never to return again. The existence of a universal style depended on conditions which no longer have any place in the structure of the modern world. The phenomenon of a universal style belongs to the past; it cannot be brought back; no more, for instance, than the feudal organization of society or the unity of faith or the use of Latin as the common language of the scholarly world.

Those who reason on such lines admit that with the disappearance of a universal style there is lost the possibility of expressing and, hence, of rendering generally conscious the unity of the Western mind, inasmuch as it still exists or is capable of existing. From this fact, however, one would have to conclude that this form of expression or manifestation of unity is no longer commensurate with the level the Western mind has attained on its march since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Not a universal architectural or artistic style but the generality of technological devices and the new lines of communication become the visible documentation of unity nowadays. The effectiveness of these means is even considerably greater than a universal style ever was or could be because technology is neutral in regard to local social and national differentiations.

This, is, indeed, a defensible argument and one that does not lack a certain plausibility. Its cogency is nevertheless not as

great as it might appear, because it rests upon a questionable presupposition, namely that the kind of unity attained and expressed by diverse means is independent of these.

People can live in harmony and unity only if and inasmuch as they recognize as valid the same scale of values. To put it very simply, too simply in fact, true unity requires that the same things be at least approximately of the same importance to all. A universally understandable expression of unity must bear on values higher than those of mere "comfort." But the latter are the only ones which technology is capable of realizing. The facility of communication which results from technological achievements can be conducive to a real unity only if the communicated content, the "message," has an intrinsic reference to the true ends of man. This reference is completely lacking in technology as such, which is, by its very nature, indifferent to the ends for which realization it is employed. The unity brought about by the universality of technology, consequently, is not only in itself of a low order, but it is also most precarious because it does not render accessible, as it were, a supra-individual and supra-national meeting place. In other words, even the most universalized expansion of technology cannot

guarantee a correspondingly universalized recognition of principles.

The fact that the man in Marrakech, in Hanoi, and in Philadelphia avails himself of the same "gadgets" does not bring the three closer together. They could find and meet with each other only if they were agreed on the validity of universal principles. This agreement made possible the existence of a universal style, and this style, in turn, was the expression of the agreement.

The progressivist mentality and its by-products, scientism and relativism, a misunderstood conception of freedom and the negation of absolutes, oppose a not-to-be-overcome obstacle to the re-emergence of a universal style and to the attainment of, or even the approximation to, that minimum of unity and harmony without which mankind, one is afraid, is doomed.

To demand that certain principles be universally recognized and posited as absolutes is, in the eyes of the progressivist, characteristic of an obsolete, petrified, and—as he loves to call it—"reactionary" mind. But when action results in catastrophe, is it not time to resist? When the edifice of Western civilization threatens to disintegrate, should one not make all possible efforts to conserve its essentials?

A penetrating reappraisal of Babbitt and Croce.

Irving Babbitt and the Aestheticians

FOLKE LEANDER

When occasionally Irving Babbitt's name is mentioned in a book on aesthetics, one can almost tell in advance what is going to be said about him: that, aiming at a moral and cultural reform of his age, he applied to literature a set of standards that have little to do with aesthetic evaluation. However often this may have been repeated, it is hardly a tenable view. It is based upon a separation of aesthetic and ethical values that is increasingly felt to do violence to the facts of artistic experience and to be no more than a polemical, post-Christian and post-Classical over-simplification. Even Benedetto Croce gradually transcended the amoralist position of his early *Estetica*, especially in his practical criticism, and arrived at a point of view that is hardly consistent with it. But the study of aesthetics, as pursued in American and British

Departments of Philosophy, is still largely based on the *Estetica*, whereas Croce's later work has been little studied. The authors of a recent work on the theory of literature are no doubt right in saying that the influence of Croce has been "of a pervasive and atmospheric kind, blending with a generally favorable climate of opinion so as not always to be clearly distinguishable." Nevertheless this influence, direct or indirect, has been exerted only by the *Estetica*, and one may therefore ask whether contemporary aestheticians will not, sooner or later, be forced to undertake a revision of the amoralist postulate, similar to that which Croce himself was unable to avoid, however hard he tried to conceal it. If this should be so, Babbitt's work will be found to have a closer bearing on their problems than has hitherto been assumed.

If one were to summarize the basic tenets of Crocean aesthetics, the following formulae might be hazarded:

Intuition is a non-intellectual mode of knowing. Knowing what? Knowing life and nature as concretely experienced. Intuition means insight. Insight into what? Into the dynamic development of vital energies.

These definitions form a circuitous way of pointing to something within our experience, namely the artistic imagination as a mode of insight, a kind of knowing. Most modern aestheticians follow Croce with regard to the above doctrines. But let us now raise a question which modern aestheticians do not raise: Can the insight be more or less profound? Are there degrees of poetic truth, degrees of profundity in our imaginative vision of life? This question brings us into the realm of problems, where Babbitt's contribution to aesthetics should be looked for.

In his amoralist phase Croce says there is simply art and non-art; all art is equally true, and there are no degrees of poetic truth. Babbitt's opposition to Croce was directed against this view; and since his was the type of mind that looks for differences rather than agreements, he failed to notice in Croce the presence of another trend of thought, much closer to his own. Babbitt maintained that there is a difference between the poetry which shows us the superficial aspects of life and that which gives us profound insight into life as subjected to a moral world-order. The highest type of art, according to this view, is art which gives us insight into the moral substance of life. There is other art, valuable in its own way, although it does not go beneath the surface of life and therefore does not reach the moral core of reality.

What is the "moral substance of life"? Space does not permit me to go into Bab-

bitt's moral philosophy, nor is this necessary for a comparison with Croce, since the latter's view of the nature of the moral conscience, as expounded in his *Filosofia della pratica*, is in essentials identical with Babbitt's. Moreover, the whole conception of a moral world-order is familiar to anyone who knows his Plato or Aristotle. For the purposes of a comparison we may state that Babbitt and Croce were agreed as to the reality of a "higher will," or moral world-order, and that their disagreement—more partial than Babbitt believed—concerns the relation of art to this world-order. In his amoralist phase Croce thinks that intuition always has the same value, and that no artistically relevant distinctions can be based upon *what* is intuited.

Supreme instances of art penetrating the moral substance of life are, according to Babbitt, the dramas of Aeschylus and Sophocles, the myths of Plato, the poetry of Dante. But Babbitt also taught that this moral substance of life is inexhaustible. It cannot be locked up in a formula. It is infinitely faceted, showing some new aspect from whatever point you approach it. It is primarily through his imagination that man has access to the moral element of life: the insights of the Greek poets preceded the conceptual formulations of the Greek philosophers, just as the parables of Christ preceded the Scholastic elaboration of ethics. If one overlooks the cognitive function of the imagination as such, if one believes that the moral element of poetry is simply an importation into it of intellectual reflections, one falls into the *error of intellectualism*, as did the neo-Classical theorists of "reason" controlling "imagination." Since the imagination *as such* has varying degrees of cognitive insight, works of art may be ranked according to the fullness and clarity of such perception. Babbitt's contribution to aesthetics was a doctrine of the *degrees of poetic truth*, thus liberat-

ing Classicism from the error of intellectualism and freeing aesthetics from subservience to Romantic and "Realist" amorism.

The concept of poetic truth therefore turns out to be much more complex than might be inferred from the over-simplified accounts of it given by recent aestheticians. John Hospers, in his competent book on *Meaning and Truth in the Arts*, takes us no further than to a distinction between *truth-about* and *truth-to*. If you write a book on London, full of facts and statistics, you give *truth-about* London. If you write a poem on London, this poem may be *true-to* your experience of life as lived in that city. Poetry is true-to our feelings as evoked by concrete experience of things and events. It is true-to our emotional reactions to the life in which we participate. Poetic truth, Hospers would agree with the early Croce, is simply adequate expression. This analysis, Babbitt would object, is no doubt correct as far as it goes, but it leaves unexplored an entire dimension of our poetic experience. There is, he would explain, much more to be said in answer to the question: true-to what? Poetry may be true-to moods and states of mind not integrated into a complete personality and hence only conducive to superficial views of reality. Poetry may be true-to the whole personality, including the ethical self; it may be true-to the "human heart," and what is deepest in the human heart, and thus bring us closer to real life. Poetic truth is dependent on *what* is being expressed. To put it in terms of intuition: there is more and more poetic truth, the more our intuition penetrates our experience of life and manages to lay hold of its moral laws—laws that are not created by us for the simple reason that they are the immanent laws of our creative activity, inescapable and not subject to our caprice.

Other philosophers deal with the prob-

lem in the same one-sided fashion as does Hospers. Ernst Cassirer, for instance, summarizes his aesthetics as follows:

In science we try to trace phenomena back to their first causes, and to general laws and principles. In art we are absorbed in their immediate appearance, and we enjoy this appearance to the fullest extent in all its richness and variety. Here we are not concerned with the uniformity of laws but with the multiplicity and diversity of intuitions. Even art may be described as knowledge, but art is knowledge of a peculiar and specific kind. We may well subscribe to the observation of Shaftesbury that "all beauty is truth." But the truth of beauty does not consist in a theoretical description and explanation of things; it consists rather in the "sympathetic vision" of things. The two views of truth are in contrast with one another, but not in conflict or contradiction.

Cassirer says that there is such a thing as intuitive insight, but he forgets that this insight may vary in profundity. "Art is not an imitation but a discovery of reality," he goes on to say. A discovery of more or less? He gives no answer to that question. Irwin Edman describes the contrast between intellect and intuition as follows:

There is a poetic, dramatic, moral truth, truth that is the expression of a fact as humanly encountered or experienced [*What sort of facts?*], not a neutral description of its status in the total uncaring context of things. The arts give the truth of things [*What "things"?*] as they have an impact in the feelings and imaginations of men.

Edman, too, omits the question about the profundity of the level on which the concrete encounter takes place. What encounters what?—that is the problem which he does not raise. Susanne Langer deals

adequately with the truth-value of music. It is not just "expression," she says, meaning an immediate outburst of feeling—a theory which she erroneously attributes to Croce. Music, she says, is not as simple as that, for it gives knowledge as well:

It expresses the composer's knowledge of human feelings.

Music is the formulation and representation of emotions, moods, mental tensions and resolutions—a source of insight.

It makes emotive contents conceivable so that we can envisage and understand them.

A composer articulates subtle complexes of feeling that language cannot even name.

Musicality is often regarded as an essentially unintellectual trait. Perhaps that is why musicians, who know it is the prime source of their mental life and the medium of their clearest insight into humanity, so often feel called upon to despise the more obvious forms of understanding.

Insight is the gift of music; in very naive phrase, a knowledge of "how feelings go."

She has also an explanation of the truth-value of music. The tones are arranged in dynamic patterns that are isomorphic with the dynamic patterns of vital energies in our practical life. Hence music may serve as a symbolic picture. But she does not mention that the dynamic pattern of musical energies may be that of an ethical soul controlling expansive forces. Irwin Edman has a great deal to say about the truth of works of art:

One hears more than an arrangement of sounds in Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. One hears the comment of a great spirit on the world in which it lives. In Rembrandt's pictures of old rabbis, or El Greco's of Spanish gran-

dees, they put into canvas a vision of what life essentially meant to them.

But are all interpretations of what life means equally profound? Are imaginative visions of life always equally true? No answer. Edman continues:

A mood half articulate and half recognized in its confused recurrence becomes, as it were, clarified forever in a poem or a novel or a drama.

But how far into reality does that mood take us? Edman does not raise the question. Susanne Langer also has a good passage about the truth of literature:

The "livingness" of a story is really much surer, and often greater, than that of actual experience. Life itself may, at times, be quite mechanical and unperceived by those who live it.

And Edman is perhaps even more lucid when, speaking about a well-known poem, he expresses the same idea as follows:

Thousands of inarticulate men and women have felt that emotion about their beloved, but in that sonnet of Shakespeare's they find their common emotion rendered with uncommon and vitalizing felicity. A poem of love may teach them by its own instant and luminous reality what the reality of their own love is.

This is excellently said. But, in the name of common sense, cannot poetry give people largely illusory ideas about their own emotions? Emma Bovary was more imaginative than most people, but her imagination hardly reached down to the deeper strata of reality. It is strange that all modern, supposedly scientific, aestheticians should still follow in the wake of the nineteenth century Romantics, thus forgetting the obvious fact that the imagination may also give us superficial notions about life. And it is even more strange that they

are perfectly well aware of it in other connections. Susanne Langer is surprised that such an imaginative creature as man should have been able to survive on this earth.

Modern aestheticians, following Croce, interpret the term "catharsis" as referring merely to the act of expression or intuition, quite apart from *what* is expressed or intuited. As Cassirer puts it:

Our passions are no longer dark and impenetrable powers; they become, as it were, transparent. . . But the image of a passion is not the passion itself. . . If we accept this view of art we can come to a better understanding of a problem first encountered in the Aristotelian theory of catharsis. . . In this world all our feelings undergo a sort of transubstantiation with respect to their essence and their character.

According to Babbitt, on the other hand, "catharsis" refers to our experience when the imagination penetrates the moral substance of reality. All art does not result in this catharsis, he holds.

As Babbitt pointed out, the notion that all products of the imagination have an equal amount of poetic truth is of fairly recent origin; it goes back to the early Romantics. Before that there had been a distinction between unrestrained imagination (which was at best regarded as idyllic play, at worst as foolish "conceit") and an imagination governed by "reason." The Classical critics, Babbitt held, were right in insisting upon the necessity of a distinction, though wrong in their manner of stating it. And whereas the Classical revival in twentieth century France remained entangled in the old intellectualist error—you will find it in Maurras, Seillière, Lasserre, Benda—Irving Babbitt avoided it by completely abolishing the old idea of a "reason" controlling the imagination. The truth of art is poetic, and not intellectual. The imagination *as such* lays hold of the moral

substance of life. Art is neither intellect nor moral will; art is intuition, nothing else, but intuition *as such* may have varying degrees of depth. Thus Babbitt furnishes a complement to modern aesthetics that will disengage it definitively from the untenable elements of Romanticism, while retaining what is valid in Romantic thought.

The significance of this contribution to aesthetic theory has hardly been fully appreciated, even by those who have best understood Babbitt. Louis J. A. Mercier failed to deal with it adequately in his account of Babbitt's philosophy, and in a recent important essay Austin Warren endorsed Mercier's misinterpretation: "Comparing Babbitt's terms with those of Catholic Scholasticism, Mercier rightly glosses the 'higher imagination' as 'intellect'—that which apprehends universals." Yet Babbitt was very explicit in pointing out that his "imaginative perception of the universal" (i.e., of the Moral Law) is *not* conceptual thought. The imagination is sometimes thought of as a combination of a passive sensuous element and an active rational element which, by being fettered to sense, is not yet reason proper—rather some sort of caterpillar stage in the growth of reason which, when it reaches its full development, will leave its sensuous envelope and soar like a butterfly in the pure air of conceptual thought. This was definitely not Babbitt's view of the imagination. As he pointed out in an important note to *Rousseau and Romanticism*, the error of Greek philosophy was its notion of the imagination as a passive power: "In its failure to bring out with sufficient explicitness this *creative* rôle of the imagination and in the stubborn intellectualism that this failure implies is to be found, if anywhere, the weak point in the cuirass of Greek philosophy." In this context the word "creative" refers to the power of the imagination to

disengage essentials from the welter of actualities and thus to attain to a more accurate perception of reality. Babbitt shared Croce's view that the imagination is an active power in its own right, not merely in so far as the intellect is working through it and moving it from the inside like a hand moving a glove. The imagination as such "lays hold of," or "has access to," "the universal." It is a non-intellectual mode of cognition in the full sense of the word and not just in a Pickwickian sense.

The harmful effect of foisting on Babbitt an intellectualism that he himself rejected comes to the fore in Warren's essay when, disparaging Babbitt's aesthetic sense and raising the question why he did not become a philosopher instead of a literary critic, he produces the following sentence: "Literature he conceived of as ethics 'touched by emotion.'" This is not true. He conceived of literature as *imagination*, although with varying degrees of moral profundity.

In Gilbert and Kuhn's *A History of Esthetics* there is not a word about Matthew Arnold, which is all the more remarkable, since everybody else in the English and American nineteenth century is rather fully treated. Arnold, groping his way towards the idea of various degrees of poetic truth, does not fit into the categories of modern aestheticians, nor does Babbitt when he expands Arnold's somewhat limited attempts into an impressive body of thought. Modern aestheticians do not know what to do with either of them and prefer simply to leave them out.

II

I have said there are two trends in Croce, one towards Romantic Aestheticism, the other towards Babbittian Humanism. The first aspect of Croce's thought has exerted considerable influence on contempo-

rary aesthetic theory; its humanistic side has scarcely been noticed outside Italy, except in certain fields, such as the appreciation of the Baroque. As applied to twentieth century literature, the Humanistic trend in Croce's criticism appears for instance in the following passage of the *Breviario di estetica*, of 1912:

Contemporary art, sensual, insatiable in the desire for enjoyment, furrowed by turbid strivings towards a misunderstood aristocracy which turns out to be an ideal of voluptuousness or domination and cruelty; sometimes indulging in a mysticism which is equally egoistic and voluptuous; without faith in God or faith in reason, sceptical and pessimistic—and often powerful in rendering such states of mind—this art, which moralists condemn in vain—when it has been understood in its most profound motives and in its genesis, calls for action, which surely shall not consist in condemning, suppressing or correcting art, but in directing life more energetically towards a saner and profounder morality, which will engender an art more noble in its content. . . .

If the art Croce had in mind was "very powerful in rendering such states of mind," we may ask: Have not all *aesthetically* legitimate demands been satisfied? If "rendering" them means "expressing" them, as seems clearly to be the case, Croce would be in logic bound to answer yes. Yet Croce the Humanist answers no. Again, what is meant by "an art more noble in its content"? Croce's "official" doctrine gives him no right to introduce such a standard of evaluation. Yet Croce the Humanist applies it. In 1917 he wrote an important essay on "*Il carattere di totalità della espressione artistica*" which is rather Babbittian in spirit. Here he says that

if the moral force is, as it certainly is,

a cosmic force and queen of the world [*regina del mondo*], which is a world of liberty, it dominates by its own power; and art is the more perfect, the more clearly it reflects and expresses the development of reality; the more it is art, the better it shows the morality inherent in the nature of things.

This is Humanist aesthetics: art is "the more perfect," the profounder its intuition of reality is. Croce also says that "now, after a century and a half of Romanticism," the tendency, in France and elsewhere, towards a Classical revival is legitimate. He speaks of a Romantic "malady" which can only be overcome in the individual artist by way of a development of his "philosophical-ethical-religious character, or *personality*, the basis of art as of everything else." And if the malady is not overcome, this means prolonged suffering for a *travagliata e travagliante* humanity. True art, he says in this essay, is the expression of the *whole* personality, including the ethical self. Quite so. But what about the art that does not express the whole personality but merely expresses the longings and desires of the non-ethical self? Does Croce want to say it is imperfect as art, because—although *perfect as expression*—it is art of *less noble content*? Or does he want to say it is *imperfect as expression*? If he should choose the former alternative, he would be altogether at one with Babbitt and More. But that would mean an admission that his solution of the form-content problem in the *Estetica* had been over-simplified. If he should choose the latter alternative (imperfect as expression), he would have to maintain that immoral states of mind cannot find perfect expression in art, which seems contrary to the facts of aesthetic experience. Such is the dilemma. And there, I am afraid, Croce leaves the matter.

Croce's point of view grew more and

more Classical as time went on, and there is a vast difference between the early *Estetica* and his writings for the forties. Yet, partly perhaps for reasons of personal pride, he clung to his original theory tenaciously, trying to modify it more and more in the Humanist direction but never abandoning it altogether. Babbitt was therefore partly right and partly wrong in attacking him. Croce seems to have read only one of Babbitt's books, *The New Laokoon*, and wrote a very appreciative article on it in 1921; yet it becomes quite clear that he did not understand what Babbitt meant by "inner form," which was the presence of the ethical imagination, or the dimension of depth. No one can be surprised at this partial incomprehension. Even today, with all of Babbitt's (and More's) books at our disposal, and several interpretative works as well, it is extremely difficult to arrive at something like an adequate understanding of his thought. However, Croce's high estimate of *The New Laokoon*, in so far as he understood it, indicates the direction in which he himself was moving.

Even in the early *Estetica* there was already present a Classical element, viz., Croce's demand for adequate expression, as Vittorio Sainati points out in a recent book—so far the best book written on Croce. For this demand was partly directed against Romantic botchery and obscurity which in Croce's youth had again begun to dominate the literary scene; the Symbolist Movement in France and similar trends elsewhere were just beginning to catch on. And in his essays of the thirties and forties Croce dismisses the poetry of Mallarmé, Valéry, and Stefan George as a sign of decadence, related to the works of the Baroque. His earlier evaluations had shown an analogous tendency. To Croce, as to Bernard Berenson, the Baroque and Modern periods represent an artistic de-

cline and fall whose most characteristic symptom is the acceptance of "a kind of ugliness" as the highest artistic standard. A German critic, Gustav René Hocke, has recently devoted a very learned work to the artistic and literary parallels between the twentieth century and the period 1520-1660, a historical context already familiar through T. S. Eliot's favorable criticism of the Metaphysical Poets. Hocke's own perspective, covering both art and literature, is European in general, and he is an ardent admirer of both the Baroque and Modern periods. His evaluations are therefore diametrically opposed to those of Croce. In order to do perfect justice to the Classical element in Croce's writings (which Babbitt never did), one should follow above all the international discussion of the Baroque, where Croce emerges as the staunch upholder of Classical standards.

III

For an elucidation of what has been said we may therefore turn to Croce's studies of the Seicento. There were two tendencies at work in those days, says Croce [in 1911]:

The first of them is the tendency we would call sensual and which in those days people called "lascivious." . . . The second tendency is the predilection for *ingegnosità*, for "conceit" and wit. . . . Of these two tendencies the first could be artistically fertile, the second not. When in a historical epoch every other sort of sentiment is weak and only sensuality remains vivid—sensuality in the sense of primal and almost animal passion—it is evident that this, and nothing else, constitutes the material for the poetry and art of the period.

But did the Marinist poets express

nothing but erotic states of mind?—they did, but without poetic inspiration. Croce quotes a few lines from Marino's *La bruna pastorella*, where two lovers are looking at a volume of poetry and one of them says:

Here is the table of contents, which accounts for the subjects, listed under headings. Let us skip the serious songs, with which he lauds the heroes, prays to the gods, and bemoans the trophies of death. Let us come to those more suave, in which in a sweet vein he expresses the charming and soft tender-nesses and delights of love.

Croce comments: Without willing it or thinking of it, Marino here describes the method by which one should also read all the poets of the Seicento. Their poems are usually divided into amorous, elegiac, heroic, moral, religious and so on, but only the love songs really count. The rest are written in a mechanical or hypocritical way.

Strings other than the sensual do not vibrate, or they merely vibrate weakly, in the poets of those days. If, as we have remarked, they write much on religion, there is very little feeling in it. . . . One rarely finds an expression of moral sentiment comparable in energy with the expression of sensual enjoyment.

The Arcadian movement that supplanted Marinism in Italy was equally sterile, Croce goes on to say. And why? Because the sentiments expressed were still the same. "The frivolous habit of mind lived on, the weak religious and political faith, the superficial interest in philosophy." Marinism, Croce concludes, *rappresenta l'assenza del sentimento etico*; it was the absence of moral sentiment; that is what was wrong with it; and that is the reason why its poetry was bad. Croce is very explicit on this point: Marinist poetry was

poor and bad, because *what* was expressed was mere sensuality and because moral sentiment was absent. Thus speaks Croce the Humanist, but how does it fit in with his aesthetic theories?

It is an art and a literature deprived of moral sentiment and therefore, under apparent luxuriance, very restricted and poor. When from the most splendid productions of this art one turns to a picture by Giotto or a *terzina* by Dante, one is aware of the whole difference.

Let us enjoy this literature for what it is, he continues, and not claim too much for it. Would an Irving Babbitt or a Paul Elmer More have judged otherwise? The divergence between Croce the Humanist and Croce the Romantic aesthete becomes striking, if we now turn to what he says about Pallavicino, an important thinker of the period. Pallavicino wrote an early work on poetry in which he anticipated Croce's own aestheticism in a most remarkable way. Away with all talk about probability; the imagination must be free! Poetry consists of "primary apprehensions" that have nothing to do with truth or falsehood. The sole aim of poetic tales, says Pallavicino,

is to adorn our understanding with imagery, that is to say, with sumptuous, novel, marvellous and splendid appearances. . . . See how the world thirsts for beautiful first apprehensions, although these are neither laden with science nor are vehicles of truth.

But later Pallavicino grew dissatisfied with this view of poetry. This is just the lowest function of the imagination, he says, and poetry has the higher and more important task of giving us insight. In his *Estetica* Croce calls this a relapse into the pedagogic, moralist, and intellectualist theory that the young Pallavicino had so happily escaped from. He has not a word

about a legitimate motive for Pallavicino's change of mind. Of course Pallavicino could not expound the higher aim of poetry without falling in some degree into the error of intellectualism; that much should be granted to Croce. Yet he was dissatisfied with Marinist poetry for precisely the same reasons as is Croce himself. How, then, can Croce applaud the young Pallavicino and regret his supposed later back-sliding into error?

The Classicism that supplanted Marinism in France was built upon that element of moral insight the absence of which in Italian poetry seems to Croce the cause of its weakness. The conclusions for aesthetic theory should be evident, although Croce—even in his later work—failed to draw them with full clarity. In his definitive work on the period, *Storia della età barocca in Italia* (1929), he came as close to a thorough revision of his youthful amorality as he would ever come:

It [i.e., Baroque art] did not lack the force of expanding on the surface, but it lacked that of getting to the depths, because, although born out of a human impulse, it was not referred back to and regenerated in our complete humanity. For this reason it always retained something abstract in its apparent concreteness, something willed in its apparent spontaneity. A narrow poetry; and true poetry is never narrow.

Baroque art, accordingly, is *imperfect as expression*, because it is not the expression of the *whole* man; art that expresses the whole man has moral profundity; narrow art is the expression of only a part of human nature. The difficulty of this view comes to the fore in what is said about "narrow art": it is not "true art," yet it is "art," which is a contradiction in terms according to Crocean aesthetic theory. Croce is left floundering among inconsistencies, because he is unwilling to give up

his original monistic theory of beauty (art=expression) and introduce a dual criterion. How much simpler and truer it would be to say, with Babbitt: "narrow art" may be perfect as expression, but *what* is expressed is too superficial. Why did Croce shy away from this obvious conclusion when the facts of aesthetic experience were so obvious to him? He had staked his prestige on a theory that rejected as "moralism" any reference to the varying ethical quality of the "what." It would have been more honest, less misleading, if he had followed Pallavicino's example of openly recanting the superficial aestheticism he had once embraced.

IV

Will contemporary aesthetic theory, which is based on the Romantic Aestheticism that also inspired Croce's *Estetica* and which has indeed developed under the continuous influence of this work, gradually move in the direction of a new Classicism, as did Croce himself? Will it extricate itself from that flirtation with our modern Baroque by which Professors of Philosophy try to give evidence of their aesthetic sensibility? Will they rediscover and re-examine the nexus that unites aesthetic and moral values, both with one another and with the total context of human life? Will aesthetic theory follow the road already taken by the most discerning of modern critics? Some of the representative works in this new vein are Wladimir

Weidlé's *Les abeilles d'Aristée*, Roger Caillois' *Babel*, Walter Muschg's *Die Zerstörung der deutschen Literatur*; also a book recently translated into English, Hans Sedlmayr's *Art in Crisis*. To a considerable extent the philosophical aestheticians are lagging behind the critics; their books still read like translations into technical terminology of a somewhat domesticated Oscar Wilde. When they catch up with the critics, the time will have come for a long-delayed discovery of Irving Babbitt in the field of aesthetics similar to that which has already taken place in political theory through the writings of Russell Kirk and Peter Viereck.

Notes

- I. Babbitt, *Rousseau and Romanticism*, 1919, pp. 171-2 (Meridian Books pp. 307-8).
- E. Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*, 1944, pp. 147, 169 f.
- B. Croce, *Saggi sulla letteratura italiana del Seicento*, 1911, pp. xxi, 171 f., 382 f., 413, 429. *Nuovi saggi di estetica*, 1920, pp. 70, 132-8. *Aesthetic* (D. Ainslie's transl.), pp. 194, 201 f. *Storia della età barocca in Italia*, Bari 1929, p. 324.
- I. Edman, *Arts and the Man* (Mentor Books), pp. 28, 30, 71, 132.
- G. R. Hocke, *Die Welt als Labyrinth*, Hamburg 1957 (Rowohlt). *Manierismus in der Literatur*, Hamburg 1959 (Rowohlt).
- S. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (Mentor Books), pp. 82, 178-198.
- Feeling and Form*, London 1953, p. 292.
- V. Sainati, *L'estetica di Benedetto Croce*, Firenze 1953.
- A. Warren, *New England Saints*, Ann Arbor 1956, pp. 154-161.
- W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Cl. Brooks, *Literary Criticism*, New York 1957.
- See also F. Leander, "Irving Babbitt and Benedetto Croce" in *Göteborgsstudier i litteraturhistoria tillägnade Sverker Ek*, Göteborg 1954.

*The essential limitations of the psychologist in
arriving at a philosophy of personality.*

Personality in Psychology and Metaphysics

J. V. LANGMEAD CASSERLEY

The Spring issue of MODERN AGE featured two articles dealing with the interpretation of personality, and the relation of such an interpretation to politics, considered as an activity in and through which the wholeness and happiness of persons is fostered and served. Fr. James V. Schall in an article entitled *Theory in American Politics* maintains that what we may call the central traditions of Christian Aristotelianism, as developed by the great scholastic philosophers, remains the essential basis for a valid philosophy of personality, and lays particular stress on its way of so understanding the deepest needs of living persons that we are compelled to recognize the ultimate limitations of political theory and political action. Once we understand who the person is and what he is for, we see clearly that, although wise political action may secure many of the essential preconditions of what we may call his proximate happiness, man's ultimate happiness is something that lies beyond the limitations of political action altogether. Thus the effect of this tradition

is to humble political men with the thought of the vastness and importance of those ultimate human ends which lie completely outside the limits of their method and responsibility.

Mr. Donald Zoll on the other hand claims, in an article entitled *Conservatism and the Philosophy of Personality*, that the hold of this Christian Aristotelian tradition on the modern mind, and its prestige in the realm of contemporary thought, has become so weak and has fallen so low that we might do well to turn to one of the great contemporary achievements, the psychological work of Carl Jung, in order to find a better and more timely basis for our idea of personality. Mr. Zoll seems very imprecise and hazy about the difference between a "philosophy of personality" on the one hand and what he calls a "theory of human nature" on the other. Indeed he seems to regard the two as amounting to very much the same thing, but surely for the discerning and careful analyst they are remarkably distinct. A philosophy of human personality

seeks to interpret man considered primarily as subject, whereas a theory of human nature seeks to analyze human operations and considers man primarily as phenomenon and object. Theory analyzes and describes, whereas philosophy evaluates and interprets. In commenting upon these two papers it will perhaps be better to begin with a criticism of Mr. Zoll and then to continue by relating some of the important things he has to say to the views maintained by Fr. Schall.

WE ARE all familiar with the story of Queen Marie Antoinette who, when told that many of the peasants were so poor that they could not buy bread, is alleged to have replied, "Let them eat cake." The story is quite untrue and unfair, and was indeed current in France before Marie Antoinette was born. Probably nobody ever said it; certainly if these words were spoken by anyone at all it was by someone who lived and died at least a couple of generations or so before the time of France's martyred queen. I am reminded of the story by Mr. Zoll's odd notion that the Christian Aristotelian tradition is now so weak and lacking in prestige that we are driven to seek aid from the psychology of Carl Jung. Of course it is true that the intellectual area of our culture is now so confused that there is no doctrine current anywhere which is not violently attacked and vehemently rejected by somebody or other. However, there are a few obvious facts which Mr. Zoll should surely take into account. Our contemporary intellectual culture, whether inside or outside the academic profession, still contains many more Christians and Aristotelians, even Christian Aristotelians, than Jungians. In our world of thought all movements are minority movements, but the Christian is still very much the largest minority. Compared to it the Jungian is microscopic. Even in the

world of psychology itself the Jungians constitute no more than an important and vocal minority. If we dare to project the situation and look ahead for a generation to two, we can be confident that such a situation will continue. The Christians and the Aristotelians will still be in the debate by the end of the century, no doubt, as always, under pressure, but a lusty and living force, whereas almost certainly Jungians and Freudians by that time will be half forgotten. No doubt Jung and Freud will be venerated figures who have made their contributions, but new stars will have arisen claiming for their own views the prestige-laden title of "Modern Thought." To propose that those who cannot obtain the wholesome bread of the Christian and Aristotelian tradition should content themselves with what we may call Jungian cake is to my mind a delightful instance of what I may call the *contemporary fallacy*, the notion that the future will be like the present only very much more so, whereas the one thing that is really certain about the future is that it will react very strongly against the present.

The future and the past have one thing in common, they are both long and changing periods of time, and the probability is that the cultural elements strong enough to persist through the many changes which constitute the past will be the cultural elements strong enough to persist also through the many changes which constitute the future. Our concept of the past and future is unified by a recognition of the universals and stabilities which persist through them. The present, on the other hand, is a brief moment in the pattern of the cultural change, understood not in terms of the things that affiliate it to adjacent ages but purely in terms of its rather over-evaluated differentia. Pioneers like Jung and Freud do not yet belong to the ages,

for the ages have not yet digested them. They still belong their own age, and therefore in a sense as yet to no other. If there is anything which can fairly be called a conservative philosophy of history surely it is this which I have briefly outlined in these last few propositions. The future is like the past because each is comprehended in terms of its characteristic persistencies and continuities. The present, on the other hand, always smacks of a certain provincialism because it tends to be interpreted in terms of its own characteristic oddities and differentia.

However, I wish to criticize Mr. Zoll for more than an error of historial judgment and foresight. It seems to me that he fails properly to differentiate between what psychology is trying to do and what we should expect to receive from a philosophy of personality. For psychology, man is inevitably and rightly pure phenomenon. Its theories are a conceptualization of what the psychologist sees in his widespread and deeply probing experience of human personalities. It is the kind of conceptual description at which all science aims. To say this is not to criticize psychology. Psychology is like that because that is what psychology ought to be like. Now certainly psychology may provide data for philosophical interpretation. What it cannot conceivably do is itself to function as a philosophy. A theory of human nature will provide an analytic description of man in operation. It will tell us *how* man conducts his psychic business and orders his experience. In the course of this research it may be led to formulate distinctions between personal consciousness, the personal unconscious and some collective or racial unconscious. But this kind of description, however detailed and accurate, can never give us a philosophy of personality because a philosophy of personality is not primarily concerned with how man op-

erates or what man appears to be but with what, metaphysically speaking, man really is. Indeed, in the Christian tradition, it is precisely our philosophy of personality which enables us, even compels us, to stand in a kind of metaphysical-theological judgment over man as he appears to be, and to observe that the basic human tragedy is that man's becoming does not match his being, that his historical performance is vastly beneath and utterly unworthy of his metaphysical stature, and that the persistent misfortune observed in the record of historical performance can only be understood in terms of this vast disparity between the comparatively mean appearances and the majestic reality. This is indeed one way of stating philosophically what we mean by doctrines like the fall and original sin. (The fall and original sin are, of course, related but not identical concepts. Original sin is an observation and diagnosis of man's present predicament; the fall is a speculative theory concerning the origins of that predicament.)

Now, of course, it is always possible to argue philosophically that intellectually and epistemologically man is in such a situation that his knowledge is inevitably restricted to the mere analytic description of phenomena and that he is incapable of any metaphysical interpretations and evaluations at all. This is presumably the effect intended by all those philosophers who hold that life is a mere vale of appearances which gives us no clue to reality whatsoever. From a philosophical point of view the mere appearance may be defined as an observed and described phenomenon of which no metaphysical account whatsoever can or need be given. Many metaphysicians hold that life does include many phenomena of this kind. For example, the so-called deprivatory doctrine of sin in Augustine and other classical Christian theologians amounts to the assertion that sin,

while of course it has tragic historical actuality, has no metaphysical substance or roots. It is of course proximately real, and represents a persistent tendency to destroy reality and void it of its substance, but ultimately it has no reality at all. It is to be found in the creation but not in the Creator.

Thus a philosophy of personality cannot be a psychology, though it may and must interpret whatsoever psychologists observe and describe. Philosophy of personality begins with the element of self-transcendence so basic in personality. Personality is always an *I* which knows itself as *me*. We may say that a theory of human nature, a psychology, is an analytic description of the *me* that is known, whereas a philosophy of personality is an interpretation of the status of the *I* who knows. Wherever we draw the line between the *I* and the *me*, there will always and inevitably be an element of self-transcendence which escapes from the frame of reference in which the *me* is known, simply because the *I*, after all, is that frame of reference. (Of course it must always be true that for the observer, the psychological observer for example, the *me* of my *I know me* must be *him* and the *I* of the *I know me* must be *thou*, but that makes very little difference to the analysis of our epistemological situation.)

Some philosophers, like Fichte and Gentile, have raised the question whether the *I*, thus defined in terms of a pure principle of self-transcendence, is not identical in all cases. They have dreamed of an absolute ego who is the true ego of us all. Such doctrine does not necessarily follow from our analysis. One ego is differentiated from another by the fact that each one knows a different *me*. I am the *I* who knows this particular *me*. *Thou* art the *I* who knows that particular *me*. (Every *thou*, it will be noticed, is an *I*. This is

the truth that underlies Buber's famous I-Thou formula.) Thus I can see no real difficulty about the concept of a plurality of egos. My chief difficulty with Mr. Zoll, however, is not so much that he overestimates the vitality of Jungian psychology, or even that he underestimates the vitality of the Aristotelian and Christian tradition. It is not even that he confuses psychological description with philosophical interpretation, forgetting that properly speaking, personality is a metaphysical, not a psychological, term. It is his lack of any power, at all events so far as his article is concerned, to see that his psychological descriptions themselves require philosophical interpretation and evaluation and that they might well receive it from the very traditions of theological thought which he regards as outmoded.

If, for example, we are to accept the Jungian view that we all share a collective or racial unconscious populated and pervaded by great mythical archetypes pregnant with meaning, why are we invited at the next breath to dismiss theological and Christian versions of these great archetypes, like the fall and original sin, as being for the contemporary mind now devoid of meaning. Surely those Jungians are nearer the truth who interpret Jung as a great psychologist of our religiousness, indicating the permanent worth of our stock of religious ideas. (I should not, of course, necessarily take this view of Jung myself. I merely point out that such an interpretation might be a better one than Mr. Zoll's.) For the Christian theologian, indeed, the main difficulty about Jung is that he, like Toynbee, champions a religion of human religiousness rather than the religion of divine self-revelation. Christianity for such an observer is simply another religion, whereas for the Christian it is the redemption of religion, and it is presupposed in the Biblical tradition that

religion, like all human things, is something that needs redeeming, for the normal name for religion considered as a human activity in the Bible is not faith but idolatry. This leads us to the greatest difficulty with Jung and indeed in many other psychological observers: their tendency to regard the deepest depths which can be observed in the human psyche as more important and potent than that which lies in the surface life of consciousness. One is reminded of the Welsh Prince in Henry IV, Part I, who boasted that he could "summon spirits from the vasty deeps." Hotspur skeptically inquires whether these spirits will come when we call for them, but we may very well say, after our unhappy recent experiences, that the trouble is that spirits so often will come out of the vasty depths when man is so unwise as to conjure them up, and with the New Testament in mind, we may add that all spirits should be rigorously searched and proved because there seem to exist so many spirits which are not holy spirits. In other words, because the psychic depths are the depths of fallen man, they are also the depths inhabited by the demons that erupt again and again to torment consciousness. Empirical psychology is necessarily the psychology of fallen man—what else could it be—and the empirical psychologist repeatedly makes observations which confirm the hypothesis of original sin (i.e., that there is a sin which is not the sin of consciousness which nevertheless conditions and biases all consciousness. A sin of which we are not individually guilty is nevertheless the source of all our guilt.).

On the other hand we must not necessarily accept too pessimistic an account of all that psychic reality which lies below the level of consciousness. Is the collective or racial unconscious merely the source of demonisms and idolatries? Are there not, for example, experiences which suggest

that the unconscious does at times display a certain rationality and a genuine righteousness? It is not that the unconscious is altogether fallen and the conscious alone redeemable. Just as there is conflict on the conscious level, so are there similar and analogous conflicts in the unconscious. The insistence of revelation in religion as distinct from man's primordial and at its roots unconscious religiosity does not imply that the unconscious in man is unredeemable or outside the area of redemption; rather, it implies that whereas those dynamic destructive tendencies stemming from the fall have their source and origin in the unconscious, the even more dynamic and creative tendencies stemming from the redemption have their origin and source in the conscious, in the clear light of day where men recognize Christ as, at the same time, both redeemer of men and revelation of God. For Christianity, Christ is no more *a* man than Christianity itself is *a* religion. Christ is *the* man, the new unfallen man, and Christianity is *the* gospel which proclaims the one Christ. From the present point of view this means that Christ is *the* person, so that in Him and Him alone the metaphysical truth about personality becomes an observed phenomenon and empirical fact. From this point of view Christ is revealed as absolutely essential for, indeed the persistent theme of, a philosophy of personality, which in Christian theology is more often termed Christology than a philosophy of personality. The point that I am making as against Mr. Zoll is that apart from the solitary figure of Christ the philosophy of personality has no empirical theme and must remain entirely a matter of metaphysical speculation. If we persistently leave Christ out of our human calculations, then no very certain philosophy of personality is possible at all, and we must content ourselves with mere theories about the function of fallen human nature which

might provide political philosophy with accurate descriptions but which could hardly contribute to it any world-changing or world-preserving imperitives.

I now turn more briefly to the interesting contribution of Fr. Schall. In the main I find myself in agreement with him. The doctrine of the omniscience of politics, and therefore, by implication, of political men, lies at the root of the twentieth century resurgence of tyranny. By contrast, the doctrine of the inherent limitations of politics and of the political state, considered as simply one among many of the organs of society, is one of the indispensable foundations of freedom. Yet it seems to me that it is possible to make the distinction between man's proximate and man's ultimate happiness a little too starkly. It is never possible or satisfactory to seek the one altogether in abstraction from the other. The proximate happiness of the man who has no sense of the ultimate happiness, and therefore never seeks it, must always be precarious. Conversely, our search for the ultimate happiness must have many proximate by-products and effects. They may be distinguished from each other but they are not irrelevant to each other. It would seem to me that on the whole the American political tradition has tended to isolate each from the other much too sharply. An example of this is the favorite American doctrine of the separation of church and state. The state of affairs which this phrase implies is only possible in a certain specific historical context. The separation of church and state presupposes a situation in which most people belong to a proliferation of different churches and sects and a not inconsiderable minority belong to no church at all. Christians in America, as everywhere else, are apt to pray long and fervently for the reunion of a divided Christendom and the conversion of an unbelieving and pagan world. They can hardly

pray such prayers without an accompanying belief that things are such in God's world that both of these things might conceivably happen. Let us suppose that at some future date they did happen here in America, with the result that perhaps ninety per cent of the population of this country belonged to one single church. We may very well speculate what would happen to the doctrine of the separation of church and state in such a historical and social context as this. The outward forms of the separation might perhaps be preserved for a while, but the inner spirit of it would inevitably decline and pass away.

The truth is that life seen in its religious dimensions of eternal yearning and eternal search is still life in all its concreteness. The real context of all temporal life is eternal life. Religious life and secular life are not different things. They are distinguishable as content is distinguishable from context, which is one way of saying that although they must be distinguished they can never be separated. Another way of pointing to the same difficulty is to observe that although in a democracy characterized by a high degree of religious pluralism the state may, perhaps must, separate itself from the church, yet at the same time, *in a democracy*, no church can ever entirely separate itself from the state. The state must affect an indifference to religious affairs, but the church dare not manifest a corresponding indifference to political affairs. Even now the separation between church and state is a very unilateral thing. There is a sense in which in a democracy every man is called upon by God to be a politician, and certainly no system of political principles and proposals, least of all a democratic system, could afford to dispense with religious motivations and insights. All temporal political action takes place in a context, and that context is inescapably religious.

Again, and in some ways this is to make the same point in a more general fashion, a philosophy of personality, although it must be distinguished from psychological doctrines, can never ignore them. A philosophy of personality traces the context in which psychic events take place. Philosophy of personality is never mere psychology in the modern sense, but it must always be ready to function as the ultimate interpreter of our psychological knowledge.

It would seem to me that this interpretation of psychological data and insights in terms of our Christian philosophy of personality is becoming a more and more urgent task. The only reason for postponing it is the widespread suspicion that empirical psychological studies have not as yet supplied us with any information sufficiently accurate and certain to make the philosophical interpretation and evaluation of them more than highly, perhaps emptily, speculative. But even a provisional interpretation and evaluation, a kind of theological trial balance, would be well worth while. Nevertheless it must always be im-

portant to insist on the distinction between a philosophy of personality, a philosophical study of the status of being a person, and psychological theories which observe and describe the operations of human nature. But it is becoming more and more obvious, and this is perhaps the essential Aristotelian insight, that the more our positive sciences expand and deepen their apprehensions, the more they converge upon, without ever quite becoming, metaphysics. The positive sciences circle around and approach the problems of metaphysics in a kind of asymptotic curve. This was made very clear in Heisenberg's recent book *Physics and Philosophy*. In the long run physics must always demand metaphysics, just as in the long run psychology will inevitably demand metapsychology. It is a good thing that we may be very confident that when at last the psychological mind reaches a point at which it can recognize its need for a metapsychology, the great Christian theological and metaphysical tradition will be there, waiting and ready to supply precisely the kind of thing that is required.

A REJOINDER

In Defense of Non-Objective Art

ELISEO VIVAS

A rejoinder to Mr. Wagner: why non-representational art portrays aspects of our time.

LET ME COMMENT on Mr. Geoffrey Wagner's challenging article, "The Organized Heresy: Abstract Art in the United States," which appeared in the Summer (1960) issue of MODERN AGE. I shall confine myself to only two points of interest to conservatives, for a complete analysis of all the issues brought up in Mr. Wagner's angry interdiction—problems of aesthetics, of sociology, of history of art, of theory of culture and of technical philosophy—would call for a long essay, one for which I could not ask MODERN AGE for space.

The word "organized" in the title of the article is purely rhetorical. But the word "heresy" is more than rhetorical. It is intended to alarm conservatives whose sympathy is naturally with orthodoxy, but it also carries substantive meaning. And in

so far as it does, I submit that it obfuscates, if it does not altogether beg, a difficult and important problem. Heresy presupposes orthodoxy in theory, and in art, orthopoeisis, or the right way of making, defined by an appeal to tradition. But to define the tradition of Western art is no easy task, since a modicum of innovation is not only permitted the artist but is called for, or artistic creativity is denied. Innovation, of course, is something of which conservatives are suspicious. But right as we are to suspect it, we must be very careful lest we merit the accusation of being endowed with monolithic minds that demand uniformity. To what extent Mr. Wagner's use of the word "heresy" arises from a passion for uniformity I cannot say. Fortunately we do not need to know. The question in-

terests us because one of the facile, and not always undeserved, jibes to which we are exposed is that we tend to espouse authoritarian principles.

But the problem transcends the differences between conservatives and those we disagree with. To dismiss non-objectivist art in anger is to neglect something of great importance to anyone seeking to understand our culture. I refer to the factors that move men to paint and shape wood and metal as the non-objectivists do. Some of these artists are no doubt fakes, others are moved by the wish to be among the avant garde, others enjoy slapping the booboisie. But many of them are working in response to subtle, deeply hidden, but powerful, forces operative in our era. And they are operative not only in the West but even in Russia, as we have lately learnt, where such deviations from the party line are risky. A mind concerned to understand the complex crisis of our moment of history has little time and energy for anathemas at those who express these forces.

I am a conservative. But if conservatism necessarily implies (and I use this expression in its technical philosophic sense) the extrapolation from the past into the present and future of an exclusivistic line of development in art or other activities of the spirit, as drawn by Mr. Wagner, I want out, and pronto. For the manner in which he draws the line, not to speak of the lack of diffidence with which he does it, would deny the autonomy of the artist and would strangle his creativity. It would end up by impoverishing us all. In our society, the autonomy of the artist (within limits, of course) is respected, and conservatives, who are opposed to regimentation of any kind, should be the first to respect it.

Back of extrapolations like Mr. Wagner's there often is, among other factors, the refusal to alter one's mode of perception and of affective response. But to be com-

placent with one's habits one need not lay down lines of development for art. All one need do is not look at the art that does not conform to one's criteria.

But conservatism does not mean monolithic rigidity and the rejection of non-objectivist art. Commenting on Mr. Wagner's essay, the editorial writer pointed out that he numbers among his acquaintances at least two conservatives who disagree with Mr. Wagner. I beg him to note that there is a third, who takes non-objective art seriously.

I do not wish to suggest that the artist should be altogether free from traditional control. Not at all. In any case he could not be, if he tried, although the extent that he is varies from one historical period to another and from one artist to another. My point is that Mr. Wagner's rejection of non-objectivist art is based on an inadmissible conception of the tradition. He takes the tradition to be defined by the artist's loyalty to reality. I shall indicate briefly below that he is not altogether consistent as regards the artist's task. Here let me point out that he conceives the artist's loyalty in terms of imitation. He does not use this word, but there can be no doubt about his meaning. He writes:

Now to a considerable extent all art is an abstraction, or selective re-ordering, of reality. Still, ever since Daguerre's invention in the last century painting has seemed to take an extremely liberating interpretation of this tradition.

A few paragraphs below, writing in language redolent of theology—for he speaks of "the shadow of the whole gnosis of expressionism"—he tells us that these gnostic heretics externalize

occult emotions through non-representational design. Indeed not even by design. By anything. Non-visual equivalents are called for.

Again, elsewhere Mr. Wagner bewails the results of an art "that declines to accept the semantic relationship between man and his world." Other passages could be cited.

In passing it must be acknowledged that non-objectivists and their sympathetic critics have handed Mr. Wagner the stick with which he belabors them, since they often speak and write as if what they were doing was finding objective equivalents of their inward life. Be that as it may, what we have here, obviously, is a variant of T. S. Eliot's "objective correlative," a smartly labeled but radically confused notion that I have examined in detail elsewhere. Suffice it to say here that its root error consists of the assumption that emotions can be imitated by external means; or in a more sophisticated version advanced by a contemporary aesthetician, that the structure of art is similar to the structure of our inward life. This is but a revamped version of the old, the enshrined, the ineradicable error that has vitiated Western aesthetics since the days of Aristototele. The Spaniards say that *hierba mala nunca muere*—weeds never die. The theory of imitation has been and will ever be the worst rankling weed of Western aesthetics.

The root error of this theory is that it denies genuine creativity. Abstractive selection from the real and re-ordering of what is abstracted—these activities exhaustively define, for Mr. Wagner and all those who accept the notion of imitation, the task of the artist as exhibited in our tradition. Where is there room for creativity in this conception? Genuine creativity means an addition to what the artist selects and re-orders, real novelty not accounted for by the clever manipulation of what he selects and re-orders, however subtle and complex that manipulation be. A conception of art to which genuine creativity is central must of course acknowledge that the artist ab-

stracts and re-orders. But his product is art only if what he abstracts is transformed or re-ordered and, if I may be allowed the term, if it is transubstantiated. New form or order and new substance, made of course from the matter taken from the real, but subjected to the creative process—if the object does not possess, or rather, to the extent that it does not possess, *creatively* informed, in-formed, or re-ordered substance, it is not art. The upshot is that the similarity between the made object and that which it is said to resemble is of relatively minor importance—for those interested in art. To the question "Who is that lady?" Matisse is said to have given the well-known reply: "That's no lady, that's a picture." In a few words the great Frenchman put where it belongs, in the trash can, the weed of imitation.

Many technical problems emerge at this juncture which delight as much as they baffle the aesthetician. For instance the question: Where does the artist get that which he adds to what he selects from the real? If he creates it out of nothing, he is God. If he does not, it would appear that all that creativity involves is the subtle and complex manipulation of what he selects from the real. Note that on this view, a machine that can play chess can write tragedies and rival Cézanne and Renoir. But this is no place to examine this and other problems of this nature. There is one question, however, that must be faced, since it is the alternative to imitation, namely: What relation is there between the work of art and the real world, if the former does not imitate the latter? Let me sketch the answer as simply and as briefly as I can, and let me do it by indirection.

I agree with Mr. Wagner that human life is symbolic. But when he speaks about the semantic relation between art and the real, I recoil and remind myself, as I have had to often in my life, that verbal agree-

ment may mask radical disagreements. For as I conceive of a symbol, it is neither an icon nor a sign. An icon imitates the object of which it is iconic. Cézanne's *Card Players*—in any one of its versions—looks like the card players that sat for it—even if the finished work happens to be (and in this case I do not know whether it is) a combination of diverse sketches and remembered images. A sign is anything that stands for something else. The flag is a sign for the nation. Objectivist art is both iconic and significant—another term for which I must apologize. But it is much more, and it is this more that makes it art and that brings non-iconic and non-significant art into line with it. Both kinds are symbolic, in the sense that both transubstantiate and transform or re-order or in-form the real. Both take the matter of experience and by means of the creative process give us something new. And here lies the function of both kinds of art: to the extent that we enter into serious intercourse with it, art gives us the means of grasping our world. Objectivist art gives us the means of grasping the external world; non-objectivist, the means of grasping what, in one of Santayana's happy phrases, we may call the inward landscape.

Mr. Wagner is right when he tells us that the non-objectivists have forsaken the outer world. But this is not the only world there is. And Mr. Wagner comes close to seeing what contemporary artists are attempting to do when he writes that "the reality of life is one constantly accorded to us, and to give form to that reality *in its own terms* may well be the highest function possible for art today." The italics are Mr. Wagner's; I would prefer to emphasize "to give form to reality." But close as he comes to what I take to be the true concept of the function of art, he does

not come close enough, for he assumes that the artist can give form to reality *in its own terms*. Since by the words in italics he means that the artist finds the form reality has in itself, and not that with which the artist endows it, Mr. Wagner, with all the followers of the Aristotelian theory of imitation (for Plato, I have a hunch, defended a view that comes considerably closer to the truth) are chasing a realistic chimera.

Yes, the thrusts and energies so violently splashed and slashed by the non-objectivist artist on to the surface of his canvas or masonite board, the shapes, often weird, into which he welds his metal or hacks his wood, are related to the inward life of the artist and therefore to our own. But they do not imitate the inward life. They in-form it, give it form or order. And if the order we find in non-objectivist art is the only order the artist can give his inward life—an order that seems to conventional folks utter chaos—we ought to be grateful to him for the sincerity with which he exhibits the brutality, the violence, even the hatred of the inward landscape in our moment of history, as well as the serenity, the stasis, the complex tensions in subdued repose and balance, that he often enables us to decry. I can understand why people are repelled by direct confrontation with non-objectivist art: it has much more of the id in it than Ingres put into his figures. And we know what stinkhole the id is. But to ask the artist today to draw like Ingres or to shape figures like Maillol is to ask him to lie. And this is tantamount to asking him to commit suicide for our comfort. If we do not like what he paints, we do not have to look at it. Who am I to tell you that you ought not to be ignorant of things I do not wish to be? Blessed be the ostrich, for his is the kingdom of the happy and the complacent.

REVIEWS

Human Liberty: Its Nature and Conditions

WILLIAM H. CHAMBERLIN

The Constitution of Liberty, by Friedrich A. Hayek. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960.

TOWARD THE END of the Second World War, when collectivism in varying shades and degrees was the prevalent economic doctrine on both sides of the Atlantic, an internationally famous economist published a little book with a message as clear as the call of a trumpet from a gallantly resisting fortress. The author was Friedrich A. Hayek; the book was *The Road to Serfdom*. Many books, large and small, have

been written on the general theme that freedom is preferable to state compulsion in economic relations; but I know of none that ranks with *The Road to Serfdom* in its combination of closely reasoned exposition with moral passion.

Fifteen years have passed since *The Road to Serfdom* conveyed the impression of an eloquent voice crying in the wilderness. During that time there has been a turn of the tide. Today it is socialism that is on the defensive, that is being criticized and rejected as obsolete and inapplicable to modern conditions. There has been the tremendous object lesson of the transformation of Germany's economy from a battered derelict into the most prosperous and dynamic going concern in Europe—and as a result of the substitution of free competition for bureaucratic planning. In the two

largest industrial countries of Europe, Great Britain and Germany, conservative parties have defeated socialist parties in three successive elections, and each time by a larger majority.

Men whose economic thinking is closely akin to Hayek's, men like Wilhelm Roepke, Jacques Rueff, John Jewkes, are no longer prophets without honor. Ludwig Erhard, architect of the "German miracle" of recovery and progress, acknowledges his indebtedness to Roepke. Jacques Rueff, like Hayek a prominent member of the Mont Pelerin Society, an international society of economists and political scientists who subscribe to the creed of free initiative as against state planning, worked out the program which made the French franc, for the first time in many years, a solid stable currency. So the idea which Hayek advocated in *The Road to Serfdom* have been visibly seminal. He has the satisfaction of having touched off an economic counterrevolution that has borne at least some fruits, even if it has not gone as far as he would have liked.

Now Hayek has rendered a new distinguished service to the cause of liberty. He has published an elaborate study of the nature and conditions of human liberty, a work of careful scholarship and profound erudition in political science and moral philosophy as well as economics. As compared with the swift-paced, hard-hitting *Road to Serfdom*, pamphleteering at its best, the present volume moves at a slower tempo and demands from the reader more intense application. But the author's familiar gifts of clear exposition and a readable style, quite unencumbered by affected academic pomposity, make the development of his ideas crystal clear.

The author starts out with an admirable definition of "the state of liberty or freedom": "that condition of men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as

much as is possible in society." To Hayek liberty and individual responsibility are inseparable and interdependent and here, as in many of his other observations, he speaks a language that has become unfashionable in the twentieth century. For uncritical acceptance of the theories of Marx and Freud has fostered the growth of what may be called a robot theory of human character. If man is a helpless product of materialistic economic environment or of instincts formed in a natal or pre-natal state how can he be held responsible for his actions? From this outlook stems much of the moral and intellectual softness of our time, the sentimentalizing over juvenile and other criminals, the numerous attempts to shield the individual from the struggle that forms and hardens self-reliance.

Because of the range of his reading, Hayek enriches his work with quotations that illustrate his points with remarkable aptness. So Louis Brandeis sounds a warning against the state, even with the best of intentions, encroaching on the freedom of the individual:

Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evilminded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding.

Still more vivid is the citation of the remarkably prophetic vision of Alexis de Tocqueville, one of Hayek's favorite and most congenial thinkers, of the emergence above the race of men of an immense and tutelary power which is not cruel or consciously tyrannical, but which exercises such wide protective functions that in the end it spares its subjects "all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living."

Hayek believes that, while fifteen years

ago doctrinaire socialism was the main danger to liberty, "to-day it would be tilting at windmills to direct one's argument against it." The enemy of the community of free responsible citizens today is the welfare state, which may well be regarded as the realization of de Tocqueville's prophetic vision. Hayek warns of the danger that a paternalistic power will control most of the income of the community and allocate it to individuals in the forms and quantities which it thinks they need or deserve, that "it will no longer be competitive experimentation but solely the decisions of authority that will determine what men shall get."

It is interesting and paradoxical that, although most Americans would regard Hayek as a spokesman for the conservative viewpoint, his last chapter bears the challenging title: "Why I Am Not a Conservative." (This was delivered as an address at a session of the Mont Pelerin Society and led to an interesting exchange of ideas with Russell Kirk.)

Hayek's main objections to conservatism are that it makes terms too easily with arbitrary power, that it is more susceptible than true liberalism to schemes of state planning, that it looks backward rather than forward, that it lacks original creative thinkers. So, he writes:

Macaulay, Tocqueville, Lord Acton and Lecky certainly considered themselves liberals, and with justice; and even Edmund Burke remained an Old Whig to the end and would have shuddered at the thought of being regarded as a Tory.

At the same time Hayek is fully conscious of the alchemy which in America has made liberalism the equivalent of state interventionism. Semantics and geography both play a part in determining what one who holds the main articles of Hayek's creed, individual liberty, the rule of law, a government of checks and balances, an economy

determined by individual initiative and the working of the free market, not by state planners, should call himself.

Taking issue on some counts with conservatism, recognizing that the term "liberal" in the United States is a cause of constant misunderstandings, Hayek settles for the term "Old Whig," which might be more satisfactory if it were more understandable to a larger circle of people. Perhaps the dilemma could be resolved by suggesting that, by contemporary terminology, Dr. Hayek is a conservative in America and a liberal in Continental Europe.

For in the United States the good ship *Liberalism* has been boarded and captured by a pirate crew of near-socialists and all-out government interventionists. No one of Professor Hayek's views could call himself a liberal in this country without inviting hopeless misunderstanding. In Europe, on the other hand, the liberal parties and groups have been more resistant to statism than the British Conservatives or the German or Italian Christian Democrats.

One wonders whether a typical conservative would concede Macaulay and de Tocqueville to the liberals. One can discern strong strands of conservatism in the thought of both these men, in their respect for inherited customs and institutions, in their skepticism about doctrinaire innovations, in their perception that the germs of tyranny may lie in excesses of democracy. In this connection one of the most apposite of Hayek's numerous quotations is from Lord Acton, like de Tocqueville a thinker with whom the author obviously feels himself in close sympathy:

The dogma that absolute power may, by the hypothesis of popular origin, be as legitimate as constitutional freedom began to darken the air.

It is impossible within the limits of a review to pay adequate tribute to the incisive

judgments which are offered on a wide range of practical and theoretical issues—always from the ideal of a society where the coercion of man by state authority would be reduced to the minimum compatible with the maintenance of civil order. Consider this commentary on the changed status of trade-unions, for instance:

From a state in which little the unions could do was legal if they were not prohibited altogether, we have now reached a state where they have become uniquely privileged institutions to which the general rules of law do not apply. They have become the only important instance in which governments signally fail in their prime function—the prevention of coercion and violence.

Or this suggestion, which may win wide acceptance in the South:

Not only is the case against the management of schools by government now stronger than ever, but most of the reasons which could have been advanced in the past in its favor have disappeared.

Western culture and civilization are poorer because Lord Acton, one of the most learned men of the nineteenth century and a personality of most magnetic charm, never set about his cherished project: a history of human liberty. Professor Hayek has made a very notable and stimulating contribution in this same field, one on which Acton's approval, one feels sure, would have been generously bestowed.

The Problem of Union Power

MELCHIOR PALYI

The Public Stake in Union Power,
edited by Philip D. Bradley. Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 1959.

AMONG THE SEVENTEEN articles of this symposium—by as many distinguished professors of economics—there are two which have no bearing on the problem of Union Power. But one of the two is among those that made this reviewer feel that his time and effort were not wasted on mental gymnastics without purpose, semantic exercises without content, academic controversies

without public relevance, and professions of faith that may interest the respective professor's future biographer. In fact, the brilliant essay of P. T. Bauer of Cambridge University on Regulated Wages in Underdeveloped Countries, to which I am referring, is a pioneering study, and good reading too. Its point is that under the "moral" pressure of the (Communist-infected) International Labor Office in Geneva the countries in question, India in particular, enforce fantastically high minimum wages and other restrictive regulations which foredoom their industrial projects, contrive capital (Foreign Aid!) mal-allocations and artificial scarcities, on top of playing social havoc.

The outstanding essay of the collection, distinguished by analytical forcefulness and forthright presentation, is the one contributed by the editor, Philip D. Bradley (University of Virginia), on *The Freedom of the Individual under Collectivized Labor Arrangements*. It tackles a basic aspect of Union Power, the fact that "our laws take a most important traditional freedom from the individual employee and place it in the custody of management." Congress never dared to deprive the workers openly of their freedom of choice. But it did so in a left-handed fashion, by leaving it to a deal between union and management to force the laboring man into the hands of thugs. It all depends, then, on the robust practices of organized labor and the management's resistance, if any. In a two and one-half hour session, General Motors sold the freedom of its workers down the hoodlum-infested river, while Atchison-Topeka fought a costly seven-year legal battle for the human rights of a minority of its employees. What good the appeasement policy did to G. M. is not discussed by Dr. Bradley. To the worker, such a surrender may mean that he is to be "represented" in wage bargaining, even in matters of work rules, job security, seniority, etc., by men whom he does not trust and to whom he has to pay tribute in initiation fees, monthly dues, plus extra levies, the money being left to the discretion of men who use it notoriously for their own power objectives (if they do not steal it!).

Union Power—the power to restrict the supply of labor and thereby to control its price—is founded primarily on the toleration and legalization of the coercive closed shop. But the politicians in charge of the police forces and of the courts go further. In effect, they exempt the unions from the common rules of the penal codes. This situation is touched upon by Bradley, but is bypassed in most articles dealing with Union Power. They minimize the significance of

the unions' immunity from criminal prosecution in order to support the thesis that an inherent, purely economic monopoly, or "oligopoly," is at stake. The point is succinctly put by David McCord Wright (McGill University). "Even if there were no racketeering, no violence, no goon squads, no sit-down strikes—even if every pension fund were honestly and intelligently administered—even if every union leader were a personally honest and high-minded man—there still could be a need for restraints upon union action. Why? The answer is that practically none of the lines of action we have been describing involve moral dishonesty." Honest but misguided men can "destroy independent opportunity . . . hamstring management . . . cut down capital formation . . ." and so on. "The fundamental dilemma is thus not racketeering and dishonesty, but the basic philosophy of much of the modern labor movement itself—a philosophy which tends always and everywhere, albeit often unconsciously, to work against growth, incentives, change, opportunity, continuing political democracy and development."

The logic is impeccable: the unions constitute a vicious monopoly because their philosophy is monopolistic. The trouble is that this was not always the case, nor is it the case everywhere, either in "philosophy" or in practice. German trade unionism at present, for example, displays no such tendency. The same holds or did hold, for more than one American union. But several co-authors are so intensely upset by union malpractices that they condemn, in effect, unionism altogether (usually protesting that they do not mean it that way). None of them raises the obvious question of how far union "monopoly" could go if criminal practices were outlawed; the democratic process in union affairs re-established; the right to work nationally enforced; the strict observation of labor contracts imposed; col-

lusion between business and unions prohibited; the freedom of manages to manage—to correct stultifying work rules, feather-bedding, etc.—restored; and *inflation*, the monetization of the national debt, *stopped*.

Speaking of inflation: is it the rise of labor costs that “pushes” prices upward, or the inflated demand that “pulls” costs and prices? Several authors of a theoretical bent resolve the dilemma synthetically by what amounts to dividing by two the sum of the two doctrines. This is ingenuous, rather than helpful. One merely has to ask oneself where wages would be today if the actual and potential money supply had not increased five- or six-fold. Or how could labor’s price be raised *all around* (not just boosting it in one trade at the expense of other labor groups) if the public would not have the wherewithal to pay higher prices for the products? Labor’s remuneration rises in every inflation of prices and profits, with or without unions; the question is, which is lagging behind what? Friedrich A. Hayek (The University of Chicago) puts the finger on inflation as the underlying problem. Yet, instead of stressing the inflation-fostering *political* role of the unions, which constitute the most powerful and most vocal pressure group, he misplaces the emphasis by blaming the policy of full employment “imposed upon the monetary authorities by statute.” The fact is, as the late Senator Taft made it plain at the time, that the Employment Act of 1946 legislated nothing more subversive than to oblige the President to have his panel of economists compile an annual report on economic conditions (bristling with rose-colored statistics). Moreover, Hayek pulls the rug from under his own anti-inflationary arguments by conceding that “at a time when there is danger that we may be entering a deflationary spiral, it is desirable that aggregate spending power should be prevented from falling further.” That should

suit do-gooders like Senator Paul H. Douglas who can always detect a “deflationary spiral” lurking around the corner.

Ignoring the economic climate—inflation—which is most significant to understand the unions’ mischievous practices, distorts the picture. The consensus of the authors seems to be that the trade unions constitute an unmitigated evil, or something akin to that. But are they not providing a real service to the working class by protecting it from being victimized by this inflation, as it had been victimized in the past? Of course, there would be no need for the service, and the loyalty of the members to their strong-arm organizations would be greatly weakened, if the purchasing power of the dollar had not been systematically eroded by the budgetary deficits and their monetization. Hence, the union bosses’ concerted and highly effective drive (with funds drawn from the members whom they are supposed to shield against the inflation) to maintain the inflationary drift. To expect labor to grasp the long-run implications of Kenneth E. Boulding’s jingle, as quoted by David McCord Wright, is futile:

We all, or nearly all, consent
If wages rise by ten per cent
It puts a choice before the nation
Of unemployment or inflation—

How many businessmen or even economists appreciate the Damocles sword of Over-production, Over-indebtedness, and Technological Unemployment hanging over our heads? And who cares for the “long run” anyway?

One distinguished author concedes “the claim of labor organizations . . . to countervailing power,” a claim which D. McCord Wright thoroughly deflates. Rather than offset each other, two monopolies add up to a double monopoly power. That there is a great deal to be said for the function of the unions in *Some Non-Wage Aspects of Col-*

lective Bargaining is brought out by Albert Rees (Chicago), especially so in matters of grievance settlement and seniority. Surely, the working man needs protection against the employer's arbitrariness; but whether he fares really better under the arrogance of union officials is a question which is left undecided. However, there is no doubt left about the dangers involved in union pressure—in skilled craft trades, especially—to enforce promotion by seniority rather than by ability.

A short review can scarcely do justice to the rich and variegated content of this volume. In particular, Professor Frank H. Knight's (controversial) philosophy of "val-

ues" would require special treatment. From the non-technical reader's point of view, the purely "theoretical" contributions might have been omitted; the arbitrary assumptions, underlying their exertions in logics, can be multiplied *ad infinitum*. And at least two more important issues would have deserved attention: labor contracts and nation-wide wage bargaining. Is the function of unions as contractual partners desirable to industry itself? And is their "power" due (to any really important extent) to the nation-wide scope of the bargaining process? This writer is inclined to answer Yes to the first question, No to the second.

A Modern Marcus Aurelius

WARNER G. RICE

Paul Elmer More, by Arthur Hazard Dakin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

IN THE TROUBLED SUMMER of 1941, a Harvard undergraduate who complained because the United States had not yet joined the nations fighting against Hitler was asked to give the reasons for his impatience. Thus challenged, he confessed that

he was not moved by a passion for humanity and justice, by a distaste for the fascist philosophy, or by a thirst for the excitements of battle. What he wanted, he said frankly, was a war that would convulse American society so that he could belong to a new lost generation.

For this youth, and for many both younger and older than he, the nineteen-twenties have seemed in retrospect an era of uninhibited experiment, of relaxed moral standards, jazz, bathtub gin, and companionate marriage; more significantly, a time when the pulsations of America's intellectual life were felt from Chicago to Paris, when the arts flourished anew, when a notable group of authors—James Branch

Cabell, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Sinclair Lewis, H. L. Mencken, Eugene O'Neill, Gertrude Stein—came into prominence. Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive!

But the new novelists, poets, dramatists were by no means the only writers who influenced the nation's thought during the post-war years. There was Charles Beard and there was Vernon Parrington; more importantly, for many concerned with the issues of the day, there were the "new humanists"—Irving Babbitt, Paul Elmer More, Stuart Sherman, Prosser Hall Frye, and a score of younger critics associated with them.

The intellectual leader of this school was undoubtedly Irving Babbitt, a teacher whose views, if narrow, were firm and consistent, and whose personal force was overwhelming. A widely learned scholar, he was pugnacious, nimble and vigorous in debate, a twentieth century Johnson who could roar down an adversary, or, if his pistol missed fire, knock him down with the butt of it. Many of his ideas were akin to those promulgated by Matthew Arnold; like Arnold, he had strong reservations concerning democracy; like him, he maintained that conduct was three-fourths of life, and insisted upon the constant application of moral judgments. Like Arnold, he professed a respect for religion, but held to a creed which included no place for the supernatural—his God, too, was the "not ourselves that makes for righteousness," and his ethical appeal was to a "best self." From his chair at Harvard, Babbitt exercised a very considerable influence; and his disciples, if not numerous, were intelligent and dedicated men.

Paul Elmer More, Babbitt's friend and contemporary, was of a different stamp. In some respects he also resembled Arnold, but the parallel here is with Arnold the poet of nature and of the feelings, Arnold the sympathetic, perceptive, wide-ranging

critic, Arnold the man of the world, the cosmopolitan exponent of culture and taste, "the high priest of the kid-glove persuasion." Like his Victorian predecessor, More had a mind afflicted by doubts, skeptical, questing. "In my youth," he wrote to a young friend in his sixty-seventh year,

I was steeped in the rankest romantic literature of Germany and suffered from it grievously. . . . By the time I got to Harvard I had become acutely aware of the mischief done me, and had begun deliberately to refashion my taste on the classics. And in this Babbitt, who was born in Horace's cradle, acted as a powerful stimulus. . . . Another strand in this unstable compound was a hard, dry rationalism. While inditing tragedies and a huge epic in the romantic vein (fortunately long ago burnt), I was plotting out a rationalistic philosophy which should accomplish what Darwin and Spencer had failed to finish. . . .

But along with these three strands ran from the beginning a religious impulsion—the strongest of them, I think, though often out of sight. This was emphatically dominant in childhood, suffered from scepticism in adolescence, and was mutilated and all but destroyed by rationalism. Its reappearance, I fear, shows signs of that mutilation. But even when most submerged it was there, pushing this way and that for egress and searching for some philosophical justification of its existence. . . .

What I see, looking at my writings objectively, is a series of studies in which, so far as they are literary, classicism is gradually strangling the old romantic remnants, while, so far as the religious interest appears, the newly discovered principle of dualism expresses itself in various affiliations. . . . In the end classicism comes to its own in religious philosophy as well as in taste. The result is a transition from India and a sort of thin disembodied Hinduism to Greece, showing itself in attachment to

the doctrine of Ideas and phenomena, first in *Platonism*, where the Oriental influence can still be traced, and then more clearly in *The Religion of Plato*, and finally in the Christian Platonism, or Platonic Christianity, of the later volumes. Here *The Catholic Faith* is the τέλος.

Arthur Hazard Dakin has undertaken to chart this intellectual journey. His biography of More is full, honest, and conscientious, a "life and works" which is obviously the product of painstaking labor. Mr. Dakin has collected information from a hundred sources, has incorporated many passages from More's correspondence into his narrative, and has set the account of his subject's developing thought against "a rough chronicle of his daily doings." The result is a portrait which reveals much, even to those who knew Paul Elmer More well.

The outward events of More's life were not very striking; his adventures were chiefly those of the mind and spirit. We see him first as the son of a not very prosperous St. Louis merchant, one of a numerous family, frail, studious, a devotee of poetry. After his graduation from Washington University he taught for a while in an academy, journeyed to Europe, and at the age of twenty-eight went to Harvard to study Sanskrit and Pali with Professor Lanman. In Cambridge he met Irving Babbitt, whose views redirected his thinking, and whose friendship proved a sustaining force for thirty years. For two years he held a post at Bryn Mawr; but after failing to find a college appointment which suited him, he retired in 1897 to Shelburne, Vermont, where he applied himself to study and writing. Emerging from his solitude two years later, he married, moved to New Jersey, and in 1901, when he was thirty-six, joined the staff of *The Independent*.

As a reviewer and literary journalist he soon gained a reputation. In 1903 he was

employed by the *New York Post*; in 1906 he became the literary editor, and in 1909 the editor, of *The Nation*. The first volume of the *Shelburne Essays* was published in 1904—to be followed by ten more series which appeared at intervals up to 1921. (Three volumes of *New Shelburne Essays* were published between 1928 and 1934.) For ten years he lived a busy and happy life. His domestic affairs went smoothly; there were pleasant New England vacations, and congenial companions at the Century Club; his influence as a critic steadily grew, until he found himself an acknowledged leader in the world of letters.

In 1914, however, there came a change. Unable to accept the views of Oswald Garrison Villard, More resigned from *The Nation* and withdrew to Princeton, where he was to reside for the rest of his life. For the next twenty years he was occupied with writing, lecturing (often to academic audiences) and to the teaching of Greek. His special concern was now with the classics; and to Plato he devoted his happiest and most fruitful hours. *Platonism*, first presented as the Vanuxem Lectures at Princeton, was completed in 1918; *The Religion of Plato* followed in 1921. With this book the direction of his thought became clear. He was searching for something more than humanism could provide, and was being drawn to speculations on religion and theology. In 1924 he published *The Christ of the New Testament*; in 1927, *Christ the Word*.

Meanwhile he had to endure attacks from H. L. Mencken and others who disliked his moralizing, his conservatism in political and social matters, and his lack of sympathy with the common man. S. P. Sherman, whose talent he had fostered, opposed him on the issue of democracy, and drew away. Though his ties with Irving Babbitt remained firm, there was inevita-

bly a loss of *rapport*, and the two communicated less frequently. There were, by way of compensation, new friends, among them the men of letters and the Oxford dons whom he met on his occasional visits to England. In 1928 he dined in London with T. S. Eliot, to whom he was attracted, and with whom he subsequently carried on a considerable correspondence. Though he experienced great loneliness after the death of his wife and of his favorite sister Alice, he lived on tranquilly in Princeton, where he found admirers among his students, where his daughters and their families were attentive to his needs, and where he collected about him a group of older associates who dined at his table and enlivened the evenings with music, card-playing, and talk. Increasingly he drew away from the company of the now embattled humanists, increasingly he sought to solidify his conclusions about religion. In *The Catholic Faith* (1931), where he compares Christianity with Buddhism, More accepted the Incarnation and showed his preference for the Anglican Church over all others. To the traditions and teachings of the Establishment he paid his respects in the anthology entitled *Anglicanism* (1935); but he could not bring himself, despite a strong inclination, to become an Episcopalian. Not the certainties of belief, but the desire to achieve them, characterized his last days; and in his temperament the independent, the classicist, and the romantic were apparent to the end, which came on March 9, 1931. More was painfully conscious, as his self-analysis shows, of the partially unresolved contradictions which Mr. Dakin's biography reveals. In his yearnings, as in his uprightness of life, he was like the Marcus Aurelius of Arnold's famous essay; and to him, too, the haunting Virgilian line applies: *tendentemque manus ripae ulterioris amore*.

Give . . .

MODERN AGE

A CONSERVATIVE REVIEW

to your friends

Renew . . .

MODERN AGE

A CONSERVATIVE REVIEW

subscriptions promptly

MODERN AGE 64 E. Jackson Blvd.
Chicago 4, Illinois

Please send MODERN AGE, a quarterly, for

☐ 1 year \$4 ☐ 2 years \$7 ☐ 3 years \$10

To _____

From _____

☐ Gift ☐ New Subscriber ☐ Renewal

MODERN AGE 64 E. Jackson Blvd.
Chicago 4, Illinois

Please send MODERN AGE, a quarterly, for

☐ 1 year \$4 ☐ 2 years \$7 ☐ 3 years \$10

To _____

From _____

☐ Gift ☐ New Subscriber ☐ Renewal

Miss O'Connor and the Scandal of Redemption

ROBERT Y. DRAKE, JR.

The Violent Bear It Away, by Flannery O'Connor. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1960.

IN THIS, her second novel and third book, Flannery O'Connor is once more concerned with the scandal of Christian redemption, a theme which she developed with considerable power in her first novel, *Wise Blood* (1952), and her collection of short stories, *A Good Man Is Hard to Find* (1955). Though her vision of the human predicament is a very terrible one indeed, it is nevertheless theologically orthodox; and her works are thus populated with human grotesques whose physical or psychological deformities only reflect outwardly the deep inward canker of sin. But then often juxtaposed beside these grotesques are Miss O'Connor's arch-fiends:

the "forward-looking," "modern" characters, whose minds are verily clean, well-lighted places, who attempt, by an almost demoniac exercise of the will, either to root out the grotesque as an example of the human imperfectibility which is such an offense to their virginal souls or, what is perhaps more reprehensible, try to ignore the grotesque, pretending that it has no validity as a part of human experience. But then into this dark world comes Christ, the "displaced person," a Judge and a Redeemer to the grotesques but an offense and a scandal to the moderns, Who proceeds to "displace" in turn the entire economy and every person in it. Sometimes the grotesques accept His salvation and become terrible instruments of His grace and judgment; sometimes they die cursing Him. But invariably the arch-fiends, the moderns, who seem to regard Him as only the Great Grotesque and a scandal to their particular brand of rigid righteousness, seem to be headed for damnation.

In *The Violent Bear It Away* the issue is joined between fourteen-year-old Francis Marion Tarwater of Powderhead, Tennessee, and his uncle, George F. Rayber, a teacher-psychologist. Ostensibly at stake is the soul of Rayber's five-year-old idiot son, Bishop; but before the novel's end the souls of both Rayber and Tarwater are themselves hazarded in the struggle. Tarwater, who was "kidnaped" when a baby from the psychologist uncle by his great-uncle, Mason Tarwater, a fanatical "prophet" from the Tennessee backwoods, had been continually enjoined by the old man to claim the idiot child for the Lord by baptizing him, a sacrament which he himself had earlier administered (by violence) to both Rayber and Tarwater. Once the old man had even lived for a few months with his nephew, Rayber, assuming that he was only trespassing on Rayber's charity for the last days of his life. Too late he discovered that Rayber's interest in him was not "charitable" but scientific: Rayber had made him the subject of a paper published in a professional journal; he had crept "into his soul by the back door" and had gotten the old man "inside his head." The old man's revenge was immediately to baptize the orphan Tarwater and take him back to Powderhead, where he could raise him up as a prophet to carry on his work. Only once did the psychologist attempt to get Tarwater back. Accompanied by a "welfare-woman," whom he was later to marry, Rayber appeared one day at the old man's secluded farm, only to have part of his ear shot off (an incident which was to lead to Rayber's later deafness) by the incensed prophet. Rayber never returned because, in the old man's words, he suspected that Tarwater would really be too much trouble to raise: "He wanted it all in his head. You can't change a child's pants in your head."

Now the old man is dead; and almost

at once Tarwater, who has become more and more an unwilling vessel, seeks to free himself of the prophet's mantle which has fallen upon him. And the voice of his Tempter, having persuaded him that he will never receive a sign from the Lord as did the Biblical prophets, persuades him that his only choice lies not between Jesus and the Devil but between Jesus and himself. (The Devil, says the Tempter, doesn't exist—perhaps the arch-heresy of modern times.) And so the boy decides to go off to the city to confront his psychologist uncle, to see whether his great-uncle had spoken the truth about him and all his works. Trying to eradicate every trace of the old man's hold on him, Tarwater, drunk on his new "freedom" and corn liquor, sets fire to the house, where he believes the dead prophet still sits at the breakfast table where he died.

At first Rayber receives his nephew with open arms; he will do all those things for him, in the matters of education and "enlightenment," which he has been prevented from doing for his own idiot son, whom he is afraid to love and prefers to treat, very scientifically of course, as "one of nature's mistakes." With all the modern resources at his command, he tries to lay the ghost of the old man for Tarwater and also, to some extent, for himself (since the old man still has a powerful though grudgingly admitted hold on the psychologist). But Tarwater hungers and thirsts after righteousness too deeply to be appeased by the "intellectual" comforts of psychology, fighting against his "call" though he be. (He sneaks out to attend a revival meeting, ostensibly to "spit on it," and becomes increasingly though unwillingly obsessed with the idea of baptizing the idiot, Bishop.)

In a grand gesture of defiance at the dead prophet, finally Rayber sets out with Tarwater and Bishop for Powderhead to

track down in the dark shadows of the past the boy's "unhealthy" obsession and thus "free" him from the dead hand of his great-uncle and, incidentally, from "the bleeding stinking mad shadow of Jesus." But on the way to Powderhead Tarwater determines that he must defy the old man and his own "calling" once and for all: instead of baptizing Bishop, he will drown him.

'You can't just say NO [as Rayber and perhaps all the moderns have done],' he said. 'You got to do NO . . .'

But in the act of drowning Bishop (Rayber himself had once "mercifully" tried to do it but lost his nerve), Tarwater inadvertently pronounces the words of baptism over him. Fleeing in grim determination back to Powderhead, Tarwater still thinks to escape his calling, once more seeking to root out the old man's hold on him by setting fire to his woods. But now at last he does have his unwelcome but still sought-for vision: he sees his great-uncle as one of the multitude being fed with the loaves and fishes and acknowledges at last his own unappeasable hunger for the heavenly bread. And, like one of the prophets of old, he hears, from one of the flaming trees, the words of his "charge," "as silent as seeds opening one at a time in his blood": "GO WARN THE CHILDREN OF GOD OF THE TERRIBLE SPEED OF MERCY." He accepts at last his vocation; and, at the novel's end, he moves "steadily on, his face set toward the dark city, where the children of God lay sleeping."

Once more Miss O'Connor has shown that it is often the grotesque and the violent who bear away the Kingdom of Heaven, in the face of the indifference or

hostility of those in soft raiment who are at ease either in kings' houses or in Zion. And this "scandalous" gospel she has clothed here in a form altogether suitable, if sometimes imperfectly realized. (It is possible that it is really in her short stories that Miss O'Connor has thus far found the fullest and most effective realization of her distinctive themes.) One possible defect in the novel is that Miss O'Connor does not develop more extensively the "tragic" potentialities inherent in the character of Rayber, the "modern" man who has betrayed his past and denied his Lord but who still hungers for that which he has rejected. It might further be objected that the conflict within Francis Marion Tarwater is not always clearly defined; but, in a day when the adolescent in fiction is too often torn only between two strange gods, it is indeed refreshing to see one crazy, mixed-up kid in whom the really Ultimate Conflict rages.

Finally, a word about Miss O'Connor's "violence" and *grotesquerie*, perhaps her most distinctive characteristics, is in order. Like many other contemporary Southern writers, she has consistently displayed a *penchant* for horrors; but, unlike some of them—Tennessee Williams, for example—her distortions are always functional, serving to embody outwardly the inner horror of sin which is her principal concern. And in her grotesques we find not only the horror of man's perversion of the divine pattern but also, as the word *grotesque* implies, the sheer absurdity of his situation—utterly dependent on God and yet perversely determined to "be himself." Miss O'Connor's world is indeed a terrible one, but it is not really a strange one. And we are not any of us strangers there.

Politics and Behavioral Analysis

THOMAS MOLNAR

On the Game of Politics in France,
by Nathan Leites, with a Foreword by
D. W. Brogan. *Stanford: Stanford Uni-*
versity Press, 1959.

MR. LEITES ATTEMPTS to do pioneering work in a field in which more of this kind of book is likely to appear in the coming years: the behavioral analysis (or, rather, description) of man as a political animal. He has chosen French parliamentary life from 1951 to 1958 to demonstrate that the

National Assembly of the Palais Bourbon is not the unorthodox body of mavericks and ranting ideologues that the public thinks it is, but essentially a representative section of the political class which pursues its "game" according to certain mental and behavioral patterns.

The supreme goal for each of these timid conformists, the author says, is to maintain himself as an influential member of an unchanging elite; hence the tactics, maneuvers and deals by which the deputies, alert to subterranean currents, the sudden influence of certain groups, and the implication of various issues, national and international, manage to reduce the whole game to one rule: that of political survival.

Ample quotations from the parliamentary record and from newspaper reports help Mr. Leites construct his chapters, each devoted to one aspect of what is supposed to be the pattern emerging at the end: according to these chapters, the members of the Assembly, use delaying tactics, avoid final commitments, yield only to *force majeure*, prefer not to push their opponents into intolerable situations, and expect to be spared similar predicaments.

Now all this sounds, if not quite convincing, at least plausible at first. In any group of human beings, from juvenile gangs to academies, certain rules are observed, and by calling them "pattern of behavior," sociology has not added much to our awareness of it. It is interesting, for example, to read in Tocqueville's *Recollec-tions* remarks similar to those of Mr. Leites, but placed in a better perspective from the point of view of history and national psychology: "I am able to declare that these great orators [of Louis Philippe's parliament] were bored to death at listening to one another, and, what was worse, the whole country was bored with listening to them. France grew unconsciously accustomed to look upon the debate in the Chamber as exercises of the intellect rather than as serious discussions, and upon all the differences between the various parliamentary parties—the majority, the left center, or the dynastic opposition—as domestic quarrels between children of one family trying to trick one another. A few glaring instances of corruption . . . convinced the country that the whole of the governing class was corrupt, whence it conceived for the latter a silent contempt which was generally taken for confiding and contented submission."

It was necessary to quote at length from Tocqueville to show that there is an entire national history, temperament, subtle psychological and political network of tacit

understanding behind what Mr. Leites presents as a puppet show. For this failure one must, I think, hold responsible his commitment to the "behavioristic" approach, not his ignorance. For I am sure that the author knows French history well; yet his thesis is that ideology plays no important role in French parliamentary life. The proof, he says, is that the deputies play it down or avoid any reference to it.

Precisely, since everybody—their colleagues and the public—knows exactly where each one of them stands, the elementary rule of political intercourse dictates that they camouflage their conviction, understate its importance, reserve surprises, pretend to move on another plane, etc.

There is no question but that M. Jacques Fauvet, editorialist of *Le Monde*, is a far more perspicacious observer than the author when he writes: "With us dead regimes possess the property of surviving in many souls, and even in parties. . . In France one's real allegiance goes to the regime of the past. Thus the Orleans monarchy still lives on. . . . Two masses are read on the anniversary of the execution of Louis XVI. Two newspapers speak in the name of Charles Maurras." Mr. Leites, who quotes Fauvet in many instances, disagrees with this statement. Yet Fauvet merely alludes to the natural richness of the political animal, his attachment to the past, the continuity of his loyalties or enmities, the complexity of his motivations, whereas Mr. Leites falls victim to his theory which impoverishes his vision. To propose his concept as valid, he must present the deputies as people cut from their roots, as a student-body government observing the rules of the meeting but having no real issues to debate. Undoubtedly, he attended parliamentary sessions and carefully noted the words and gestures; but he failed to detect their underlying subtle meaning.

After all, the constitutional and ideological debate in France has been going on since 1792, the doctrinal positions are too well known to need constant repetition. But at occasions they erupt, and then it becomes evident that they had been there all along. Witness the recent debate on the school issue.

MY FIRST OBJECTION to Mr. Leites' book is, then, that starting from a biased view of man, he does not do justice to the existential richness of the political animal. My second objection is that he shows himself an unsophisticated student of the political phenomenon. Like those "political" scientists who moralize and preach instead of accepting that good and evil will grow together in the soul of man, Mr. Leites is confounded by the techniques of the political "game." Repeatedly he notes how inextricably tricky the ways of French political behavior are, and implies that they are beyond his (and of some other American observers') innocence.

Here is one instance which fills Mr. Leites, a student of politics, mind you, with amazement before the incredible Machiavellism of the French, whether on the Left or on the Right: In 1941 the Germans urged Petain to declare war alongside the Axis powers. This Petain did not want to do, yet he could not refuse it openly. General Weygand then suggested that he discuss the problem with the Germans as if he seriously weighed the arguments for

and against, but ask for such compensations in return for cobelligerence that the Germans were bound to reject. The purpose of this maneuver was, as reported by Robert Aron, to "give Petain the means of refusing military collaboration with Germany without taking himself the initiative of interrupting negotiations."

It is significant that Mr. Leites mentions this instance in a chapter labeled "The Struggle against Responsibility." To me, on the contrary, this is politics in its best tradition, that is, a realistic evaluation of the facts as they *are*, and action taken (or avoided) within the limits of what is *possible*, provided, of course, that one knows what one wants. Nevertheless I understand that both behaviorists and utopians are baffled by it.

ONE LAST word: I mentioned at the beginning that more books of this kind can be expected to appear. No doubt, a behavioral description of the Kremlin's "political class" will one day be undertaken. The American public atmosphere today is such that it may inspire a writer to discuss the Soviet masters *minus* their ideology, *minus* their political power drive. On that day we will learn that Khrushchev's men form a managerial class, bent on remaining in power, but in reality for quite frivolous reasons.

This is the long-range danger of the mental attitude evidenced by Mr. Leites' book.

The Pattern within the Blank Page

DEAN TERRILL

Human Nature and the Human Condition, by Joseph Wood Krutch. New York: Random House, 1959.

THERE IS an inherent calm force in the development of the theme of *Human Nature and the Human Condition* that, linked with the noble significance of the theme itself, lifts this volume high above the undiscerning ruck of writings on the many aspects of the human condition, almost all of the most currently popular of which deny the existence of human nature. Mr. Krutch's persuasive affirmation of the whole of human nature in its various manifestations,

and his revelation of the significance of the denial of important attributes of human nature evidenced by the present contradictory but generally unhappy human condition, combine into a monumental achievement. The implications and consequences of this study of the reality of humankind must be dealt with by the relativists and those of allied ideologies if they are to preserve any pretense to intellectuality as they cling to their contrary positions.

The thesis of the book is simple, though profound: Hobbes and Locke and the current relativists to the contrary notwithstanding, men are born in a state of something more than *iabula rasa*. The slate with which we commence our being is not blank, but contains the potential image of that which we ought to be and can be; but

only by accepting the reality that human nature comprehends aspirations (of a non-quantitative and unmeasurable order) and that the process of their realization involves reasoned effort of a kind and degree more profound and personally sacrificial than we are wont to bring to the task. The attempt of the relativists and positivists, which has been going on for years now, to overlay this *ought to be* and *can be* by *what is*, necessarily engenders the malaise of spirit that is so evident in the world today; a pervading deep rooted conflict of mind and soul manifest even in our own country where, to a greater extent than ever before in history, a society has more nearly attained its apparent prime objective, the highest possible (measurable) standard of living. This serious unease of society in the face of imminent victory is itself occasion for doubt and inquiry as to both the direction of our lives and the appropriateness of the methods by which we are pursuing them.

In the demonstrations of his thesis Mr. Krutch adduces recent evidence brought forward by the scientists themselves (many of whom have been in the vanguard of relativism) which tends to show that there are "not just two classes of animal behavior (inborn and learned) but also a third—that which is not inborn though the ability to learn it easily is."

Some to whom these facts have come home have begun to wonder whether the same may not be true, not only of skills, but throughout the whole psychic realm of beliefs, tastes, and motives. The thesis of the moral relativists is—to take an extreme case—that since no one was born with the "innate idea" that dishonesty and treachery are evil, then the conviction that they are evil can be nothing but the result of social education. The opposite, so they say, could just as easily be taught. Value judgments are therefore merely the rationalized prej-

udices of a given culture. But, compare that reasoning with the insights of Mr. Krutch:

May not, in actual fact, the contrary be true, namely, that certain ideas are more easily learned than others; that what the eighteenth century called natural law, natural taste, and the rest is real and consists in those beliefs and tastes which are most readily learned and also most productive of health and happiness?

Perhaps you can condition an individual or a society to think and behave "unnaturally" just as you might possibly teach a robin to swim. But men who have been conditioned to think or behave unnaturally are as unhappy and as inefficient as swimming robins. . . .

The easy-going and slothful, those most readily gulled into acceptance of and comfort in that which is, in lieu of what ought to be are, sad to note, in the great majority. Being a part of the existing "is" by the strength of their numbers and their addiction to a predominately materialistic way of life, they add force to the dogma of the relativists and their allies that society's objectives, criteria, and ways of life are only "realistically" attainable and "reasonable" to the extent they are consonant with measurable, and readily acceptable, realities. They claim that innate and independent or semi-independent human nature, since it is not measurable, does not exist and is to be disregarded in the ordering of society. Nevertheless the common sense of mankind, no less than the demonstrations of Mr. Krutch, confirms one in the knowledge that reason is applicable to other than measurable phenomena and that belief in their reality is not necessarily mere superstition. The evidence, available to all who will examine it, as well as one's private knowledge, of the existence of human nature and of its independent reality and its force is too overwhelming for us to surrender to

those who insist upon planning and "conditioning" our lives as if such a human nature were not a reality, to the probable destruction of our humanity.

After devoting an active mind to Mr. Krutch's theme and variations surely only the most biased or obtuse can take serious issue with him when he writes:

It may be true that cultures exhibit such a bewildering variety of actions and attitudes as to give a superficial air of probability to the conclusion that all moral ideas and all ideas of what constitutes propriety are no more than what limitlessly variable custom has established. Yet men almost invariably believe that some beliefs and some customs are right. However diverse and irreconcilable specific moral judgments are and have been, moral judgment itself has been a constantly continuing activity of the human mind. What no society has ever been able to believe for long is precisely the doctrine which ours has embraced—namely, that morals are no more than mores.

Mr. Krutch's book is of especial interest and value to those who are engaged in re-interpreting and re-evaluating conservatism. Although the concept of individualism, the inviolable rights and responsibilities of each person, is one of the indisputable essentials of conservatism; it is becoming increasingly evident that another *sine qua non* of the underlying philosophy upon which conservatism must be based requires something more than attaching greater importance to the individual as a non-violable entity than relativism permits. Yet that something more entails difficulties for the unity of conservatives because it implies the religious principle, concerning the details of which mankind has as yet found it impossible to agree. Humanism, as it has been understood and misunderstood by those who have been attracted to it and

by those who have found it insufficient during the past several decades, has not usually been felt to be sufficiently concrete, religiously, to provide for a philosophy, otherwise therein lacking, the mysterious force of religion. Mr. Krutch, admitting that humanism as a label is not entirely satisfactory for his purposes, nevertheless chooses to use it to stand for the complex of attitudes, including an affirmation of the religious principle, which he has undertaken to defend.

In this sense a humanist is anyone who rejects the attempt to describe or account for man wholly on the basis of physics, chemistry, mechanics, and animal behavior. He is anyone who believes that will, reason, and purpose are real and significant; that value and justice are aspects of a reality called good and evil and rest upon some foundation other than custom; that consciousness is so far from being a mere epiphenomenon that it is the most tremendous of actualities; that the unmeasurable may be significant; or, to sum it all up, that those human realities which sometimes seem to exist only in the human mind are the perceptions, rather than merely the creations, of that mind. He is, in brief, anyone who says that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in the positivist philosophy.

This definition of humanism includes the religious principle without, however, raising the many attendant stubborn obstacles which a more detailed specification of religion would erect. And a religious foundation is necessary for the approach to the problems of society shared by Mr. Krutch and most of those who call themselves conservatives; a granitic base upon which more solidly to mount the protection of the integrity and welfare of the individual against the depredations of collectivism, no matter the variety of guise

in which it appears or the shifting strategy of its assaults.

By his definition of humanism Mr. Krutch has linked himself to a long chain of humanist-conservatives: with Irving Babbitt (much of whose core of belief in the necessary existence of standards and their primacy in any proper way of life is reaffirmed by Mr. Krutch); with the strongly religious-conservative John Henry Newman (who, in 1841, proclaimed that science cannot provide the solution to the education of the masses and who clearly saw it is a case of "let Benthamism reign, if men have no aspirations"); and with the conservative-liberal Edmund Burke (who knew that "natural law" with its consequent rights and duties of mankind is verified by man's aspirations, while the competing concept, then violently being agitated in France, the "natural rights of men," ends by equating the rights of men with mere gratification of their desires and the perpetuation of coercive conflict in that respect). Mr. Krutch, together with these men of the past and the thoughtful conservatives of today, believes that mankind is born, if not with aspirations, then at least with a disposition thereto and that while this disposition may be smothered by pandering to man's desires only, the disintegration of his humanity necessarily follows, no matter how high his material standard of living may be lifted in the process. In effect, Mr. Krutch purposefully goads us into yet another examination of the age-old question: What is mankind's standard by which to live in the course of realizing man's potential?

Were one not aware of the weaknesses and imperfections of human nature, it would be incomprehensible that so many have been induced to accept such concepts as the existence of the unmeasurable, capricious, semi-independent, and but re-

cently invented subconscious, while they giggle at the "credulous" who continue to proclaim the reality of a total human nature not solely dependent for its existence, perception, development, and power upon the relativistic and positivistic dogmas of measurability, absolute knowability, and the manipulability of men only by quantitative and like forces so determinable. Yet throughout recorded history, at least until recently, mankind has been vividly aware that the whole of human nature embraces not only man's animalistic desires and the challenges and imperatives of his position in a mysterious and not always tractable world, but also his more mature apprehensions of what, ultimately, he ought to be and would like to be. The aspirations of men, which are satisfied more by outgiving and quiet meditation than by intaking and feverish activity, are the source of our otherwise inexplicable dissatisfaction with the satisfactions of the world's most successful materialistic civilization, one which is, at the same time, more nearly completely democratic (superficially, at least) and egalitarian than any before it. It is primarily by the polarity of our aspirations that we may yet discover the true route to the best the universe holds for mankind. It is man's urgent task carefully to sift the content of his human nature to know the reality of his aspirations and to prevent them from becoming buried under the overlay of a disaster-bound way of life grounded upon the twin errors of individual irresponsibility and the primacy of materialistic goals.

This is the essence of *Human Nature and the Human Condition*: its theme of an innate independent or semi-independent human nature embracing both man's peculiar strength and weakness, its somber prophecy and its bright promise. It is a book that must not be ignored.

those who insist upon planning and "conditioning" our lives as if such a human nature were not a reality, to the probable destruction of our humanity.

After devoting an active mind to Mr. Krutch's theme and variations surely only the most biased or obtuse can take serious issue with him when he writes:

It may be true that cultures exhibit such a bewildering variety of actions and attitudes as to give a superficial air of probability to the conclusion that all moral ideas and all ideas of what constitutes propriety are no more than what limitlessly variable custom has established. Yet men almost invariably believe that some beliefs and some customs are right. However diverse and irreconcilable specific moral judgments are and have been, moral judgment itself has been a constantly continuing activity of the human mind. What no society has ever been able to believe for long is precisely the doctrine which ours has embraced—namely, that morals are no more than mores.

Mr. Krutch's book is of especial interest and value to those who are engaged in re-interpreting and re-evaluating conservatism. Although the concept of individualism, the inviolable rights and responsibilities of each person, is one of the indisputable essentials of conservatism; it is becoming increasingly evident that another *sine qua non* of the underlying philosophy upon which conservatism must be based requires something more than attaching greater importance to the individual as a non-violable entity than relativism permits. Yet that something more entails difficulties for the unity of conservatives because it implies the religious principle, concerning the details of which mankind has as yet found it impossible to agree. Humanism, as it has been understood and misunderstood by those who have been attracted to it and

by those who have found it insufficient during the past several decades, has not usually been felt to be sufficiently concrete, religiously, to provide for a philosophy, otherwise therein lacking, the mysterious force of religion. Mr. Krutch, admitting that humanism as a label is not entirely satisfactory for his purposes, nevertheless chooses to use it to stand for the complex of attitudes, including an affirmation of the religious principle, which he has undertaken to defend.

In this sense a humanist is anyone who rejects the attempt to describe or account for man wholly on the basis of physics, chemistry, mechanics, and animal behavior. He is anyone who believes that will, reason, and purpose are real and significant; that value and justice are aspects of a reality called good and evil and rest upon some foundation other than custom; that consciousness is so far from being a mere epiphenomenon that it is the most tremendous of actualities; that the unmeasurable may be significant; or, to sum it all up, that those human realities which sometimes seem to exist only in the human mind are the perceptions, rather than merely the creations, of that mind. He is, in brief, anyone who says that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in the positivist philosophy.

This definition of humanism includes the religious principle without, however, raising the many attendant stubborn obstacles which a more detailed specification of religion would erect. And a religious foundation is necessary for the approach to the problems of society shared by Mr. Krutch and most of those who call themselves conservatives; a granitic base upon which more solidly to mount the protection of the integrity and welfare of the individual against the depredations of collectivism, no matter the variety of guise

in which it appears or the shifting strategy of its assaults.

By his definition of humanism Mr. Krutch has linked himself to a long chain of humanist-conservatives: with Irving Babbitt (much of whose core of belief in the necessary existence of standards and their primacy in any proper way of life is reaffirmed by Mr. Krutch); with the strongly religious-conservative John Henry Newman (who, in 1841, proclaimed that science cannot provide the solution to the education of the masses and who clearly saw it is a case of "let Benthamism reign, if men have no aspirations"); and with the conservative-liberal Edmund Burke (who knew that "natural law" with its consequent rights and duties of mankind is verified by man's aspirations, while the competing concept, then violently being agitated in France, the "natural rights of men," ends by equating the rights of men with mere gratification of their desires and the perpetuation of coercive conflict in that respect). Mr. Krutch, together with these men of the past and the thoughtful conservatives of today, believes that mankind is born, if not with aspirations, then at least with a disposition thereto and that while this disposition may be smothered by pandering to man's desires only, the disintegration of his humanity necessarily follows, no matter how high his material standard of living may be lifted in the process. In effect, Mr. Krutch purposefully goads us into yet another examination of the age-old question: What is mankind's standard by which to live in the course of realizing man's potential?

Were one not aware of the weaknesses and imperfections of human nature, it would be incomprehensible that so many have been induced to accept such concepts as the existence of the unmeasurable, capricious, semi-independent, and but re-

cently invented subconscious, while they giggle at the "credulous" who continue to proclaim the reality of a total human nature not solely dependent for its existence, perception, development, and power upon the relativistic and positivistic dogmas of measurability, absolute knowability, and the manipulability of men only by quantitative and like forces so determinable. Yet throughout recorded history, at least until recently, mankind has been vividly aware that the whole of human nature embraces not only man's animalistic desires and the challenges and imperatives of his position in a mysterious and not always tractable world, but also his more mature apprehensions of what, ultimately, he ought to be and would like to be. The aspirations of men, which are satisfied more by outgiving and quiet meditation than by intaking and feverish activity, are the source of our otherwise inexplicable dissatisfaction with the satisfactions of the world's most successful materialistic civilization, one which is, at the same time, more nearly completely democratic (superficially, at least) and egalitarian than any before it. It is primarily by the polarity of our aspirations that we may yet discover the true route to the best the universe holds for mankind. It is man's urgent task carefully to sift the content of his human nature to know the reality of his aspirations and to prevent them from becoming buried under the overlay of a disaster-bound way of life grounded upon the twin errors of individual irresponsibility and the primacy of materialistic goals.

This is the essence of *Human Nature and the Human Condition*: its theme of an innate independent or semi-independent human nature embracing both man's peculiar strength and weakness, its somber prophecy and its bright promise. It is a book that must not be ignored.

The Burke Newsletter

EDITORS

Peter J. Stanlis, Department of English,
University of Detroit
C. P. Ives, *The Baltimore Sun*, Baltimore,
Maryland

EDITORIAL ADVISORS

Donald C. Bryant, Department of Speech,
University of Iowa
Thomas I. Cook, Department of Political
Science, Johns Hopkins University
Thomas W. Copeland, Department of Eng-
lish, University of Massachusetts
Ross J. S. Hoffman, Department of His-
tory, Fordham University
James T. Boulton, Department of English,
University of Nottingham, Nottingham,
England

General Announcements

THE MASTER LIST of persons interested in Burke studies has reached a total of 337 names and addresses; 239 in the United States, 69 in Britain, 11 in Canada and the Commonwealth, and 18 in seven European countries. Through an exchange arrangement with Professor James L. Clifford, Department of English, Columbia University, the 613 names and addresses

of subscribers to the *Johnsonian News Letter* have also been made available on a separate list. Even when duplications are omitted, these combined lists contain a hard core of over 900 scholars and interested lay readers, with a special concern for the historical events, the thought, the writings and persons of Burke and Johnson. Copies of both lists for delivery in the United States may be secured by sending fifteen cents in stamps to Peter J. Stanlis, Department of English, University of Detroit, Detroit, Michigan.

At the second annual meeting of the Johnsonian Society of the Great Lakes Region, held April 30 at John Carroll University, over 200 Johnsonians heard eight excellent lectures on various eighteenth century literary, historical and philosophical subjects. Burkeans should take note that this Johnsonian Society is not restricted to papers on Johnson; a panel of papers on Burke would be very much in order for the next annual meeting.

The highlight of the Johnsonian conference was Professor James Clifford's after dinner lecture, "Recent Trends in Eighteenth Century Scholarship." Respectful notice was given to Burke studies over the past two decades and those currently in progress.

At the end of the conference it was announced that for the third annual meeting, to be held on April 15, 1961, at Loyola University, Chicago, a debate has been arranged on the topic: "Resolved, that the politics of Samuel Johnson and of Edmund Burke are fundamentally different." Professor Donald Greene, University of New Mexico, will take the affirmative side, and Dr. Russell Kirk will argue the negative. Professor Greene's *The Politics of Samuel Johnson* (Yale University Press, 1960), presented a thesis flatly opposed to the central argument put forth by Dr. Kirk in his lecture at the first meeting of the Johnsonian Society. The debate calls for two thirty-minute papers, to be exchanged before the meeting for the writing of rebuttals, and after the reading of the rebuttals there will be cross-examinations, followed by questions from the floor. Midwesterners interested in attending this debate should write the secretary of the Johnsonian Society, Dr. Warren Fleischauer, Department of English, John Carroll University, Cleveland, Ohio.

Burke's Correspondence, Volume III

WORK ON *The Correspondence of Edmund Burke* has continued unabated throughout 1960. Early this year the publication by the University of Chicago Press of volume two, under Miss Sutherland's able editorship, was a great step forward toward having Burke's correspondence in definitive form. Dr. John A. Woods, editor of volume four, is getting on rapidly with his work at Sheffield. Professor Copeland reports that typescript for volume four should be ready to go to Cambridge in the fall of 1960. We will have a report on this volume by Dr. Woods in a later newsletter. Professor Furber, editor of volume five, wrote that he expected to be at work on Burke all summer.

Of more immediate interest is the forthcoming publication of the third volume of Burke's correspondence. Page proofs were returned in July, so that this book will come out late in 1960 or very early in 1961. The editor of this volume, George H. Guttridge, Sather Professor of History, University of California at Berkeley, has submitted the following account of the essential content of the third volume.

The third volume of *The Correspondence of Edmund Burke* contains letters from July 1774 to June 1778. It opens with a tentative suggestion that Burke might represent the city of Bristol in parliament; and this connection becomes a principal theme of the volume, closely related as it is to the developing crisis of the American Revolution. Over three hundred letters are included, half being printed for the first time. Of the two hundred and twenty-five written by Burke himself, sixty-two appeared in the edition of 1844, and another seventy-five have been printed elsewhere. At least a few important letters previously printed have had incorrect dates attributed to them, and have thus become a source of misunderstanding to scholars. Several letters written by members of Burke's family, or on his behalf, are included, and between sixty and seventy written to him. Of these the great majority have not been printed before. They have been selected for the light they throw on Burke's character and activities, and for their reference to his own letters. Often they refer to letters now known to be missing.

As in the previous volume, the correspondence is predominantly political. The importance of Burke's connection with the Marquess of Rockingham justifies the inclusion of nearly all of Rockingham's letters to him. These are taken from the great collections at the Central Library, Shef-

field, England. The publication of both sides of this correspondence makes it possible for the first time to examine minutely the subtle relationship between Burke and his aristocratic friend and patron. The Duke of Portland also appears frequently; his papers, including Burke's letters to him, are now accessible at the University of Nottingham. Burke's letters to William Baker can also be printed from the original manuscripts at Hertford. The Duke of Richmond and Charles Fox—a significant newcomer—are important correspondents; but relatively few of Burke's letters to them are available. Two exchanges which were prominent earlier—those with the New York Assembly and with Charles O'Hara—come to an end by the middle of this volume. On the other hand, Burke's connection with Bristol introduces a mass of new letters which shift the balance of the whole correspondence and give it a large measure of unity. As member of parliament for the great trading city he is besieged by demands concerning its commercial affairs and its intensely partisan politics. His election brings him new friendships, including one of the most intimate in his entire career—that with Richard Champion, the Quaker politician, merchant and manufacturer of Bristol porcelain. This exchange, more frequent than any other, survives in various manuscript sources, and is a notable addition to our knowledge of Burke in both his public and private life. It confirms, elaborates and occasionally re-adjusts the picture of his relations with his constituents at Bristol, beginning early in the volume and reaching sad disagreement before its close.

Although this volume throws much light on Burke's association with his Whig colleagues and his Bristol constituents, it adds little to our existing knowledge of his views on America. This may be somewhat sur-

prising, in light of the momentous sequence of events which produced the great speeches, the *Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol*, and the proposed address of 1777 to the king and to the colonists. There are a few details concerning the delivery of the speeches and the publication of the *Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol*; there are the reports which he sent to New York as Agent for that colony before war broke out; and there is an occasional reference in the later letters to O'Hara. But the main emphasis throughout is on the strategy and tactics of opposition. Moreover, in marked contrast to the second volume of his correspondence, there is hardly any discussion of East Indian business. There is the usual dearth of intimate private letters, resulting no doubt from his own destruction of such correspondence.

Nevertheless, in an occasional letter to Garrick, James Barry, or one of several scholars and writers, there are many revealing glimpses of character, temperament and broad interests. There are a few useful additions to our still incomplete knowledge of William Burke, and of the financial affairs of the whole family, including Richard's forlorn hopes of fortune, and Edmund's complicated Irish estate of Clogher. But the correspondence of these four years will probably be welcomed chiefly for the light it throws on Burke's relations with Rockingham, and with his constituents at Bristol, particularly with Richard Champion.

*Recent Ph.D. Theses,
Publications and Work in Progress*

MR. DANIEL L. MC CUE, Boston College, is writing a Ph.D. thesis at Columbia University, called "Pamphlet Replies to Burke's Reflections." Mr. Hildreth Kritzer, Long Island University, is writing a Ph.D. thesis at Brandeis, entitled "The Ethics of Rhetoric in Burke's Political Writings."

A thematic treatment of the same subject in eighteenth century English thought is being written by Paul Fussell, Jr., of Rutgers, "Rhetoric and Ethics in Pope, Swift, Johnson, Burke and Gibbon." Mr. George C. McElroy is writing "Burke's concern with India" for a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Chicago. Professor Ernest Tuveson, Department of English, University of California at Berkeley, is currently at work on Burke's aesthetic theory. Mr. Paul J. Edmunds has recently completed a Ph.D. thesis at Wisconsin, "The Political Pamphlets of Edmund Burke." (See *Dissertation Abstracts*, XX, 660-661).

Among recently published works of interest are John Brooke's "Burke in the 1760's," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, LVIII, 548-555, and James F. Davidson's "Natural Law and International Law in Edmund Burke," *Review of Politics*, XXI, 483-494. S. F. Johnson has a chapter called "Hardy and Burke's 'Sublime,'" in *Style in Prose Fiction* (16), pp. 55-86. Professor Walter D. Love has published "New Studies of Edmund Burke," *Emory University Quarterly*, XV, pp. 96-109. Mr. Stanley D. Rose has published two analytical book reviews; one on *The Correspondence of Edmund Burke*, Vol. I, and the other on *A Philosophical Enquiry into . . . the Sublime and Beautiful*, edited by J. T. Boulton. These appeared in *The Catholic University of America Law Review*, IX (May, 1960), pp. 112-119.

Professor Peter T. Underdown, Worcester Training College, Worcester, England, wrote "Edmund Burke as Member of Parliament for Bristol, 1774-1780," as a Ph.D. thesis at London University (1954). Since then he has published "Henry Cruger and Edmund Burke: Colleagues and Rivals at the Bristol Election of 1774," *William and Mary Quarterly*, XV (Jan., 1958), pp. 14-34. In this article the speech of Cruger and Burke is

compared. Professor Underdown has also published "Edmund Burke, the Commissioner of his Bristol Constituents, 1774-1780," *The English Historical Review*, LXXIII (April, 1958), pp. 252-69; "Religious Opposition to Licensing the Bristol and Birmingham Theatres," in *The University of Birmingham Historical Journal*, VI, (1958), pp. 149-60; "Burke's Bristol Friends," in *The Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological Society for 1958* (Vol. 77), pp. 127-50. Professor Underdown is interested chiefly in the political activities of Burke, especially as M.P. for Bristol. We are pleased to have his note on Wesley R. Savadge's B.Litt thesis at Oxford in 1951: "It was mainly economic theory, but contained a good deal on Burke. Title: 'The West Country and the American Mainland Colonies, 1763-83,' with special reference to the Merchants of Bristol."

Professor A. Goodwin, Department of History, The University, Manchester, England, directed a recent Ph.D. dissertation by Miss L.R.Q. Henriques, "Some Aspects of the Theory and Practice of Religious Toleration in England: 1787-1833" (1959). Chapter III is a study of Burke's theory of religious toleration, based on his published writings and the Wentworth Woodhouse collection of Burke manuscripts. Professor Goodwin teaches a third-year honors history special subject on "Reform and Revolution in England, 1784-1799," for which Burke's pamphlets on the French Revolution are set texts. He is mainly interested in Burke's activities within the Whig Party at the time of the French Revolution.

At Sheffield this summer Dr. Woods and Miss Sutherland pretty much completed their study of William Burke's finances. Dr. C. P. Courtney, who finished his Ph.D. dissertation on "Burke and Montesquieu," (Oxford, 1960), is now on the Sheffield

University faculty, in the Department of French, and is working on Burke's connections with French *émigrés*.

The first number of *P A N L* (March, 1960), a newsletter on British public address, edited by Donald C. Bryant, devoted pages 4-5 to bibliographical matters on Burke. An item of interest related to Burke is Peter D. G. Thomas' "The Beginning of Parliamentary Reporting in Newspapers, 1768-1774," *English Historical Review*, LXXIV, 623-636. This account broadens the earlier treatment of Aspinall and Hoover. Sometimes reporting was so poor that it expressed views the opposite of what was spoken by members, as Burke had occasion to complain in February, 1771.

A New Burke Anthology

A NEW TEXTBOOK anthology of approximately 300 pages, *The Philosophy of Ed-*

mund Burke (under \$3.00), will be published this fall in a paperback printing, a season ahead of the trade printing, by the University of Michigan Press. Joint editors of this worthy enterprise are Professors Louis I. Bredvold and Ralph G. Ross. The anthology will include extensive passages from Burke's speeches, writings and correspondence that represent Burke's essential views on such important subjects as "Theory of Law and Legislation," "Prudence as a Political Virtue," "Government and Human Nature," "Reform and Tradition," "Tradition in the English Establishment," "Jacobinism," and "Aesthetics." The anthology will provide introductory material, notes, and a list of suggested readings. This anthology is pitched at the upper-division and graduate-student level, and will be a welcome text to teachers of seminars in eighteenth century English thought.

ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MONEY QUESTION

THE STRUGGLE FOR WORLD POWER by George Knupffer \$2.50

A penetrating search into the real nature of Communism and its sub-rosa relationship with international Capitalism.

CITADELS OF CHAOS by Cornelius C. Veith \$2.50

A well documented summary of the financial workings which determine the destiny of nations. A stimulating book for Americans who want to make sense out of the present chaotic world condition.

ECONOMIC TRIBULATION by Vincent C. Vickers (American Reprint) \$2.00

Sincerity and knowledge characterize this brief book, which plainly defines the faults of the financial system, and the need for a new economic outlook.

MASS PRODUCTION AND MONEY by Whitney H. Slocomb 2 Vol. \$15.00

An exhaustive and scientific study of the economic system of the United States.

Order from:

OMNI PUBLICATIONS

P.O. Box 216 Hawthorne, Calif.

Write for free brochure listing other informative titles dealing with the money question.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

John Chamberlain, an editor of *National Review*, is a recognized authority on conservatism. He also contributes frequently to the *Wall Street Journal*.

Frank S. Meyer's new book *Liberalism and the New Conservatism* will be published next spring. His article in this issue will be further developed and published as a pamphlet by the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists.

M. Stanton Evans, editor of *The Indianapolis News*, won a Freedom Foundation Award for editorial writing in 1959.

George Schwartz of *The Sunday Times*, London, is a well-known economist and writer. *James Burnham* is the well-known author of *Managerial Revolution*, *Congress and the American Tradition* (Regnery, 1959), and other works.

Rudolf Allers, Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University, is one of the most widely-read of American psychologists.

Folke Leander is author, lecturer, and Professor of Philosophy in Norrköping, Sweden.

J. V. Langmead Casserley, Professor of Apologetics at Seabury-Western Seminary, is author of several books dealing with theological, philosophical, and sociological subjects. He also is a Fellow of King's College, London.

Eliseo Vivas, Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University, is author of the recently published book *D. H. Lawrence: The Triumph and Failure of Art* (Northwestern University Press, 1960). He is also an associate editor of *MODERN AGE*.

Our book reviews are contributed by *William H. Chamberlin*, author of *The Evolution of a Conservative* (Regnery, 1959); *Melchior Palyi*, Professor Emeritus, University of Berlin, and author of *Managed Money at the Crossroads* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1958); *Warner G. Rice* of the Department of English, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; *Robert Y. Drake, Jr.* of Northwestern University; *Thomas Molnar* of Brooklyn College; and *Dean Terrill*, retired Vice-President and General Counsel of Kerr-McGee Oil Corporation and also a director of the Institute for Philosophical and Historical Studies.

FOUNDATION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SERIES

No. 1

***Globe and Hemisphere* — LATIN AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE POSTWAR
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
by J. Fred Rippy**

Professor of History at the University of Chicago

An analysis of inter-American economic relations since the war and a plea for a return to the spirit of Pan-American solidarity. \$6.00

No. 2

***Massive Retaliation* — THE POLICY AND ITS CRITICS
by Paul L. Peeters**

Professor of Political Science at Iona College

An explanation of Massive Retaliation and its application, in terms of practical action, in United States foreign policy since its formulation by the late John Foster Dulles. \$5.00

No. 3

***Peaceful Co-Existence* — AN ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
by Wladyslaw W. Kulski**

*Professor on International Relations at the Maxwell Graduate
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University*

A study of Soviet foreign policy since the Revolution in which Professor Kulski, former Polish Minister to London, examines the possibility of peaceful co-existence. \$12.50



published by Henry Regnery Company in cooperation with
FOUNDATION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INC.
64 East Jackson Boulevard Chicago 4, Illinois



unlike any other...

NATIONAL REVIEW is distinctive, unique.

There is no other magazine quite like it (just as there is no other fortnightly journal of conservative opinion). Thousands of thoughtful Americans, having read a copy, would not be without it. We invite you, if you have not done so already, to see for yourself. It will cost you nothing: merely write to Dept. MA, NATIONAL REVIEW, 150 East 35th Street, New York 16, New York, and a complimentary copy will be sent you by return mail. In return, we ask one thing — that you write for your copy today. "National Review continues to interest, amuse, and anger me and what more can I ask of a magazine? I don't get this reaction from any other journal these days." *Prof. Clinton Rossiter, Cornell University Project Director, Fund for the Republic.*

3 good books for serious reading . . .

A HUMANE ECONOMY

the Social Framework of the
Free Market

by Wilhelm Röpke

A new book by one of the leading free-market economists of the world. Röpke brings the logic of economic theory to bear on such problems as inflation, the welfare state, planning, and the undeveloped countries.

\$5.00

" . . . this is an able, hard-hitting and well written account of the century-old conflict between mass society and humanist culture . . . a challenging manifesto of economic liberalism based on the hard currency of individual freedom."

Maurice Feldman
Saturday Review

IMPACT

Essays on ignorance and
the decline of
American civilization

by Ezra Pound

In this collection of essays, "gists" and letters written during the last 40 years, Pound drives home with all his tremendous talent the concept that his fellow Americans have "lost or mislaid the HABIT of thinking of things in general as set in an orderly universe."

\$4.00

"At worst, Pound stimulates; at best, he points our way to the sources of wisdom."

Russell Kirk

FREEDOM and FEDERALISM

by Felix Morley

A political philosopher is convinced Freedom is our most precious possession . . . and that Federalism is the best method of securing it!

\$5.00

"Mr. Morley's exposition of federalism and democracy is a notable contribution to political science and indeed to jurisprudence."

Roscoe Pound

"As a retired naval officer, I commend this book . . . The study of our government structure (should be) their first order of business."

Admiral Ben Morell

at all
bookstores



Henry REGNERY Company
CHICAGO 4, ILLINOIS

1003

1

—

.

s

k

—

n

at

!

0

d

i-

d

is

c-

,"

ell

Index to Volume 4

Page numbering for Volume 4:

Winter 1959-1960 (1 - 112); Spring 1960 (113 - 224);
Summer 1960 (225 - 336); Fall 1960 (337 - 448).

A

Adenwalla, Minoo, "Gandhi and Indian Nationalism Reappraised," p. 69.

Allers, Rudolf, "Some Reflections on the Problem of Universal Style," p. 387.

"Anti-Intellectualism of Contemporary Architecture, The," James Brophy, p. 255.

Artemiev, Vyascheslav, "The Salvo" (story), p. 243.

Auerbach, M. Morton, *The Conservative Illusion*, reviewed by Richard M. Weaver, p. 316.

B

Barnes, Harry Elmer, reviewer, *Roosevelt's Road to Russia*, George N. Crocker, p. 201.

Beum, Robert, *Orpheus and Other Poems*, reviewed by Nicholas Joost, p. 210.

Bradley, Philip D., *The Public Stake in Union Power*, reviewed by Melchior Palyi, p. 420.

Brophy, James, "The Anti-Intellectualism of Contemporary Architecture," p. 255.

Buckley, William F. Jr., *Up from Liberalism*, reviewed by Stanley Parry, p. 306.

Burnham, James, *Congress and the American*

Tradition, reviewed by Francis Graham Wilson, p. 205.

"Burke Newsletter, The," p. 104; p. 216; p. 329; p. 438.

Burnham, James, "The Circular Travels of the Professors," p. 380.

Burton, William L., "The Conservatism of William Graham Sumner," p. 45.

"Business and the Plural Society," Theodore Levitt, p. 173.

C

Carson, Clarence B., "The Concept of Democracy and John Dewey," p. 180.

Carter, Thomas H., reviewer, *The Southern Heritage*, James McBride Dabbs, p. 91.

Casserley, J. V. Langmead, "Personality in Psychology and Metaphysics," p. 405.

"Challenge of the Sixties, The," George Romney, p. 229.

Chamberlain, John, "The End of the Old Education," p. 343.

Chamberlain, John, "William Graham Sumner and the Old Republic," p. 52.

Chamberlin, William H., reviewer of *The Constitution of Liberty*, by Friedrich A. Hayek, p. 416.

Chamberlin, William Henry, *The Evolution of a Conservative*, reviewed by C. P. Ives, p. 97.

Chay, Marie, "Piedmont Every Friday" (story), p. 167.

"Circular Travels of the Professors, The" by James Burnham, p. 380.

Clapp, Harold L., "Scattershot Scholarship," p. 30.

Colegrove, Kenneth, "Compromise Politics and International Relations," p. 22.

Collier, David S., "Introducing Eugene Davidson," p. 338.

Colwell, C. Carter, reviewer, *The Vision of Tragedy*, Richard Benson Sewall, p. 326.

"Compromise Politics and International Relations," Kenneth Colegrove, p. 22.

"Concept of Democracy and John Dewey, The," Clarence B. Carson, p. 180.

Congress and the American Tradition, James Burnham, reviewed by Francis Graham Wilson, p. 205.

"Conservatism and a Philosophy of Personality," Donald A. Zoll, p. 160.

"Coolidge's Vermont: Plymouth Notch in an Off-season," Francis Russell, p. 63.

"Conservatism of William Graham Sumner, The," William L. Burton, p. 45.

"Conservative Case for Freedom, A" by M. Stanton Evans, p. 364.

Cottrell, Alvin J., (co-author) *Protracted Conflict*, reviewed by J. Daniel Mahoney, p. 188.

"Crack-Up of American Optimism: Vachel Lindsay, The Dante of the Fundamentalists, The," Peter Viereck, p. 269.

"Critical Process of Conservatism, The," Dean Terrill, p. 286.

Crocker, George N., *Roosevelt's Road to Russia*, reviewed by Harry Elmer Barnes, p. 201.

D

Dakin, Arthur Hazard, *Paul Elmer More*, reviewed by Warner G. Rice, p. 424.

Dabbs, James McBride, *The Southern Heritage*, reviewed by Thomas H. Carter, p. 91.

Davidson, Eugene, "A Look at East Germany" (editorial), p. 340.

Dougherty, James E., *Protracted Conflict*, reviewed by J. Daniel Mahoney, p. 188.

Drake, Robert Y. Jr., reviewer of *The Violent Bear It Away*, by Flannery O'Connor, p. 428.

E

"Election Sermon: Sample and Symbol, The," Stewart M. Robinson, p. 292.

"End of the Old Education, The" by John Chamberlain, p. 343.

Evans, M. Stanton, "A Conservative Case for Freedom," p. 364.

F

"Flower Turned Lady, The," (poem), John Moffitt, p. 145.

"Freedom, Tradition, Conservatism," by Frank S. Meyer, p. 355.

"Future of Britain, The" by George Schwartz, p. 371.

G

"Gandhi and Indian Nationalism Reappraised," Minoo Adenwalla, p. 69.

"Gandhi and Indian Nationalism: Two Rejoinders," Pyarelal and Ramashray Roy, p. 302.

"Gold Standard and Its Significance, The," Walter E. Spahr, p. 297.

Gordon, Rosalie M., *Nine Men Against America*, reviewed by C. P. Ives, p. 87.

H

Hayek, Friedrich A., *The Constitution of Liberty*, reviewed by William H. Chamberlin, p. 416.

Hazo, Samuel, "Whatever Made Tertullian Rave" (poem), p. 268.

Hindus, Milton, reviewer, *I Remember: Sketch for an Autobiography*, Boris Pasternak, and *The Chains of Fear*, N. Narokov, p. 194.

Hocking, William Ernest, "The International Role of Art in Revolutionary Times," p. 129.

Human Nature and the Human Condition, by Joseph Wood Krutch, reviewed by Dean Terrill, p. 434.

I

"Idiot Factory, The" (story), Willard Marsh, p. 41.

"In Defense of Non-Objective Art," by Eliseo Vivas, p. 412.

"International Role of Art in Revolutionary Times, The," William Ernest Hocking, p. 129.

"Introducing Eugene Davidson," by David S. Collier, p. 338.

I Remember: Sketch for an Autobiography, Boris Pasternak, reviewed by Milton Hindus, p. 194.

"Irving Babbitt and the Aestheticians," by Folke Leander, p. 395.

Ives, C. P., reviewer, *The Evolution of a Conservative*, William Henry Chamberlin, p. 97.

Ives, C. P., reviewer, *The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren*, Alpheus T. Mason, *Nine Men against America*, Rosalie M. Gordon, p. 87.

J

"Jefferson-Adams Letters as a Shrine and a Monument, The," Ezra Pound, p. 136.

"John Foster Dulles: The Man and His Work," Paul Peeters, p. 235.

Joost, Nicholas, reviewer, *Orpheus and Other Poems*, Robert Beum, *Two Laughters*, Joseph Joel Keith, and *This Narrow World*, John Moffitt, p. 210.

Jouvenel, Bertrand de, "A Place to Live In," p. 5.

K

Keith, Joseph Joel, *Two Laughters*, reviewed by Nicholas Joost, p. 210.

Kent, Diantha, Correspondence, p. 100.

Kerrigan, Anthony, "On the Road to Segovia and Back" (poem), p. 254.

Kilby, Clyde S., reviewer, *Religion and American Democracy*, Roy F. Nichols, *The Structure of Christian Ethics*, Joseph A. Sittler, p. 99.

Kolbe, Frank F., "Letter to an Unconvinced Friend," p. 146.

Kintner, William R., (co-author) *Protracted Conflict*, reviewed by J. Daniel Mahoney, p. 188.

Krutch, Joseph Wood, *Human Nature and the Human Condition*, reviewed by Dean Terrill, p. 434.

L

Leander, Folke, "Irving Babbitt and the Aestheticians," p. 395.

Leites, Nathan, *The Game of Politics in France*, reviewed by Thomas Molnar, p. 431.

"Letter to an Unconvinced Friend," Frank F. Kolbe, p. 146.

Levitt, Theodore, "Business and the Plural Society," p. 173.

L'Heureux, John, "Wind" (poem), p. 296.

Lindeman, Jack, "Restoration" (poem), p. 285.

"Look at East Germany, A" (editorial), by Eugene Davidson, p. 340.

M

Mahoney, J. Daniel, reviewer, *Protracted Conflict*, Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner, James E. Dougherty, Alvin J. Cottrell, p. 188.

Marsh, Willard, "The Idiot Factory" (story), p. 41.

Martinelli, Sheri, Correspondence, p. 335.

Mason, Alpheus T., *The Supreme Court from*

Taft to Warren, reviewed by C. P. Ives, p. 87.

Massive Retaliation, Paul L. Peeters, reviewed by J. Daniel Mahoney, p. 188.

Mellon, Stanley, *The Political Uses of History; A Study of Historians in the French Restoration*, reviewed by Robert A. Nisbet, p. 82.

Meriwether, Robert L. (ed.), *The Papers of John C. Calhoun, Volume I, 1801-1817*, reviewed by Felix Morley, p. 312.

Meyer, Frank S., "Freedom, Tradition, Conservatism," p. 355.

Miles, Stephen B., Correspondence, p. 335.

Moffitt, John, "The Flower Turned Lady" (poem), p. 145.

Moffitt, John, *This Narrow World*, reviewed by Nicholas Joost, p. 210.

Molnar, Thomas, reviewer of *On the Game of Politics in France*, by Nathan Leites, p. 431.

Morley, Felix, reviewer, *The Papers of John C. Calhoun, Vol. I, 1801-1817*, Robert L. Meriwether, editor, p. 312.

Mullendore, William C., "Our Tragic State of Confusion: A Diagnosis," p. 14.

N

Narokov, N., *The Chains of Fear*, reviewed by Milton Hindus, p. 194.

Nichols, Roy F., *Religion and American Democracy*, reviewed by Clyde S. Kilby, p. 99.

Niemeyer, Gerhart, "Risk or Betrayal? The Crossroads of Western Policy," p. 119.

Nine Men Against America, Rosalie M. Gordon, reviewed by C. P. Ives, p. 87.

Nisbet, Robert A., reviewer, *The Political Uses of History; A Study of Historians in the French Restoration*, Stanley Mellon, p. 82.

O

O'Connor, Flannery, *The Violent Bear It Away*, reviewed by Robert Y. Drake, Jr., p. 428.

Oedipus Plays of Sophocles, The, Paul Roche, translator, reviewed by Garry Wills, p. 324.

"Organized Heresy: Abstract Art in the United States, The," Geoffrey Wagner, p. 260.

"On the Road to Segovia and Back" (poem), Anthony Kerrigan, p. 254.

Orpheus and Other Poems, Robert Beum, reviewed by Nicholas Joost, p. 210.

"Our Tragic State of Confusion: A Diagnosis," William C. Mullendore, p. 14.

P

Palyi, Melchior, reviewer of *The Public Stake in Union Power*, by Philip D. Bradley, p. 420.

Parry, Stanley, reviewer, *Up From Liberalism*, William F. Buckley, Jr., p. 306.

Pasternak, Boris, *I Rember: Sketch for an Autobiography*, reviewed by Milton Hindus, p. 194.

Paul Elmer More, by Arthur Hazard Dakin, reviewed by Warner G. Rice, p. 424.

Peeters, Paul, "John Foster Dulles: The Man and His Work," p. 235.

Peeters, Paul L., *Massive Retaliation*, reviewed by J. Daniel Mahoney, p. 188.

"Personality in Psychology and Metaphysics," by J. V. Langmead Casserley, p. 405.

"Piedmont Every Friday" (story), Marie Chay, p. 167.

"Place to Live In, A," Bertrand de Jouvenel, p. 5.

Pound, Ezra, "The Jefferson-Adams Letters as a Shrine and a Monument," p. 136.

Protracted Conflict, Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner, James E. Dougherty and Alvin J. Cottrell, reviewed by J. Daniel Mahoney, p. 188.

R

Religion and American Democracy, Roy F. Nichols, reviewed by Clyde S. Kilby, p. 99.

"Restoration" (poem), Jack Lindemen, p. 285.

Rice, Warner G., reviewer of *Paul Elmer More*, by Arthur Hazard Dakin, p. 424.

"Risk or Betrayal? The Crossroads of Western Policy," Gerhart Niemeyer, p. 119.

Robinson, Stewart M., "The Election Sermon: Sample and Symbol," p. 292.

Roche, Paul, translator of *The Oedipus Plays of Sophocles*, reviewed by Garry Wills, p. 324.

Romney, George, "The Challenge of the Sixties," p. 229.

Roosevelt's Road to Russia, George N. Crocker, reviewed by Harry Elmer Barnes, p. 201.

Roy, Pyarelal and Ramashray, "Gandhi and Indian Nationalism: Two Rejoinders," p. 302.

Russell, Edward W., Correspondence, p. 334.

Russell, Francis, "Coolidge's Vermont: Plymouth Notch in an Off-season," p. 63.

S

"Salvo, The" (story), Vyascheslav Artemiev, p. 243.

"Scattershot Scholarship," Harold L. Clapp, p. 30.

Schall, James V., "Theory in American Politics," p. 150.

Schwartz, George, "The Future of Britain," p. 371.

"Scrub Oak: Montauk Point" (poem), Felix Stefanile, p. 40.

Sewall, Richard Benson, *The Vision of Tragedy*, reviewed by C. Carter Colwell, p. 326.

Sittler, Joseph A., *The Structure of Christian Ethics*, reviewed by Clyde S. Kilby, p. 99.

Smith, Larry, Correspondence, p. 334.

"Some Reflections on the Problem of Universal Style," by Rudolf Allers, p. 387.

Spahr, Walter E., "The Gold Standard and Its Significance," p. 297.

Strausz-Hupé, Robert, (co-author) *Protracted Conflict*, reviewed by J. Daniel Mahoney, p. 188.

Stefanile, Felix, "Scrub Oak: Montauk Point" (poem), p. 40.

Stewart, Randall, reviewer, *William Faulkner: From Jefferson to the World*, Hyatt H. Waggoner, p. 321.

T

Terrill, Dean, "The Critical Process of Conservatism," p. 286.

Terrill, Dean, reviewer of *Human Nature and the Human Condition*, by Joseph Wood Krutch, p. 434.

Terrill, Dean, reviewer, *The Thirteenth Apostle*, Eugene Vale, p. 102.

The Chains of Fear, N. Narokov, reviewed by Milton Hindus, p. 194.

The Conservative Illusion, M. Morton Auerbach, reviewed by Richard M. Weaver, p. 316.

The Constitution of Liberty, by Friedrich A. Hayek, reviewed by William H. Chamberlin, p. 416.

The Evolution of a Conservative, William Henry Chamberlin, reviewed by C. P. Ives, p. 97.

The Game of Politics in France, by Nathan Leites, reviewed by Thomas Molnar, p. 431.

The Papers of John C. Calhoun, Vol. I, 1801-1817, Robert L. Meriwether, editor, reviewed by Felix Morley, p. 312.

The Political Uses of History; A Study of Historians in the French Restoration, reviewed by Robert A. Nisbet, p. 82.

The Public Stake in Union Power, by Philip D. Bradley, reviewed by Melchior Palyi, p. 420.

The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren, Alpheus T. Mason, reviewed by C. P. Ives, p. 87.

The Southern Heritage, James McBride Dabbs, reviewed by Thomas H. Carter, p. 91.

The Structure of Christian Ethics, Joseph A. Sittler, reviewed by Clyde S. Kilby, p. 99.

The Thirteenth Apostle, Eugene Vale, reviewed by Dean Terrill, p. 102.

The Violent Bear It Away, by Flannery O'Connor, reviewed by Robert Y. Drake, Jr., p. 428.

"Theory in American Politics," James V. Schall, p. 150.

"This and Other Issues" (editorial), p. 2; p. 114; p. 226.

This Narrow World, John Moffitt, reviewed by Nicholas Joost, p. 210.

Tonsor, Stephen, Correspondence, p. 109.
Two Laughters, Joseph Joel Keith, reviewed
by Nicholas Joost, p. 210.

U

Up From Liberalism, William F. Buckley, Jr.,
reviewed by Stanley Parry, p. 306.

V

Vale, Eugene, *The Thirteenth Apostle*, reviewed
by Dean Terrill, p. 102.

Viereck, Peter, "The Crack-Up of American
Optimism: Vachel Lindsay, The Dante of the
Fundamentalists," p. 269.

Vision of Tragedy, The, Richard Benson
Sewall, reviewed by C. Carter Colwell, p. 326.

Vivas, Eliseo, "In Defense of Non-Objective
Art," p. 412.

W

Wagner, Geoffrey, "The Organized Heresy:

Abstract Art in the United States," p. 260.

Waggoner, Hyatt H., *William Faulkner: From
Jefferson to the World*, reviewed by Randall
Stewart, p. 321.

Weaver, Richard M., reviewer, *The Conserva-
tive Illusion*, M. Morton Auerbach, p. 316.

"Whatever Made Tertullian Rave" (poem),
Samuel Hazo, p. 268.

*William Faulkner: From Jefferson to the
World*, Hyatt H. Waggoner, reviewed by Randall
Stewart, p. 321.

"William Graham Sumner and the Old Repub-
lic," John Chamberlain, p. 52.

Wills, Garry, reviewer, *The Oedipus Plays of
Sophocles*, Paul Roche, translator, p. 324.

Wilson, Francis Graham, reviewer, *Congress
and the American Tradition*, James Burnham, p.
205.

"Wind" (poem), John L'Heureux, p. 296.

Z

Zoll, Donald A., "Conservatism and a Phi-
losophy of Personality," p. 160.

